ARR 435-436

CCAR RESPONSA

American Reform Responsa

139. Marriage of a Cohen to a Divorcee Prohibited

(Vol. LIII, 1943, pp. 85-86)QUESTION: There is a problem which I am trying to help a young couple solve. The young woman is a divorcee; the boy is a Cohen. The man’s father objects to the marriage. I wonder: Is there any argument, based on Jewish law, which I can use with the father to keep him from making his son’s life miserable because of this marriage?ANSWER: The status of the modern Cohen has long been questioned by leading authorities in Jewish law. As early as the 14th century, Isaac ben Sheshet differentiated between the ancient Priest and the modern Cohen in no uncertain terms. He contended that the Cohen of his time, lacking any documentary evidence of his rightful claim to the priestly title, owed his special privileges and obligations, not to the express mandate of the law, but rather to the force of custom or common usage: “Kol sheken kohanim shebedorenu she-ein lahem ketav hayachas ela mipenei chezkatan nahagu hayom likro rishon baTorah. Kohen afilu am ha-arets lifnei chacham gadol shebeYisra-el” (Sefer Bar Sheshet, Responsum 94, Lemberg, 1805). Solomon Luria, the well-known 16th century authority, states it categorically that because of the frequent persecutions and expulsions of the Jews, the original priestly families, in most instances, failed to preserve the purity of their descent: “Uva-avonoteinu, merov arichut hagalut, gezerot vegerushim, nitbalbelu. Vehalevai shelo yehe nitbalbel zera kodesh bechol, aval zera kohanim uleviyim karov levadai shenitbalbelu, ve-im lo kulo, harov nitbalbel” (Yam Shel Shelomo, B.K., ch. 5, sec. 35). Likewise, the author of the Magen Avraham assumes the impurity of the modern Cohen’s descent when he seeks to account for the doubtful status accorded him in the law: “She-ein machazikin oto kechohen vadai dedilema nitchalela achat me-imotav” (Magen Avraham, Orach Chayim, Hil. Pesach, sec. 457). Jacob Emden was so impressed with the questionable character of the Cohen’s claims that, while hesitating to invoke the power of the law, he urged upon the Cohen the wisdom to refund the sum given him for the redemption of the first-born, and thus preserve his own moral integrity. Since he could not be sure of his priestly origin, Emden declared, the Cohen, in keeping the redemption fee, ran the risk of pocketing money to which he had no legal claim: “Nir-eh she-ein kohen yafeh lehafkia mamon bechezkato hageru-a. Vechim-at she-ani omer demidina tserichin lehachzir, ulefachot kol kohen yachush la-atsmo lifrosh misafek gadol shema eino kohen” (She-elot Ya-avets, part I, Responsum 155). When, therefore, Reform Judaism chose to ignore the nominal distinction between the ordinary Israelite and the Cohen–a distinction which has persisted to this very day–it did not so much depart from tradition as it did display the resolute will to surrender a notion the validity of which eminent Rabbinic authorities had repeatedly called in question.Israel Bettan

If needed, please consult Abbreviations used in CCAR Responsa.