CCAR RESPONSA
American Reform Responsa
161. Divorce (Get)
(Vol. LVI, 1946, pp. 123-125)QUESTION: Some time ago, I officiated at the wedding of a young woman of Orthodox background. She had previously been divorced and had been extremely eager to secure a religious divorce from her former husband. However, he put all sorts of humiliating obstacles in the path of this woman, so that it was necessary to be married without this religious divorce. She felt very badly about it, and so did her new husband. I suggested to…that in cases where it is almost impossible to secure a divorce because of the obstinacy of a spouse, the Conference issue a unilateral divorce. This divorce would say that, inasmuch as a civil divorce had been granted, we recognize the religious right of the party to remarry. I feel that this would be of great psychological value to many people. It would solve the problem of large numbers who are now encountering difficulty in remarrying because of the lack of cooperation of their former spouses… I might add that my proposal does not pretend to give any religious authority to the divorce, but is rather a device whereby we give sanction for remarriage to people who may, because of their inability to secure a Get, feel that their remarriage is not quite according to correct procedure. ANSWER: The proposal herein set forth, while somewhat startling, contemplates no revolutionary change in our attitude. The correspondent reaffirms his belief in the adequacy of the civil decree, and disavows any desire to restore to the religious bill of divorcement its former character and status. He would merely invest the Conference with the power to issue, in special cases a document similar to the Get only as a “device” to foil the willful husband who refuses to comply with the Orthodox requirement, and thus embarrasses his scrupulous former mate. It is worthy of note that the divorcee in question, though eager to obtain a religious divorce, does not seem to regard its absence as a serious obstacle to her remarriage. Reared amidst Orthodox surroundings, she is conscious of an unfulfilled requirement and betrays a measure of mental disturbance. The suggested “device,” in the judgment of the correspondent would tend to ease her perturbed mind. We are dealing here, then, not with a question of law, but with a question of policy. Shall we as a religious body that has abandoned a given practice on principle (see CCAR Yearbook, vol. 39, p. 43), deliberately resolve to restore it, not as a discipline in our lives, but as a possible palliative for the none-too-poignant scruples of certain divorcees who still cherish a superficial attachment for Orthodox practices? The question, so put, can therefore have but one answer. Nor, as a matter of policy, is the suggested step free from unpleasant complications. It is necessary to remember that the leaders of Orthodoxy insist, as is their right, that the civil decree, though binding, must be validated by a supplementary religious divorce, if the remarriage of either party is to be within the law. To be sure, we are not bound by this insistence. We are at liberty to dispense with this provision of the law. Yet, were we to adopt the proposal of the correspondent and proceed to issue this sort of “indulgence” to all comers, as a salve to their tender consciences, we would justly be condemned for the unwarranted attempt to interfere with the proper enforcement of an Orthodox discipline. The proposal is neither sound in principle nor safe in practice and cannot receive the endorsement of the Committee.Israel Bettan
If needed, please consult Abbreviations used in CCAR Responsa.