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CCAR RESPONSA

American Reform Responsa

164. Validity of Rabbinical Opinions

(Vol. XLII, 1932, pp. 82-84)QUESTION: Is it true that a first opinion is legally and ethically binding on the one who asks a rabbinic authority? In other words, is there no appeal to one of equal or superior standing?ANSWER: Your question would require a lengthy and elaborate discussion into which I cannot enter now, but may do so at some future time. For the present, I will only briefly state that to a certain degree the first opinion given by any rabbinical authority is ethically binding upon the one who consulted the rabbinical authority. For if he had no confidence in his rabbi, he should not have turned to him with his question. The Talmudic ethical rule is as follows: A person who received from the rabbi an opinion that a certain thing or act is forbidden should not go around to other rabbis seeking to find one who would permit it. But if he does receive two conflicting opinions–one declaring it prohibited and the other permitted–he should follow the opinion of the teacher who is older in years and greater in knowledge and wisdom. If they be equal, then if the question involves merely rabbinical decrees, he may follow the more lenient decision (Avoda Zara 7a). Likewise, one rabbi should not lightly declare permitted what his colleague prohibited or vice versa (Berachot 63b, Nidda 20b). But when he feels confident that his own contrary opinion is correct–especially when he believes himself to be in possession of better information, a reliable tradition, or an established precedent in support of his opinion–he may render an opinion contrary to that of his colleague (Chulin 49a). All this is only from the ethical standpoint, or, if you wish, from the standpoint of professional ethics among the rabbis in questions that are matters of opinion. Legally, however, the first opinion or decision given by any authority is not binding on anyone, if other authorities disagree on the basis of what they consider a more correct interpretation of the law. In Temple times there was a final appeal to the highest court in Jerusalem (Mishna, Sanhedrin 11.2; Tosefta, Sanhedrin 7.1). After the Temple was destroyed, there was no authoritatively established “highest court” in Jewish law. Hence, we cannot speak of “appeal.” But a person who has some reason to think that a decision rendered by any rabbi is not correct, may present the case before another authority who might prove–on the basis of reliable authorities and correct interpretation of the statutes–that the former decision is wrong. In that case the previous decision is, of course, void. In some instances, depending on the nature of the mistake involved and on the official standing of the one who made it, the first authority who gave the wrong decision may even be liable to pay damages caused by his decision.Jacob Z. LauterbachSee also:Introduction to this volume.S.B. Freehof, “Introduction,” Reform Responsa, pp. 3ff.Rabbinic Authority, New York: CCAR Press, 1982.

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