CCAR RESPONSA
Contemporary American Reform Responsa
63. Concealing Jewish
Identity*
QUESTION: Is it permissible to deny our identity as Jews if we
find ourselves in a life threatening situation caused by terrorists? This question has been prompted by the events surrounding the hijacking of the Achille Lauro by terrorists. What should we do if we find ourselves in such a situation? Should we instruct our children to conceal their Jewish identity under such circumstances? (Rabbi S. Priesand, Tinton Falls, NJ)
ANSWER: It is a clear statement of Jewish tradition that one must give up one’s
life rather than violate three prohibitions. They are idolatry, incest and killing another person (San. 60b ff; A. Z. 43b, 54a; Ket. 33b; Shab. 149a; Sefer Hazmitvot Lo Ta-aseh #2 ff, 10 and 14; Shulhan Arukh Yoreh Deah 157.1). Unfortunately, this question has arisen many times, and there is considerable literature on the subject. Frequently in the Middle Ages Jews were threatened with death unless they accepted Christianity or Islam. (A good summary of the literature is provided by H. J. Zimmel’s Die Marranen in der Rabbinischen Literatur). Many from the time of the Crusaders onward became martyrs under those circumstances. Others simulated an acceptance of Christianity or Islam while they privately remained Jews and escaped when that possibility arose (W. Jacob, “Status of Children,” American Reform Responsa, #145). Such individuals who publicly proclaimed another religion, but privately remained Jews, were to be considered Jews in most ways even though lehat-hilah, another course of action was mandated (Shulhan Arukh Yoreh Deah 119.12; Orah Hayim 128.37; Even Haezer 42.5). These were the decisions of the Shulhan Arukh Earlier opinions varied according to: (a) the danger presented by such apostasy to the Jewish community; (b) the conditions under which they returned to Judaism, as I have discussed in the responsum cited above.
Maimonides prohibited a feigned acceptance of another
religion in accordance with the Talmud; no Jew was to abandon his religion for another religion (Sefer Hamitzvot, Ta-aseh 9), as did Caro (Shulhan Arukh Yoreh Deah 157.1). The Shulhan Arukh had also stipulated very clearly that even at the risk of death, one can not declare, “I am not a Jew” (Yoreh Deah 157.2). The question of permitting apostasy was faced by Ephraim Oshry (Responsa Mema-amakim 13) and others during the Holocaust. And he answered it negatively, and stated that a Jew may not save himself through the purchase of a forged baptismal certificate, and thereby, try to join the partisans in the forest. However, there is also another line of thought which states that if the Jew is able to provide an ambiguous answer, which does not require an outright declaration that he is a Christian, such a declaration is considered acceptable (Isserles to Shulhan Arukh Yoreh Deah 157.2, in accord with Nimukei Yosef).
There were also instances, particularly in the
medieval period, in which Jews wore Christian garb to save themselves. The surrounding world considered them to be Christians, and asked no questions. This, too, won the approval of the Shulhan Arukh (Yoreh Deah 157.2), although Maimonides disagreed (Sefer Mitzvot- Lo Ta-aseh #30).
For Oshry during the Holocaust there was a difference
between following a path which had the appearance of permanently abandoning Judaism, like using a baptismal certificate which he prohibited, and on the other hand using a forged Christian passport, a temporary measure, which he permitted. Similarly, he allowed an individual with a non-Jewish name to enter the letters R. K. into a passport, which stood for Roman Catholic in German, to the Nazis, but could be interpreted differently by the Jewish bearer. A parallel decision was given by Hayim Shor (Torat Hayim #17) and Samuel Ungar (Mekadshei Hashem, p. 214; R. Kirschner, Anthology of Holocaust Responsa, pp. 97 ff). It is clear from these statements that these rabbis took a hard line with a baptismal certificate which seemed like an outright denial of Judaism, but were willing to go along with anything less.
Other authorities during the Holocaust, however, decided differently even on the
matter of baptismal certificates. They realized that (a) the Nazis were not interested in converting anyone to Christianity; (b) they made such conversions punishable by death; (c) they severely punished any Christian clergy involved in such an act of mercy. For these reasons the number of Batei Din in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, as well as Lithuania, permitted such baptismal certificates to be held by Jews, and treated these Jews as any other member of the Jewish community despite protests within the community. Any other action seemed to play directly in the hands of the Nazis, and the rabbis certainly did not wish to do that (H. J. Zimmels, The Echo of the Nazi Holocaust in Rabbinic Literature, pp. 77 ff). Similarly, it was permitted for individuals to declare themselves Karaites as they were not considered Jews under various Nazi rulings (Ibid. 81 ff).
The main line of thought among both
Medieval and modern commentators prohibits an outright denial of Judaism, but permits an ambiguous statement which can be interpreted as a denial by the persecutor. It also permits a disguise which would not cause any questions to be asked.
The Medieval authorities
also distinguished types of persecution. If the persecutor wished to force Jews to accept another religion, then it was the duty of the Jew to resist even if it meant death. If, however, it was the intent of the persecutor merely to persecute the Jew and threaten him with death without any interest in turning him into an idol worshiper, then he could simulate idol worship in order to save his life (Azei Levonah Yoreh Deah 179; Turei Zahav Yoreh Deah 179; Shulhan ArukhYoreh Deah 157.1).
In the period of the Holocaust and the Expulsion from
Spain, the identification of Jews and their persecution was a matter of government policy. In 1492, the authorities demanded conversion to Christianity. During the Holocaust everyone of Jewish descent, even Christians, were to be slain. Those conditions were very different from a temporary act of terrorism.
Terrorists usually do not hold their hostages beyond a brief
specified period. Furthermore, such terrorists are not interested in bringing about a change in religion, but want to use Jewish hostages for whatever leverage can be exercised through them upon Israel. It is the duty of the remainder of the Jewish community to obtain the freedom of captives whenever this does not endanger the community itself (B. B. 8b;- Yad Hil. Matnat Aniyim 8.10; Shulhan Arukh Yoreh Deah 252). One great medieval hostage, Meir of Rothenburg, forbade payment of any ransom after he had been taken captive as he felt that this would hurt the community and set a bad precedent (Graetz, Geschichte der Juden Vol. VII, pp. 173 f; 423 f). In the case of modern hijacking by terrorists potential hostages can help Israel to avoid blackmail and guard themselves from additional danger by hiding their Jewish identity.
It would, therefore, be appropriate for children and adults, if taken
hostage by terrorists, to conceal their Jewish identity first through passive acts and then through any other way which is possible.
November 1985
If needed, please consult Abbreviations used in CCAR Responsa.