CCAR RESPONSA
Contemporary American Reform Responsa
138. Rabbi’s Responsibility to the
Unaffiliated
QUESTION: What is the rabbi’s responsibility toward the
unaffiliated? What is the financial responsibility of a Jew to his religious community? Does a Jew
have the right to demand religious services from the community even if he refuses to pay
membership fees? (Rabbi B. Cohn, New York, NY)ANSWER: The financial
responsibility of the adult Jew toward religious institutions was first mentioned in the discussion
of the half shekel (Ex. 30:11 ff), which was demanded of every male above the age of
twenty as an atonement. Rich and poor were to provide the same sum. According to some
modern Biblical interpreters, this was intended less as a financial contribution and more as a way
of taking census. Although the gifts, sacrifices and tithes were regularly contributed to the
Temple, the sources did not indicate any mechanism for their collection. Actually, we learn far
more from them about the distribution among priests, Levites and the poor. We, of
course, know that the Diaspora Jewish community continued to provide funds for the Temple
until its destruction and that the Roman Emperor Vespasian, after 70 C.E., sought to devote
those funds to the Temple of Jupiter Capitolina in Rome, causing considerable misery to the
Diaspora. The measure, however, eventually lapsed. We do not know what regular contributions
were demanded of all Jews who worshiped at the Temple in ancient times. In the
Middle Ages, it was clear that the community could compel (kofin) its members to
contribute for the sake of charity (Shulhan Arukh Yoreh Deah 256.5). Even the poor were
to give according to their means (Yoreh Deah 248.1). In matters of communal support and
charity, therefore, the pressure of the community was exerted. All this becomes even
clearer when we look at direct support for synagogues. The Shulhan Arukh indicated that
members of the community could force each other to contribute to the building of the synagogue,
the purchase of Torah scrolls, etc. (Orah Hayim, 150.1 kofin zeh et zeh),
and if this was not effective, various forms of excommunication could be, and were, used. The
obligation of individuals toward the community went considerably further. For example if a
community consisted of only ten adult males, and one of them wished to absent himself during
the High Holidays, then the community could force him to attend their services or to obtain a
substitute in order to complete the minyan (Shulhan Arukh Orah Hayim 55.20). In
some places they could force each other to engage two, or even more individuals to complete a
minyan not only for the High Holidays, but for the regular synagogue services. Traditional
sources have set ample precedent for obtaining proper support for religious institutions and using
communal force when necessary. In our age, herem, niduii and other lighter
forms of punishment have lost their meaning; it would only be appropriate to use those means
which are at our disposal, i.e., the restriction of services in life cycle events from the individuals
in question. There is, of course, no doubt that those who withhold their support are still
considered Jews. It is clear throughout the tradition that even apostate Jews were considered to
be Jews in most ways and could be buried by rabbis in the Jewish cemetery at a distance from
others (Shulhan Arukh Yoreh Deah 34.1, 151.12, 367.1), for even sinners were still
considered Israelites (San. 44a). Those under the ban could be buried but with a stone on the
coffin; furthermore, there was no shiva for them. Individuals who had deeply offended the
community, or had been disloyal, were denied services by the Hevra Qadisha in
eighteenth century Germany. This could extend to no visiting or care while ill, nor would their
bodies be prepared for a funeral (Marcus, Communal Sick-Care, p. 129). Here, however,
we are not dealing with the status of the Jew, rather with the survival of the Jewish religious
institutions. Perhaps most analogous is a nineteenth century Galician question brought
to Joseph Saul Nathanson of Lemberg, (Sheol Umeshiv, Vol. 3, part A, #58). He was
asked by a rabbi in a small community whether the ban on private home services, which then
existed in that community, should remain in force. In the discussion Nathanson shows that the
ban was originally pronounced as regular services in the synagogue were in danger of lapsing
due to the home services– something which he felt was not restricted to the small community of
the questioner, but also represented a danger in Lemberg. Even on the Sabbath and holidays,
synagogue attendance had diminished. This, in turn, would lead to a shrinking of the income of
the synagogue and its inability to support a cantor, the rabbis and teachers. He concluded that it
was clearly the responsibility of the rabbinic authorities to control communal life in such a way
that the synagogue would be strengthened. Certainly, such a step to which Nathanson
agreed was more stringent than the decision on our part to conduct no private services for
unaffiliated individuals. After all, his decision dealt with regular daily religious services, not with a
wedding, funeral or brit, which occur but seldom. A similar kind of restriction
was imposed on special services at home by the London Jewish community in the eighteenth
century; someone who was ill was permitted to hold High Holiday services at home only if he
paid the community one guinea and turned the proceeds of the sale of religious honors over to
the community (Taqonot, London, 1791, in J. Marcus, Communal Sick-Care, p.
10). It would seem clear that the tradition indicates that we can, and should, do
everything possible to strengthen synagogue affiliation in our time and to assure the proper
support for our religious institutions. Unaffiliated individuals have no right to demand religious
services. April 1975
If needed, please consult Abbreviations used in CCAR Responsa.