CORR 64-68

THE PREGNANT BRIDE

QUESTION:

The bride was found to be pregnant before the marriage ceremony. Should this fact cause the marriage ceremony to be postponed or perhaps to be cancelled altogether? (Asked by Vigdor W. Kavaler)

ANSWER:

THE ORDINARY and immediate common-sense reaction would be that the marriage should certainly take place and, for the sake of the unborn child, the sooner the better. However, there are certain obstacles in the legal tradition with regard to this simple solution. As well may be imagined, in the course of human experience such situations, namely, that the bride was pregnant before the wedding ceremony, have occurred many times in the past. Therefore there is considerable law on the matter which must be considered when we are confronted with a circumstance such as the one described. Of course, some of the situations dealt with at length in the past are no longer applicable today; but for the sake of completeness they should be mentioned.

The word “engagement” which we use today meant something much different and much more legally bind ing in the time of the Mishnah and the Talmud and for a number of centuries thereafter. What we today call “engagement” is simply a promise, often merely verbal, to marry at some future date. But in the past this “engagement” was marked by a ceremony and documents. It was called Erusin and was virtually a marriage in every respect except sexual relationship. The betrothed woman, Arusa, stayed in her father’s house until the Nissuin when she was brought to the house of the groom and the marriage then completed and consummated. But before that she is “betrothed” and, in the full legal sense, the man’s wife. If, therefore, she became pregnant during that period, this occurred while she had the actual status of a married woman. If, then, it was proved that during this betrothal period she was impregnated by some stranger, the husband-to-be (who was actually her “betrothed” husband now) would not be permitted to live with her and the marriage would have to be called off. Of course if, contrary to the law, the husband-to-be himself was the man who impregnated her, then that is largely their own affair, except that he must rewrite her marriage document describing her no longer as a virgin.

There is much in the law concerning complaints by the groom that he was deceived and his bride was not a virgin. But if he was in her parents’ house with her during the betrothal period, he could no longer make such a complaint (Mishnah Kesubos 1:5).

All this was based upon the legal fact that the engagement in the past was actually a full betrothal, virtually a marriage. But this no longer applies today and has not applied for many centuries. Nowadays we combine the betrothal (Erusin) and the Nissuin in one ceremony with two sets of blessings under the Chuppah. Therefore our modern engagement is merely a promise to marry and not a legal betrothal, and if the bride becomes pregnant during the engagement, it is not as his wife that she has become pregnant and so there is no basic objection to his marrying her if he wishes to. So the Be’er Hetev (Judah Ashkenazi of Tiktin) to Even Hoezer 68, paragraph 2, says that nowadays the whole ceremony takes place under the Chuppah (i.e., before the Chuppah she was in no sense his betrothed wife). If, therefore, it is found that she is not a virgin, she is nevertheless permitted to marry the husband-to-be because the immorality took place before the wedding (i.e., she was not in any sense his wife).

However, there is still another obstacle in the law against a pregnant bride being married. If a woman is pregnant, she may not marry another man for twenty- four months after the child is born (Even Hoezer 13:11 ff., based on Yevamos 42a). This is for the protection of the child. The fear is that if she marries while she is pregnant, or after the child has recently been born, her milk will dry up if she becomes pregnant again and the child will suffer from malnutrition. The law, then, becomes complicated, namely, as to whether a divorced woman is in duty bound to nurse the baby of her former husband (or give it to a wet nurse).

There is an interesting modern case in the responsa of Moses Feinstein, the present head of the Agudas Ha-Rabanim, in his Igros Moshe, Even Hoezer #32. The case is as follows: The bride is pregnant by some man other than the engaged groom. The groom, nevertheless, wants to marry her. They agree that as soon as the child is born they will put it up for irrevocable adoption through the courts. The child therefore will have someone else to nurse it and take care of it. Need this couple, therefore, wait the twenty-four months of lactation? Moses Feinstein answers in the negative and permits the couple to marry. An analogous case two centuries earlier was decided in the same way by Ezekiel Katzenellenbogen, Rabbi of Altona, 16th-17th century, in his Kenesses Yechezkel, #7 3. So in this case here, if the child will be born normally and will need to be nursed, other arrangements can be made to take care of it, either to feed by formula or to put the baby up for adoption, as in the case mentioned above.

There is, of course, one final element involved here. I understand (from the verbal discussion of the question) that both bride-to-be and groom-to-be acknowledge that the child is theirs. In that case, the law is clear enough that the safety of the child will be considered assured since it is their child and the law is that they may marry. So the Be’er Hetev to Even Hoezer 13, at the end of his paragraph # 17 says: If he and she both agree that it was with him that she had sexual intercourse, and that she was impregnated by him, then we have no ground for suspicion that she was also immoral with others and there is no reason to fear that her lactation will be spoiled (therefore they may be married at once). So too, Moses Sofer (Chatam Sofer, Even Hoezer 27) gives the following case: An engaged girl who was pregnant stated that she was impregnated by her fiance. He denied it but when he was told that if she was impregnated by someone else, she will have to wait twenty-four months before she can marry this fiance, thereupon he changed his statement and admitted that he had impregnated her but had been too ashamed to admit it. Are we to believe him? Moses Sofer reluctantly comes to the conclusion that we do believe him but must impress upon him the importance of telling the truth in this case. After doing so, we permit him to marry her at once.

To sum up: Our modern “engagement” is not the classic “betrothal.” Therefore the engaged bride is not really (in the legal sense) a wife; and if she becomes pregnant before the marriage, there is no requirement in the law for him to refuse to marry her. As for waiting twenty-four months of lactation, more recent decisions permit other provisions for the nursing of the child. Finally, since both acknowledge that it is their child, then, while there is the general objection in the law to sexual relationship between unmarried people, now that it has occurred and they wish to marry, they may do so. Thus the requirements of common sense in this matter are fully justified by the legal tradition.