GAMBLING FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE SYNAGOGUE

The C.C.A.R. and the U.A.H.C. have passed resolutions opposed to gambling of all kinds sponsored by the synagogue. Have these resolutions so firm a foundation in Jewish legal and ethical tradition that the Rabbi and the Board of the Congregation should absolutely prohibit such method of raising money for the synagogue? (From Rabbi Paul H. Levenson, Fords, New Jersey.)

THE Central Conference and the Union do not have a governmental authority over the rabbis and the congregations. They are voluntary associations. Their resolutions, therefore, are primarily advisory and are meant to be of guidance and assistance to the rabbis and the congregations. Therefore it is quite justified to ask how strong a foundation in Jewish tradition there is or is not for these resolutions against any gambling sponsored by the congregation. Besides the question of the right to independent judgment on the part of rabbi and congregation respectively, the question itself has special importance nowadays, when increasing suggestions are being made for secular lotteries to be established to help finance local and state government. When these questions come up as public questions, the rabbi and the congregation may well need to express an opinion in the name of the ethics of our religious tradition. Thus, the whole subject of, public gambling, at least in relation to our religious institutions, deserves a fuller discussion than is available in encyclopedic articles.

The matter cannot be discussed entirely upon the basis of Jewish law, because changing sentiments are involved and have to be considered. For example, nowadays many Catholic churches in America receive considerable income from bingo games, and I am told that there are some Jewish congregations which follow that practice. More widespread than bingo games for the benefit of Jewish congregations in America is the use of lotteries for many types of Jewish social and philanthropic organizations. There is hardly a year in any large Jewish community in which automobiles or bonds are not raffled off. The fact that people are getting used to the idea as normal tends to give raffles and lotteries almost the status of an accepted custom; and an accepted custom, if it is not manifestly bad, has certain status in Jewish law. However, a distinction would naturally be considered between social or philanthropic organizations and the synagogue itself. The synagogue must be treated with special sanctity. It was this feeling that the sanctity of the synagogue itself should be especially protected against general laxity, which must be the motivation behind the resolutions referred to. What, then, is the opinion and the mood of Jewish tradition on this matter?

It is a manifest fact that gambling is not mentioned in the Bible itself. Evidently our people in Biblical times were free from that vice or it certainly would have been mentioned as a prohibited sin. Objections to gambling do not appear until the time of the Mishnah. Nevertheless, the Bible makes frequent use of the device of casting lots. For example, which of two goats should be used for which of the two sacrifices on Yom Kippur was determined by lot (see Leviticus 13:8 and also M. Yoma IV, 1). The land was divided among the tribes by lot. The various duties of the priests were distributed by lot (M. Tamid I, 2) . In fact, the use of lots was sanctioned by the later law codes. The Shulchan Aruch in Orah Hayyim 322:6 says that the man may distribute the various portions of the meal by lot on the Sabbath to members of his household. This law goes back to the Mishnah, Shabbas XXIII, 2. However, if this casting of lots, which is permitted, results in one person gaining much more than another, then it is prohibited as gambling (m’shum kuvya). This is the subject of occasional discussion in the Responsa literature: Certain property belongs jointly to a few men. They may divide it by lot. This is legitimate, unless the casting of lots gives one of the men (the winner) a great advantage (see Jacob Reischer, Shevus Yaacov, II, 167). In other words, a difference must be made between the casting of lots and a lottery. Merely to determine who gets what, without any particular advantage but just to avoid disputes, is only a casting of lots and is permissible, but who shall win a special prize is lottery and is gambling.

If, then, a lottery which will result in some one or a certain few winning a special prize is to be considered gambling, we must now ask what is the attitude of the tradition to gambling. There is no question that gambling of various kinds finally spread among our people in post-Biblical times up to modern times and, therefore, in reaction to that fact, there is a great deal of material in the legal tradition on the subject. The original source of the laws is in Mishnah Sanhedrin, III, 3, which lists those who are ineligible to give testimony in the Jewish courts, and at the beginning of the list, there are mentioned “those who play with dice and those who race pigeons.” The Talmud takes this up in b. Sanhedrin 24 b. and 25 b., and gives as the reason for the ineligibility of such gamblers that they do not participate as they should in constructive social efforts (b ‘yeshuvo shel olam). From here on the law is carried over into the codes. Maimonides, in Hilchos Gezela, VII, 7, says the objection to gambling is that it is a form of robbery. So the Shulchan Aruch in Choshen Mishpot 370:2, gives this as a definite law. Some of the authorities (based upon a minority opinion in the Talmud) wish to confine the ineligibility (to testify) to those who have no occupation except gambling, but this exception remains only a side opinion.

The large amount of legal discussion which the literature contains is itself an evidence of how widespread the habit of gambling became. Frequently communities passed communal regulation against any sort of gambling in the community (i.e., even private gambling; see Pachad Yitzchok, s.v., “Cherem”). This practice of public prohibition by the community of all gambling naturally led to questions which are analogous to the one you are asking. When is the cherem applicable and when is it not applicable? When is it deemed properly ordained or improperly ordained and, therefore, invalid? What if a man from a community which does not have such a ruling visits a community which does have such a ruling; is he in duty bound to refrain from gambling during his visit? (See Shevus Yaacov II, 79; see also Reischer’s full discussion of this matter in his commentary, Chok Yaacov to Shulchan Aruch Orah Hayyim 468). In addition to these communal decisions there are many instances of men disgusted with their own addiction to gambling, who take personal vows never to gamble again. This habit led to a series of legal questions as to whether such vows can be released by the proper authorities or not.

In spite of all this evidence that gambling was an urgent problem all through the Middle Ages, and the law and individuals struggled against it, I do not recall at the present any discussion of whether gambling would be acceptable if carried out for the benefit of the congregation. I have the impression that I once read such a responsum about a lottery and that the suggestion was indignantly rejected. But the fact that such discussions, if they have occurred, are very rare, would in itself indicate that it would hardly enter anybody’s mind to think that it would be permissible.

While, then, there is no specific prohibition of a lottery in behalf of a synagogue, the whole mood of the Jewish struggle against gambling, even private gambling, makes it evident that such a proposal would be deemed flagrantly wrong. However, the Committee on Responsa of the Conference (Jacob Mann, Chairman) in the Yearbook Volume XLVI, page 126, cites a rather permissive opinion by the Rabbi of Modena, Ishmael Sacerdote (died 1811) in his Zera Emeth, Volume III, 144 (p. 171d). He gives this rather permissive opinion in an analogous situation: A man had become poor, but he possessed a Sefer Torah which he wanted to sell by a lottery, in order to support himself and his family. The rabbi agreed to it on the ground that this method of selling would not be a disgrace to the Sefer Torah. He even gave the man a letter to send out to prospective purchasers of the lottery tickets. To this opinion cited by the Conference, one can add another which Rabbi Ishmael quotes, namely, that of Meir Eisenstadt in Hungary (Panim Meiros, III, 43). His case was very much like the one of the Rabbi Ishmael’s: A man needed to provide a trousseau for his daughter and he wanted to sell a Sefer Torah by lottery. Eisenstadt agrees that this is no disgrace to the Torah. In fact, he says, it is an honor to the Torah to have people compete and want to pay a higher price for it. He says further that it is the custom in his part of the country for scribes, when they write the scroll of the Book of Esther, to sell it by lottery. However, there is a contrary opinion to these two, cited by the editor and pupil of Rabbi Ishmael. The contrary opinion is by Zvi Ashkenazi of Amsterdam, in his responsa Chacham Zvi, 123. He speaks of the custom in Amsterdam of selling a Sefer Torah by auction (i.e., by competitive bidding) and he objects to it strenuously.

But these isolated opinions which are not in agreement with each other are not sufficient to help decide the question before us. We must judge by the general mood of the law. Although the decisions of the Union and the Conference on this matter do not have (as we have mentioned) the prohibitory force of the medieval cherem, it does indeed represent the spirit of the Jewish tradition. As Jacob Reischer properly says, “The cherem against gambling is a public vow and ‘a fence’ to protect the commandments.” Your congregation, therefore, is not prohibited and cannot be prohibited from conducting its “Las Vegas” night, but the spirit of tradition would urge them to refrain.

Some additional references for completeness’ sake: Israel Mizrahi in his Peri Ha -Aretz, II, 16, decides that the Torah may be sold by a scribe by lottery, although he is concerned that his own teacher says that it may not be so sold. Joseph Messas in his Mayim Chayim, 78, also decides in favor of an indigent scribe, permitting him to sell the Torah by lottery.

Mordecai Roller in Be’er Chaim Mordecai, Volume I, 50, asked whether it is permitted to raise money for a synagogue by a dance, (i.e., men and women dancing together) forbids it based on the verse in Deuteronomy, “The hire of a harlot, etc.” Kalman Zuckerman in Minchas Ha-Komtez, 9 and 10, refutes this on the usual ground that it means only the actual object given to the harlot (e.g., a lamb may not be brought to the altar).