CCAR RESPONSA COMMITTEE
5774.1
The Menorah and the Christmas Tree in a Holiday Display
Sh’elah.
Some Jewish staff members at Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center (MSKCC) have complained that during the Christmas season they feel that there is not a Jewish “presence” to offset the overwhelming non-Jewish presence of Christmas wreaths and trees. They are asking that 1) during Hanukkah the lit menorah (electric as flames are dangerous in a hospital setting) be displayed wherever the Christmas trees and wreaths are displayed and 2) unlit electric menorahs be displayed along with Christmas trees after the end of Hanukkah up to and including during Christmas.
Some worry that this proposal, rather than honor the miracle of Hanukkah, simply turns a genuine Jewish religious object into a “cultural” artifact to counter a non-Jewish “cultural” symbol. (This year Hanukkah will be over by the time Christmas begins.)
Is it halachically proper to 1) display an unlit electric menorah during Christmas after Hanukkah has ended and 2) especially to display an unlit or lit electric menorah next to a Christmas tree in a hospital? (Rabbi Harry D. Rothstein, Staff Chaplain, Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center, New York)
T’shuvah.
“Holiday displays” that include the symbols of various religious traditions have for several decades been the subject of legal controversy in the United States. Some communities erect them on public property, seeking thereby to meet the legal and constitutional objections that the government is giving its endorsement to any one particular religion.[1] Since the Memorial Sloane-Kettering Cancer Center is a private institution, these constitutional issues do not apply. Our sho’el, however, asks if there are halachic objections, that is, principles of Jewish law and tradition, to holiday displays even in privately-owned spaces.
There is no specific halachic impediment to placing a lit menorah next to a Christmas tree during the festival of Hanukkah. While we might well have aesthetic or other objections to a display of this kind (see below), the menorah would satisfy the religious functions for which it is intended: to fulfill the mitzvah of kindling the Hanukkah lamp (l’hadlik ner shel Hanukkah) [2] and to “proclaim the miracle” (pirsumei nisa).[3] On the other hand, there are three potential halakhic objections to including the menorah in a holiday display once Hanukkah has ended and the menorah no longer serves a specifically ritual purpose. Let us consider each in turn.
1. Dishonorable Treatment of Sacred Objects. The first potential objection is suggested in the sh’elah itself: to display a hanukkiah (Hanukkah menorah) next to a Christmas tree risks transforming a “genuine Jewish religious object” into a “cultural symbol,” particularly once Hanukkah has ended and the menorah no longer fulfills its fundamental religious purpose. To do so, it could be argued, offends against the standards of honor and reverence with which we are taught to treat religious objects such as the Torah scroll.[4] Yet while the hanukkiah is a religious object, that is, one that customarily[5] fulfills a religious function, the halachah contains no ritual prohibition (isur) against displaying it for purposes other than the ritual end it usually serves. As we have previously written, “the menorah itself is not a sacred item and there is no degree of sanctity connected with it.”[6] And given that it is the widespread custom in our communities to display Torah scrolls in glass museum cases for educational purposes,[7] it would certainly be permitted to place a menorah in a display intended to serve a similarly legitimate goal.
2. Chukot Hagoyim. One might think that the proposed holiday display violates the prohibition of chukot hagoyim, the imitation of Gentile customs and practices.[8] The point of this isur, as Maimonides describes it,[9] is that Judaism and the Jewish people remain distinct and recognizably different from the surrounding cultures and peoples. A display that mixes our own symbolism with that of another religion might well frustrate this purpose. Still, there have always been limits to the prohibition; not every non-Jewish custom and practice has been deemed off-limits to Jews.[10] The tradition tends to apply it to practices that are specific to and characteristic of non-Jewish religious observance; on the other hand, “Gentile” practices that serve legitimate purposes do not fall within its sway.[11] For these very reasons, we think, the prohibition does not govern our case. As our sho’el notes, the proposed holiday display is cultural rather than religious in nature; we would not define it as the sort of non-Jewish religious practice with which the isur is concerned.[12] Moreover, the desire to maintain a “Jewish presence” during the December holiday season could be said to serve a “legitimate purpose,” namely, to raise the consciousness of our own people and to educate the public that Jews as well as Christians celebrate a festival during that time of the year.
3. Misleading Impressions. The third potential objection is that the display of a hanukkiah next to a Christmas tree might communicate a false or misleading message. The viewer of the display could draw any of several wrong conclusions: that the holidays symbolized by the two objects are really one and the same, that Hanukkah is “the Jewish Christmas,” or even that the Christmas tree is a legitimate element of Jewish observance. This, we stress, is no minor irritant. Jewish tradition strongly condemns g’neivat da`at, deceitful conduct and the conveying of false information;[13] neither we nor the hospital administration should contribute, however innocently, to this end. Still, as a matter of technical halachah, it is not absolutely necessary to remove the menorah from the display in order to forestall these erroneous conclusions. It would not be difficult to place a sign or a video screen at the display that would explain to passersby the meaning of Hanukkah and the symbolism of the menorah. The sign or screen would note that the menorah is illuminated during the festival but remains unlit once the holiday is over.
Conclusion. Our t’shuvah has addressed the specific query that was submitted to us: is it halachically proper to place a menorah next to a Christmas tree in a holiday display such as the one described? We have found no impediments based in Jewish law that require that we object to the display.
On the other hand, as we noted above there are other and to our mind persuasive reasons that would lead us to object. Chief among these is the tendency, all too prevalent in our culture today, toward religious syncretism, the mixing and blending of religious traditions. We are religious liberals, not separatists; we happily participate in interfaith activities, discussions, and services because we believe that to do so strengthens the bonds of understanding, civility, and respect among the different religious groups in our communities. But syncretism is the opposite of interfaith work, because by blurring the lines that distinguish one religious tradition from another it expresses an attitude of disrespect toward each of them. The proposed display is no doubt a well-intentioned effort to include Jews as well as Christians in the celebration of the holiday season. But the very term “holiday season” implies that Hanukkah and Christmas are somehow related culturally and religiously, that the two festivals are essentially the same. As we suggest above, this need not amount to an act of out-and-out deception. But, because the festivals are not essentially the same, it is precisely the wrong message to convey to our people.
The menorah should not be displayed next to the Christmas tree. If the hospital’s Jewish staff members desire a “Jewish presence” during the season, it would be far better to arrange for a Hanukkah display that is kept separate and distinct from the Christmas decorations, just as Judaism itself, for all it may share in common with other faiths, is a religious tradition separate and distinct from all others.
NOTES
1. The governing precedents include Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984), and County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
2. This is a matter of controversy. Some authorities, for various reasons, rule that one can fulfill the mitzvah only by means of an oil- or wax-fueled flame. Among them: R. Yitzchak Shmelkes, Resp. Beit Yitzchak, Yore De`ah no. 120; Sha`arim Metzuyanim B’halachah, ch. 139, note 5; R. Benzion Meir Hai Ouziel, Mishpetei Ouziel, vol. 1, Orach Chayim 7, and see R. Walter Jacob, New American Reform Responsa no. 76 (New York: CCAR Press, 1992), pp. 118-119 (http://ccarnet.org/responsa/narr-118-119, accessed October 9, 2013). We could argue this question either way, but that is not our intention here. For purposes of this sh’elah, we will assume, along with the sho’el, that an electric menorah (which, for safety reasons, is the only kind permitted in many hospitals) serves a particularly religious/ritual function during (but not after) the festival of Hanukkah.
3. See B. Shabbat 23b. As Maimonides formulates it, the purpose of the mitzvah is “to make visible and reveal the miracle” (l’harot ul’galot hanes; Yad, Hanukkah 3:3).
4. On the Torah scroll see B. Kiddushin 33b, Yad, Sefer Torah 10:9, and Shulchan Aruch Yore De`ah 282:2. On other religious objects see B. Megilah 26b, Yad, Sefer Torah 10:4, and Shulchan Aruch 154:3.
5. We say “customarily” because there is no actual halachic requirement that the mitzvah of Hanukkah be performed by using a nine-branched candelabrum. We can fulfill that mitzvah by lighting even one light or lamp, any sort of light or lamp that is designated as the ner shel Hanukkah during its illumination. See B. Shabbat 21b.
6. R. Walter Jacob, note 2, above, at p. 119. This fact distinguishes a menorah from the crèche that was at issue in the Lynch decision (note 2, above).
7. See R. Walter Jacob, New American Reform Responsa (New York: CCAR, 1992), no. 137, http://ccarnet.org/responsa/narr-218-220, and R. Solomon B. Freehof, Contemporary Reform Responsa (Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College Press, 1974, no. 23.
8. The prohibition is based upon Leviticus 18:3 (uv’chukoteihem lo teleichu, “you shall not follow their laws”): Sifra, Acharei Mot, parasha 9; B. Chulin 41b; B. Avodah Zarah 11a; B. Sanhedrin 52b.
9. “It is forbidden to adopt the customs of the Gentiles or to imitate them in their manner of dress or grooming… Jews should not imitate the Gentiles but rather remain separate and distinct (muvdal) from them in their manner of dress and in their behavior as they are separate and distinct from them in their culture and their beliefs” (Yad, Avodat Kochavim 11:1).
10. The Sifra (note 7, above) asks rhetorically: “does this [i.e., the prohibition of chukot hagoyim] mean we are not to build buildings or plant crops as they do?” The answer is no: the prohibition deals only with practices (chukim) that are culturally specific to them. The Talmud suggests that we may copy Gentile practices so long as we can find legitimate precedents for those practices in our own sources (B. Sanhedrin 52b) or when the practices in question are not intended specifically for idolatrous worship (Tosafot ad loc., s.v. ella, and see B. Avodah Zarah 11a and Tosafot ad loc., s.v. v’i). R. Yitzchak bar Sheshet (Rivash, 14th-century Spain and North Africa) ruled that Jews in his country need not abandon certain mourning customsthat characterized Muslim practice; “if you say otherwise, we might as well forbid eulogies, on the grounds that Gentiles, too, eulogize their dead” (Resp. Rivash, no. 158).
11. This standard was formulated in the fifteenth century by the Italian posek R. Yosef Colon: only those that a) offend our standards of modesty and propriety, or b) are adopted by Jews for no other apparent reason than to imitate the Gentiles are prohibited under the terms of Leviticus 18:3; Resp. Maharik no. 88. While not all authorities accept this standard, it has been adopted as halachah by R. Moshe Isserles, Shulchan Aruch Yore De`ah 178:1. Among those recent poskim who accept it are R. Yechiel Ya`akov Weinberg (20th-century Germany/Switzerland), Resp. S’ridei Eish 2:39 and R Ovadyah Yosef (20th-21st century Israel), Resp. Y’chaveh Da`at 4:33. The CCAR Responsa Committee follows this reasoning as well. For a case in point, see our responsum “Amazing Grace,” Teshuvot for the Nineties (New York: CCAR, 1997), no. 5752.17, pp. 21-22, http://ccarnet.org/responsa/ccarj-fall-1992-65-66-tfn-no-5752-11-21-22 .
12. It is at most an element of the American “civil religion,” which makes use of religious symbolism and modes of expression for civic purposes that are common to all members of the community. We do not object in principle to Jewish participation in the civil religion. “We generally take part in ceremonies which are religiously neutral these ceremonies are neutral and non-Christological,” and we accept certain of its ritual expressions – “prayers for the government during the service, the national flag on the bimah, national anthems printed in our prayer books and Haggadahs, liturgies for a communal Thanksgiving and Memorial Day service, and the like” – into our own practice. See our responsum “Blessing the Fleet,” Teshuvot for the Nineties, no. 5751.3, pp. 159-164, http://ccarnet.org/responsa/tfn-no-5751-3-159-164 .
13. B. Chulin 94a; Yad, De`ot 2:6; Shulchan Arukh Choshen Mishpat 228:6. A second issue, quite possibly, is “do not place a stumbling block before the blind” (Leviticus 19:14), which our tradition interprets as an act of deception that does lead an innocent or naïve person into sin or into acting to her harm (Sifra K’doshim, parasha 2, 2). False impressions about the distinction – or lack thereof – between Christianity and Judaism can be harmful indeed.