CHANGING NAMES ON MEMORIAL WINDOWS

QUESTION:

A recently widowed lady wants names of deceased kinsmen which appear on a memorial window removed to another place in the Temple and her husband’s name put in the window instead. What is your opinion of such a procedure? (From Rabbi William Braude, Providence, R.I.)

ANSWER:

IT IS A comparatively modern phenomenon to donate stained-glass windows to a synagogue and to dedicate them to the memory of a relative. So there cannot be anything in the older legal literature about such windows and their legal status. Nevertheless there is a great deal of discussion on the more general question of gifts to the synagogue, and a considerable body of law has been developed on this theme. The questions discussed are as follows: Does a donor of a gift to a synagogue still exercise some measure of control over its use and its disposal? What control over the gift do the officers of the congregation have? Does the presence of a name on the gift affect its status? All these questions have a close analogy to the modern question of the status of a stained-glass window.

It is not clear from the question whether this widow was the original donor of the window, or whether she merely wants this window (which was dedicated to the memory of certain kinsmen) now to be dedicated to the memory of her husband. Let us consider that she or her husband (or both of them jointly) gave the window in the first place and that, therefore, she feels that she now has the right to change the dedication on the window. The question, then, is: Has a donor the right to change a gift to charity or a gift to the Temple once the gift has been made? The law is based upon the Talmud in Arakhin 6b, where it is said that if a person gives a certain sum to charity, the purpose can be changed providing it has not yet come into the hands of the official appointed to receive it (the gabai) . But even then, while the money may be used by the donor, other charity money must be substituted for it. In this case this might mean that she would pay for the other memorial to the kinsmen whose names are to be removed from the window. However, this supposition is totally inapplicable in this case, for the law in the Talmud says that once it is in the hands of the gabai, it al ready belongs (in the case of charity) to the poor and now, in this case, it already belongs to the synagogue. It is out of her hands and she cannot change it, or take it back to be used for a different purpose. This law from the Talmud is clearly codified in all the standard codes. See for example, Yoreh Deah 258:6, etc.

In other words, once the gift has been officially received she has no more rights with regard to it. There is some discussion in the law in the case of the gift of a Sefer Torah or the gold or silver ornaments on it, as to whether in the case of these sacred objects a person may claim that when his father gave them, he did not really give them as an outright gift to the synagogue but he merely lent them and therefore the heirs now want to take them back. Isserles (to 259:2) says that whether such things can be taken back depends on whether there is a fixed minhag in that community to allow it. But of course what might possibly apply to a Torah and ornaments, which could be kept in a private house for a private minyan, does not apply to a window which is a fixed part of the synagogue. In general, the tendency of the law is that even in the face of such a claim and even where there is some sort of minhag to allow such a claim, that it should not be allowed. See the latest authoritative codifier, Yechiel Epstein in his Aruch Hashulchan, Yoreh Deah 259. Thus there seems to be no way in which a donor can have any authority or control over this fixed gift once it has been given to the gabai and made a permanent part of the synagogue. But, perhaps, the widow is not raising a legal claim at all. She does not maintain that she has a right to demand this change. All she is trying to do is persuade the synagogue authorities to make the change of their own accord. Of course, if neither she nor her husband were the donors of the window in the first place, then it is ethically wrong for the congregation to make such a change. What about those who are close relatives of the kinsmen whose names are already on the window? They surely in this case would have a strong ethical right to protest. If there are no closer relatives left to those names already on the window and therefore there are none to object to such a change, the question must still be answered, whether in general the officers have the right to make such a change.

The Talmud in Arakhin 6b discusses the gift of a menorah to the synagogue and asks whether that menorah can be changed for some other object or its metal used for the benefit of the synagogue. There a clear criterion is given, namely, whether the names of the donors are still known or forgotten. If the names are forgotten, there is still some partial permission given for certain changes which will be discussed in a moment. But if the names on the menorah are still known, it is much more difficult to permit any change. See the Rambam in Hil. Matnot Aniyim, VIII:6, and see also the commentary of David ben Zimri to that passage. Thus, if the name is engraved on the menorah, or if people still say “so and so’s menorah,” the law is much stricter against changing it. While here the law seems to refer to the name of the donor on the menorah, obviously the law applies to whatever names there are on it in whose behalf it was dedicated. Here, on the window, it is impossible to say the name has disappeared (nishtakach hashem) since the names are clear for all to see, and therefore the right of the congregation itself to change it is severely restricted.

There is still another restriction against change besides the one of whether the name is still on the menorah. The Mordecai to Baba Batra, Chapter I (#492) says that the menorah might be changed if it was never used, but once it has been used it cannot be changed. In this case the window has been up and seen and been used as part of the structure. One can see the logic of the Mordecai’s rule. People would wonder at the change and raise questions about it.

All these restrictions amount to the following: It is permitted to make changes when the changes are “upward,” that is to say for a still holier purpose than the original. Some opinions are that if the name is forgotten, they may change it to any purpose, but the general consensus is that if the name is still there, it can only be changed for a more holy purpose. For example, a menorah may be sold for the greater mitzvah of Talmud Torah, study, etc. Now, clearly this change, as far as the congregation is concerned, is not a change for a holier purpose. Her husband is of course dearer to her than those relatives, but from the point of view of the community it would be absurd to say that her husband’s name is more sacred than those of the kinsmen whose names are already there.

To sum up: Once the gift has been received by the congregation (and especially here where it is a permanent part of the structure) the donor has no more rights over it. Secondly, the congregation is severely restricted in changing the gift when the name is still on it. Finally, whatever changes might be made would have to be for a more sacred religious purpose only. This is not the case here. It seems clear to me that the spirit of the law would require that her request not be granted, and that she be invited to memorialize her dear husband in some other way which would not de-stroy the memorial of others.