THE REVERTING PROSELYTE

QUESTION:

A Christian woman, a Baptist, had converted to Judaism in 1955 under the auspices of the Temple, as the photostat of the conversion certificate indicates. She was married then to a Jew. Now, thirteen years later, she announces that she has rejoined her original Baptist religion (there is no statement in the letter as to whether she is still married to the gentleman referred to above). She concludes her letter to the congregation as follows: “I have rejoined my original Baptist religion and hereby request release from the B’rith Kodesh Congregation.” Shall the congregation agree to her request and give her a certificate indicating that she is released from membership and free to rejoin the Baptist Church? (Asked by Rabbi Philip Bernstein, Rochester, New York.)

THE FACT that the woman had belonged to the Baptist denomination helps explain her request. It is the rule in the Baptist church, in America at least, that when a person leaves one Baptist church to join another Bap tist church, the application for membership in the second church must be accompanied by a statement of release from the first church. So this young woman, being a Baptist by birth and training, asks for such a release from the Jewish congregation in which she had held membership hitherto.

Of course, as an American citizen she has the right to join any church she wishes to join, and she no more needs a formal release from the Jewish congregation than a born Jew who would want to leave the congregation to join a Baptist church. She is free to do as she wishes in this matter. Yet what she means by receiving a release from the congregation implies much more than a formal note of transfer. Actually what she is asking is that the congregation by such a “release” declare thereby that she is now no longer a Jewess. Can the congregation, in the light of Jewish law and tradition, declare this woman to be no longer a Jewess on the ground that she wishes to cease being Jewish, or on any other grounds? There is considerable discussion in the Talmud that is continued in the later codes as to the status of a proselyte to Judaism who reverts to his or her original faith. Can a proselyte, by such a reversion, cancel the fact of his or her former conversion to Judaism?

It must be understood at the outset that conversion to Judaism is meant to go further than conversion, for example, to Christianity. It is possible for the Christian church to convert thousands of Hindus, Congolese, or Chinese to Christianity, and these converts become simply members of the same religion. But in Judaism the convert is described as a newborn child. He is, as it were, reborn into the Jewish family. You might say that at least symbolically he not only is a member of the Jewish religion, but becomes also a part of the Jewish people. That is why Maimonides told Obadiah the Proselyte that in his prayers he may without hesitation say: “Our God and God of our fathers,” because even if he has no Jewish father in the generation immedi-ately behind him, Abraham is his father now. He is a member of the family.

What, then, is the status of a born Jew who apostatizes to another religion? Does he cease to be a Jew? Yes, by religion, but by religion only. As far as his personal relations are concerned, he remains a Jew; and if he marries a Jewess, even though he is now a professed Mohammedan or a Christian, his marriage is a valid marriage. He is called yisrael mumar, an apostate Jew, but still a Jew. Similarly, Rashi to b. Bechorot, 30b (near the top) speaking of a recreant proselyte, says definitely: “We do not say that he is like an idolator (the conversions in ancient times were from idolatry) who never was converted.” And the Talmud at that passage speaks of this reverting proselyte as being in the status of a yisrael mumar, an apostasizing Jew. This is clearly stated in a number of places in the Talmud, essentially however in b. Yevamot, 47b, which says of the proselyte, “If he reverts and thereafter mar ries a Jewess, we call him yisrael mumar and his marriage is valid Jewish marriage.” Asher ben Jechiel to the passage repeats this law, but the supercommentary (Korban Natanel, Nathaniel Weil of Karlsruhe, 1687- 1769) elaborates the law as follows: Even the child of a revert can effect Jewish marriage (Kidushin).

This is the fixed law and is so recorded in the Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 268:12. Of course some authorities quoted in the Tur (op. cit.) say that in certain matters of ritual carefulness he is now not to be trusted. We may no longer taste his wine or eat his bread. But even this limitation is debatable. See Elijah of Vilna’s comment to the Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah, 268:12, in which he says, “He remains a Jew in every respect.” At all events, even though some authorities say he may not be trusted any more in matters of food, no one will deny that in all essential matters, such as marriage, he, the reverting proselyte, is essentially and permanently a Jew. In other words, we accept a proselyte literally into the family, and it is that familial relationship which cannot be thrown off. It is an indelible alle-giance, exactly as that of a born Jew who apostatizes.

Is this indelible allegiance proclaimed by traditional law to be applied with equal force to the conversions conducted in a Reform Temple? An Orthodox author-ity would say no, because he does not consider our conversions to be true conversions. The Yad (Issure Biah, XIII, 17) and the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 268: 12) say that if all the warnings and instructions are omitted in the preparatory instruction of the proselyte, but if he is circumcised and bathed in the mikvah, these two acts make him forever a Jew. But with us, it is the reverse. We do not consider the two acts of milah and tevilah as essential requirements, but do consider the careful instruction as the essential. What the older law considers essential, we consider unessential, and what the law considers dispensable, we consider indispensable. On this ground (that we omit the essential ceremonies) an Orthodox authority would say the conversion of this woman (if she was not taken to the mikvah) is not a valid one, and therefore she can go back to her original faith, which, in fact, she has never left.

To this, of course, we can never agree. We consider our emphasis upon instruction as more effective than certain ritual acts, and we mean to achieve by our conversion everything that Jewish tradition has meant to achieve. We accept a proselyte exactly as tradition accepted him or her, not only into an allegiance but, by this type of adoption, into the Jewish family. To us, too, therefore the conversion involves an indelible allegiance.

We must explain to this woman that her conversion to Judaism gave her certain privileges which she cannot slough off. It made her mariage to a Jew a Jewish marriage, Kidushin, because she was now, in every sense a Jewess. She is still a Jewess in matters of marriage. A daughter born to her will be a Jewish daughter, eligible to be married to a Jewish man. Even if she now marries a Christian, her daughter who would then follow the status of the mother, would still be Jewish. There might, of course, be practical or cautionary reasons why we might hesitate to marry this daughter to a Jew, but technically the daughter is Jewish. This right inheres in her daughter and in her daughter’s daughter as Solomon ben Zemach Duran said (Rashbash #89) “to the end of all the generations.” This status became hers by her conversion. Nothing can eradicate it.

If, therefore, this Jewish woman now wishes to be a Baptist, she is free to do as she wishes. But we cannot violate the wholehearted brotherliness of Jewish tra-dition, which had made her a permanent member of the family. We cannot declare that she has ceased to be a Jewess. It is doubtful anyhow whether the Baptist church which she is now joining would require a letter of transfer from a Jewish congregation but, in any event, we cannot give any such document.