APOSTATE WEDDING ATTENDANTS

QUESTION:

The sister of the bride has converted to Christianity. Now this convert wishes to stand under the chuppah as an attendant at her sister’s wedding. Should this be permitted? (Asked by Rabbi David Polish, Chicago, Illinois.)

ANSWER:

IT IS NECESSARY, first, to consider the actual status in Jewish law of the apostate from Judaism. Then, after considering the legal status of the apostate, we must come to a conclusion suitable to our present circumstances as to the rights of this apostate in the wedding ceremony of her sister.

In Deuteronomy 22:1-3, Scripture speaks of strayed cattle and other lost objects. It declares it to be the duty of everyone to protect these strayed or lost objects until the owner can search them out and recover them. In verse 3, Scripture says:” Thus shall you do with regard to all things lost by thy brother.” R. Jochanan, in Avoda Zara 26b, says, “I take the Scriptural word ‘brother’ to include the apostate.” Also, the phrase in Sanhedrin 44a, “Although he has sinned, he is still an Israelite,” applies as a general principle to the apostate. Note that Pachad Yitzchok (s.v. Mumar) applies this phrase a number of times to the apostate. Of course the law makes a distinction between a hostile apostate (mumar l’hachis) and an apostate merely out of supposed self-benefit or self-gratification (mumar l’teovone). These two different groups are met, of course, with different attitudes, but legally they are Jews, poshey Yisroel, sinful Jews, but still Jews.

These general maxims which include the apostate in the Jewish fold are exemplified and emphasized by the fact that certain vital Jewish functions, if performed by an apostate, are fully valid. This rule applies especially in matters of family life. If a woman’s husband has become an apostate, her marriage cannot be dissolved unless her apostate-husband gives her a get. In this divorce document the apostate may not use his new Gentile name but must use his old Jewish name, since it is still his name (Even Hoezer 129:5). If a man dies childless, his wife must get chalitza before she can marry again. She must get the chalitza from her husband’s brother even if the brother is now an apostate (Even Hoezer 157:4). (There are some variations of this law, but they do not directly concern us here.) This unbroken kinship with the apostate is to be seen also in the laws of inheritance. An apostate is entitled to inherit his father’s estate; and if he is the first-born, he still has the additional rights of a first-born (Choshen Mishpot 283:2).

Now if an apostate can validly perform and participate in these vital legal situations, there certainly can be no legal objection to an apostate being an attendant at a wedding. The wedding attendant is not an indispensable functionary. A Jewish wedding is legal if the husband proposes to the wife and gives her an object of value, and she accepts it in the presence of witnesses. Here the apostate sister is not necessary as a witness. There are other witnesses present, and so there can be no legal objection to her participating in the wedding.

This is the purely legal situation. But in all relationships with an apostate, there is, of course, some natural human reaction. We have suffered so cruelly through the centuries from the slanders and machinations of apostates that their very presence becomes hard for a Jew who knows Jewish history to endure. Of course, those bitter enemies of ours were mumar l’hachis. While it is reasonable to assume that this girl has no hostile intention at all, but has converted out of convenience, she is a mumar l’teovone. Nevertheless, to the extent that we are guided by our Jewish feelings, any sort of mumar is objectionable.

Thus it is that although the law gives a mumar virtually every legal right, the law still expresses caution in dealing with them. For example, in the laws of shechitah (Yore Deah 2:2, 4), as a general rule the apostate’s shechitah is kosher, but he must be carefully examined and watched. In the laws of inheritance, while the apostate may legally inherit, the rabbis under certain circumstances have stopped the transfer of property from a Jew to an apostate (see Choshen Mishpot 283:2). In other words, we judge the special circumstances before we decide whether or not we permit an apostate to exercise his privileges in Judaism, although it is legal for him to do so.

Thus in this case, the rabbi by tradition has leeway to go by his personal judgment. He must consider the communal and also the family situation. If having the apostate sister stand under the chuppah next to the bride at the marriage will be taken by many in the community as a condoning of apostasy and may, therefore, tend to increase such occurrences, then the rabbi has the right l ‘ migdor milso, to make “a fence of protection” and forbid the apostate’s participation. If, however, there is no danger of misunderstanding, then we must remember the legal status of the apostate in general. Nevertheless it would be wise not to have her there if it is a very small wedding. If there are more people present who are considered the legal witnesses, and if there is no danger of her presence being taken as condoning apostasy, then there can be no legal objection to her presence. Furthermore, one must also consider the family situation. If the parents of the bride are eager to have their daughter present, and if the bride herself is eager to have her sister, then forbidding her to participate could easily do more harm than good, especially since, after all, there is no real legal objection to her presence.