CCAR RESPONSA
5768.3
On Human Genetic Modification
She’elah
Positive eugenics is the medical process through which science and medicine is allowing parents to facilitate genetic enhancements in their children. Through a procedure known as prenatal genetic diagnosis (PGD), for example, parents can screen the genetic potential of zygotes and thereby choose the most “desirable” fetus. To be sure, we believe that negative eugenics is often immoral — the most evil example of negative eugenics is genocide. What does Judaism have to say about the morality of positive eugenics? Is genetic enhancement moral according to Judaism? Specifically, is PGD allowable for the selection of a “desirable” fetus from among a number of fertilized zygotes? Also, may we modify such zygotes prior to implantation for the purpose of enhancements such as increased height or intelligence, rather than for remedy? (Rabbi Josh Burrows, Washington, DC)
Teshuvah.
Prenatal genetic diagnosis (PGD) is often classified under the heading of “genetic engineering.” This may not be entirely accurate. While genetic engineering has been defined as “a process of inserting new genetic information into existing cells in order to modify a specific organism for the purpose of changing one of its characteristics,”[1] PGD is a much less intrusive technology; it involves no directed alteration of a cell or organism but rather an act of choice among existing zygotes. This, perhaps, is why our she’elah identifies PGD as a form of “eugenics,” a science “that deals with the improvement (as by control of human mating) of hereditary qualities of a race or breed.”[2] Yet there are differences here, as well. The concept of eugenics has been discussed and practiced for many centuries, whereas PGD, like genetic engineering, has been made possible thanks to recent advances in genetic technology and for that reason suggests a different set of questions. Given these similarities and differences, we want to examine our she’elah as an element of a larger topic that we would term “genetic modification,” which would include both genetic engineering and PGD. What is the attitude of Jewish tradition toward the range of new technologies that are intended to modify the generation of human life, that is, the outcome of the process of conception, birth, and procreation?[3] On the basis of that discussion, we can better address the specific question that has been posed to us.
1. Genetic Modification: No Prohibition. We begin by noting that halakhic authorities (poskim) have identified no traditional Jewish ritual prohibition (isur) against contemporary technologies of genetic modification. This conclusion might seem surprising, given the Biblical prohibition of kilayim, the mixing of diverse species in (among other things) the breeding of animals (Leviticus 19:19).[4] Yet leading poskim point out that the verse explicitly reads “You shall not let your cattle mate (lo tarbi`a) with a different kind,” that is, the prohibition deals specifically with the mating of mixed species and not with the “mixing” of genetic materials in a laboratory setting.[5] Since no other Biblical passage would seem to offer grounds to prohibit genetic modification, we are not required to deduce such a prohibition by means of creative interpretation.
To be sure, some commentators, including Nachmanides (Ramban), identify a governing rationale behind the mitzvah of kilayim: to instruct us that God’s creation is perfect as it is and that one who “mixes” the species denies that perfection.[6] Were we to adopt this reasoning, we might conclude that Jewish tradition opposes genetic modification as an impermissible tampering with ma`aseh bereishit, the order of creation. Yet not all halakhic authorities have drawn this conclusion. While some take a very restrictive attitude toward these new technologies,[7] others emphasize that Jewish thought has historically recognized the human control over the natural order: that is, the created universe has been entrusted to us to use, to exploit – and to alter – for our own benefit.[8] One classic statement to this effect is that of Nachmanides himself, who notes in his commentary to Genesis 1:28 (“… God said to [the man and the woman]: Be fertile, and increase, fill the earth and master it…”) that “God has given to humankind power and sovereignty over the earth, to do as they please with the animals and all that creep upon the earth, to build, to uproot, and to plant.” This statement, in turn, has been cited by halakhists in support of a permissive approach toward genetic engineering.[9] Our task here is not to resolve these two apparently contradictory statements of Nachmanides. We would simply note that Jewish tradition offers a range of understandings of humankind’s proper relationship to the natural world. For this reason, we cannot say that Jewish tradition requires that we regard the existing natural order, including the existing genetic structures of the various species of plant and animal life, as sacred and inviolate. This might imply, in turn, that there is no clear Jewish religious or legal objection to our manipulation of the genetic code of plants, animals, or even of human beings.[10]
2. Genetic Modification: Positive Support from the Jewish Tradition. Our sources, moreover, offer some positive evidence in support of this more permissive view.[11] We read in the Talmud:[12]
Rabbi Yochanan used to sit at the gates of the mikveh. He explained: “When the daughters of Israel come forth from their required immersion, they will look at me and may have sons who are handsome as I and as learned in Torah as I.”
His reasoning was that the women would be thinking of him when they went home to have intercourse with their husbands at the conclusion of their period of nidah, and that image would be imprinted upon the children they conceived. In a similar vein, Rabbi Yitzchak says, “One who places his marital bed in a north-to-south direction is sure to beget male offspring.”[13] Today, obviously, we regard these “technologies” as rank superstition. They may be better described as segulot, measures that work (if they work at all) through supernatural means and that far from replacing the “will of God” in the human reproductive process actually require Divine intervention to be successful. Yet these sources do suggest that the Sages did not object in principle to measures undertaken by human beings to influence the outcome of the “genetic lottery” and to try to insure that children would possess qualities that their parents thought desirable. From here we might learn that we, too, need not refrain from intervening in matters relating to human reproduction. And this thinking has guided contemporary halakhic authorities, including those representing the Reform responsa tradition, who have generally supported the use of advanced techniques to assist human reproduction (artificial insemination,[14] in vitro fertilization[15]), as well as such procedures as human stem cell research[16] and cloning.[17] Every one of these technologies could be viewed as a violation of the natural order, an imposition of human will upon that which ought to be reserved for Divine authority.[18] Yet the affirmative rabbinical attitudes suggest that we Jews do not necessarily view them as such. Rather, we can perceive them as the application of human reason, itself gift of God, toward finding remedies for human infertility and treatments for disease.
2. Genetic Modification: Causes for Concern. On the other hand, the fact that the sources of Jewish law do not explicitly prohibit the techniques of genetic modification does not mean that we enthusiastically support the application of those techniques under any and all circumstances. The Torah, as our teachers remind us,[19] is a written document and therefore cannot mention every conceivable issue of human conduct. For this reason, it speaks to some of those issues specifically and then offers us general rubrics or values – such as “holiness” or “righteousness” – by which we should determine our behavior in matters to which the text does not explicitly address itself. A specific action or behavior might not violate an explicit prohibition, but it might well run counter to one of those general principles, the higher standards of conduct to which the tradition would have us aspire. How we ought to apply these general, higher standards to specific questions is not obvious. Indeed, the precise meaning of terms such as “holiness” and “righteousness” in any specific instance will inevitably be contested. Yet this inherent ambiguity does not mean that we should ignore the demands of higher principles. Rather, we should consider them carefully and argue their implications as thoroughly as we can.
Along these lines, two major causes for concern make us hesitant to declare that Jewish tradition unreservedly “permits” the technologies of genetic modification.
a. Environmental Concerns. Before we can endorse any technology, we must first consider the effects it may have upon the natural environment.[20] In this case, we simply do not know enough about the potential hazards involved in the release of genetically-modified organisms (GMOs) into the environment to respond with a blanket heter (permit). In particular, with respect to genetic modification of humans, one hears dire predictions that such techniques, in the wrong hands, might be used to produce a “super race” of human beings. Some rabbis warn that they may lead to the breakdown of our social structure and of the family unit.[21] These fears may strike us as lurid or far-fetched, based as they are upon a form of “slippery slope” argumentation that is, at best, controversial.[22] As rabbis, at any rate, it lies beyond our professional competence to evaluate the probability that genetic manipulation technologies will produce ill effects upon our environment. Still, we do not believe it irrational to feel a deep concern over the potential for such effects. For example, while the Union for Reform Judaism is on record as supporting research using somatic gene therapy, i.e., the alteration of the genetic makeup of an individual organism, it pointedly does not endorse germline gene therapy, “which is more controversial and involves changes to an individual’s genetic makeup that can then be passed on to future generations, with unknown implications and potential complications.”[23] These implications and complications, precisely because they are “unknown” and “potential,” cannot be predicted with certainty. Yet their very prospect suggests that the only sane response to human genetic modification is one of extreme caution.[24]
b. Human Concerns. In addition to potentially damaging effects upon the environment, human genetic modification may also pose serious hazards to the very nature of our humanity. That is to say, it may alter in fundamental ways the manner in which we relate to the community and to our conception of our role as participants in human society. And Jewish tradition, we believe, would cast a worried eye toward the possibility of such changes. Although, as we have seen, Judaism accepts humankind’s dominion over physical creation, our sources also sound a cautionary note, warning us to avoid arrogance, to maintain our humility even at moments when we exercise our mastery, to keep far from the illusion that “my own strength and power have acquired all this abundance for me” (Deuteronomy 8:17). To put this metaphorically, we are entitled to eat the fruit of the garden (Genesis 2:16) on condition that we tend to the garden and protect it (Genesis 2:15).[25] The larger theological idea at issue is that of covenant (berit). To say that we exist in a covenantal relationship with God is on the one hand to assert a deep sense of our dignity and standing in God’s eyes; on the other hand, it is to suggest that there are proper limits to our assertiveness. This tension is reflected in the way that our sources famously describe humankind as “God’s partner (shutaf) in the work of creation.” We become God’s “partner” by following the rules God lays down for us: when we arrive at the correct legal decision,[26] when we keep the festivals properly,[27] or when we recite the passage Vayekhulu (Genesis 2:1-3) during the Friday evening prayers.[28] We would ask, therefore, what becomes of this notion of “partnership” when we undertake the enhancement of our offspring through means of genetic manipulation? Our question evokes the famous midrash on Genesis 1:26 (“Let us make the human being in our image and after our likeness”): from now on, says God, the human being shall be created by us, not by male or female alone, but by the two of them, together with God’s active participation.[29] Human life is created, yes, by human beings, but created by them in concert with God, with a sense of awe and reverence before the blessing of new life, conscious of the extent of our power and yet aware of the physical and moral limitations upon it. What happens to this sense of balance, of limitation, and of proportion when we arrogate to ourselves the power to design the genetic makeup of our children totally in accordance with our own desires?[30] What sort of people do we become when we assert our dominion over the generation of human life to the extent that these new genetic technologies make possible? What, moreover, becomes of our relationship to our children when we are empowered to “order” them in accordance with a list of desired specifications? Do we not risk turning them into commodities whose worth is measurable precisely on the basis of those specifications? We are concerned that the availability of this power will serve as an invitation to precisely the sort of arrogance that our tradition decries. Indeed, it will serve to convince us that there are no limitations (aside from technological ones) upon our right to affect and control the generation of human life.
Some of our readers, we realize, will not find these questions troubling. They will argue that the technologies of genetic manipulation pose no special or unprecedented assertion of human power. Genetic enhancement in their view is simply a form of education. They will claim that it is no less ethical “to allow parents to pick the eye color of their child or to try and create a fetus with a propensity for mathematics than it is to permit them to teach their children the values of a particular religion, try to inculcate a love of sports by taking them to football games, or to require them to play the piano.”[31] In our view, however, genetic manipulation may differ in kind, and not merely in degree, from those more traditional means of “improving” our children. It is one thing to educate our children in accordance with a set of values and virtues that we deem proper. It is the very nature of parenthood to “teach our children diligently” the path that we would have them walk.[32] At issue here, by contrast, is a level of control over our children that can hardly be compared to or described as “teaching.” We are, of course, far from neutral when it comes to wanting the best for our children. We are justified in acting so as to influence them to make good choices in their lives. But to our mind there is a huge difference between doing our best to influence outcomes (the talents that our children possess, the preferences they display, the decisions they are called upon to make) and acting so as to determine those outcomes. The latter, the province of human genetic enhancement, would tend to restrict the freedom of choice that is the basis of our conception of ethics and human personhood. It constitutes a radical and thoroughly unprecedented assertion of our control over the lives of others.
We should note that one need not be “religious” to share these concerns. There are prominent thinkers working from a secular liberal perspective who warn that the widespread availability of genetic enhancement technologies will foster the kind of world in which some of our most cherished moral values – humility; the unconditional love of parents for their children; solidarity with those who are less fortunate than we – are called into question.[33] They fear that it will be a world intolerant of human “weakness,” disability, and diversity, and they predict that such intolerance will fall heavily upon those segments of the population that do not choose – or cannot afford – to avail themselves of these technologies. Those parents who do not utilize genetic screening in order to produce more “successful” offspring, to say nothing of the offspring themselves, will bear the burden of their children’s “failures.” As one author puts it:[34]
The successful would become even more likely than they are now to view themselves as self-made and self-sufficient, and hence wholly responsible for their success. Those at the bottom of society would be viewed not as disadvantaged, and so worthy of a measure of compensation, but as simply unfit, and so worthy of genetic repair. The meritocracy, less chastened by chance, would become harder, less forgiving.
We, who approach the world from a perspective that is religious as well as liberal, would add that the values of humility, love, and social solidarity that these secular thinkers wish to preserve are firmly rooted in traditional Judaic teachings concerning our proper relationship to the world and to God. A world in which the technologies of human genetic enhancement are routine will be a world that dulls our quality of mercy and compassion, our capacity to empathize with our fellow humans, and our passion for social justice. Living in such a world may cause us to forget the message of our tradition that we human beings are not the sole masters of our nature and destiny. That act of forgetting would signal a terrible loss for humanity. We do not wish to create that sort of world for ourselves and our descendants.
Having stated our concerns over the application of the technologies of human genetic enhancement, we acknowledge that we are operating in a realm of great uncertainty. We cannot prove beyond reasonable doubt that the widespread availability of these technologies will necessarily produce the unfortunate effects that we have described. At the same time, we cannot predict with any confidence that these things will not happen if human genetic enhancement becomes a widespread practice. We find it vital, therefore, to state these possibilities clearly and not to dismiss them out of hand as improbable and far-fetched. The stakes involved, after all, could hardly be higher.
3. Medical Versus Non-Medical Applications: The Crucial Distinction. What, then, should be our response to questions such as the one addressed to us? Whatever answers we derive must proceed from a point we have already raised: our sources offer support for two differing understandings of our relationship as human beings to the created universe. We do not seek to proclaim that one of these understandings – mastery and dominion on the one hand, humility and restraint on the other – is the “correct” or better interpretation of Jewish tradition. Both are “correct,” because each makes its proper demands upon us. Judaism permits us to exercise our technological power over the natural environment, but it also asks us to place appropriate limits upon that power. Our response to this she’elah therefore seeks to define that crucial term “appropriate,” to strike a balance between the requirements of both lessons of our tradition, of both ways of looking at and acting in the world.
We find such a balance, as we have with respect to other controversial technologies,[35] in the distinction between medical and non-medical applications. Given that Jewish law and tradition offer no clear prohibition against the technologies of human genetic modification, there is no justification for rejecting their use for legitimate medical purposes. The practice of medicine is a mitzvah; it partakes of pikuach nefesh, the act of saving human life, which our tradition recognizes as our highest moral obligation.[36] To turn our back upon these newly-developed treatments for disease would accordingly be a senseless, self-destructive act in violation of that mitzvah. The better response is one of gratitude: we ought to give thanks that science has improved our ability to relieve human suffering.[37] On the other hand, to the extent that these technologies are to be employed for non-medical ends, our attitude would be more restrictive. We should emphasize that this is not a firm “no” to any and every application of these technologies for ends that are not strictly speaking medical. We recognize that there may be non-medical applications for human genetic enhancement that, when we consider each case on the basis of its own merits, will strike us as legitimate and compelling. We speak here rather of general tendencies: when the aim of genetic enhancement is not to fulfill the mitzvah of pikuach nefesh, the “causes for concern” that we have raised would correspondingly become more urgent and predominant in our thinking.
The line between “medical” and “non-medical” can be difficult to draw. The definition of “medical” is inherently controversial, in no small part because the definition of “disease,” the condition that medicine is meant to remedy, is also controversial.[38] Suppose, for example, that prenatal screening indicates that an embryo displays a genetic abnormality associated with albinism, or deafness, or short stature. Are these to be considered “diseases,” as proper subjects for intervention by way of genetic manipulation? Some define “disease” as a condition that the community judges to be “abnormal, dysfunctional, and disvalued”; if we accept that standard, “the entire process of defining health and disease must be subjective and especially vulnerable to political or social influences.”[39] Yet the fact that the definition of “disease” is not entirely objective does not mean that the term cannot be defined or that it has no substantive content. We might liken the situation to that of a spectrum. At the one end, we group those conditions that most of us would with confidence describe as “diseases,” while at the other end are those conditions that, even though we might wish to avoid them, we cannot so define. In between these two extremes will be conditions about which we will be in doubt: are these “diseases,” or are they simply realities that we may wish were different? We should consider these conditions on a case-by-case basis, open ourselves to arguments for both sides, and make the best decision that we can. We will surely disagree among ourselves as to the conclusions we draw. But such disagreements are the stuff of ethical argument and, indeed, of the study of Torah in all generations.
4. Conclusion. We cannot, therefore, draw a hard and fast general rule that distinguishes between acceptable and unacceptable use of prenatal genetic diagnosis (PGD) in all cases. What we can say is that in the cases described in our she’elah, where PGD would be employed to produce children with “increased height or intelligence,” the procedure would serve a decidedly non-medical purpose. These are goals of enhancement; they are not legitimate therapeutic responses to disease. As such, we would counsel against them. True, these enhancements would involve a choice among existing embryos rather than the directed genetic modification of any of them. They are, however, “enhancements” just the same, and of a piece with the technologies of human genetic modification that we have discussed, and over which we have expressed our deep concern, in this teshuvah.
One final note. Our she’elah speaks of a distinction between “positive” and “negative” eugenics. This calls to mind the eugenics movement that rose to social and cultural prominence in the United States and other Western countries during the early- to mid-20th century. That movement used the phrase “negative eugenics” to describe steps aimed at discouraging (or prohibiting) reproduction among those deemed unfit, while “positive eugenics” referred to measures that would encourage reproduction among the “fit” elements of the society. The movement as a whole, including its particular conceptions of human “fitness,” was rooted in a social outlook that was frankly racist;[40] there is, in other words, little that we find “positive” in “positive eugenics.” While present-day advocates of “genetic enhancement” should not be declared guilty by way of linguistic association, the fact that their terminology bears such connotations is another reason for us to think long, hard, and carefully before endorsing such measures.
NOTES
1. United States. Environmental Protection Agency, “Terms of Environment: Glossary, Abbreviations and Acronyms,” http://www.epa.gov/OCEPAterms/gterms.html (accessed January 27, 2008).
2. The definition is taken from Medline Plus, an online medical dictionary maintained by the United States National Institutes of Health, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/mplusdictionary.html (accessed March 3, 2008).
3. Much of what we write here is informed by the responsum of our colleague Rabbi Walter Jacob, “Jewish Involvement in Genetic Engineering,” Questions and Reform Jewish Answers (QRJA) (New York: CCAR, 1992), no. 154, pp. 247-252 and http://data.ccarnet.org/cgi-bin/respdisp.pl?file=154&year=narr . We shall extend some of the conclusions to be found there, as Rabbi Jacob notes that his responsum “is not intended to discuss genetic engineering in human beings” (p. 247).
4. See also Deuteronomy 22:9-12. These laws are set forth in the mishnaic tractate Kilayim and in the section of Maimonides’ Mishneh Torah called Hilkhot Kilayim.
5. R. Shelomo Zalman Auerbach (Israel, d. 1995), Resp. Minchat Shelomo 2:100. See also A. S. Avraham, Nishmat Avraham (Jerusalem: Falk Schlesinger Institute, 1991), v. 4, p. 216.
6. Nachmanides, Lev. 19:19; see also Sefer Hachinukh, comm. no. 331. This diverges from the approach of Rashi (Lev. 19:19), who classifies kilayim in the category of gezeirot, commandments that have no apparent logical or rational explanation and are to be obeyed simply because they are expressions of God’s will.
7. R. Shelomo Goren, Torat Harefu’ah (Jerusalem, 2001), 269, cites Genesis 5:3 (“When Adam had lived for 130 years, he begot a son I his likeness, after his image”), and remarks: “(I)f we permit genetic engineering, it is possible that the human being will no longer produce children after his own image and likeness but rather according to the image chosen by scientists…”. It is difficult to imagine that Rabbi Goren expects this purely homiletical statement to be taken literally. He does not specify, for example, at just what point a genetically-altered person ceases to be “human” and is to be defined as something else. After all, even a cloned human being would be human. As an expression of his concern over potential abuses, however, the statement does deserve to be taken seriously.
8. Rabbi Jacob (note 3, above) makes this point at length.
9. Nishmat Avraham (note 5, above), v. 4, p. 215.
10. R. Michael Broyde reaches a similar conclusion on a related issue in his article “Cloning People: A Jewish Law Analysis of the Issues,” Connecticut Law Review 30 (1997-1998), 503-535. The article is also available at http://jlaw.com/Articles/cloning.html (accessed April 8, 2008).
11. One interesting attempt to find such positive support is based upon the comment of R. Yechiel Mechel Epstein that the Torah’s prohibitions do not apply to substances too small to be seen with the naked eye (Arukh Hashulchan, Yoreh De`ah 84:36). This determination allows him to explain why we are permitted to drink water and breathe air even though in doing so we ingest countless microorganisms that presumably are forbidden for consumption. On this basis, Jewish law could be said to be strictly neutral with respect to technologies such as genetic engineering that take place in the microscopic realm. This line of thinking is rejected, however, by contemporary authorities on the very reasonable grounds that the effects of genetic engineering occur in organisms that are indeed visible to us all; see Nishmat Avraham (note 5, above), v. 4, pp. 215-216.
12. B. Berakhot 20a, B. Bava Metzi`a 84a.
13. B. Berakhot 5b.
14. See American Reform Responsa (ARR), nos. 157-158 (http://data.ccarnet.org/cgi-bin/respdisp.pl?file=157&year=arr and http://data.ccarnet.org/cgi-bin/respdisp.pl?file=158&year=arr ). For a brief survey of the traditional halakhic discussion of this procedure see Mark Washofsky, Jewish Living (New York: URJ Press, 2001), 233-236 and 447-448.
15. See Responsa Committee, 5757.2, “In Vitro Fertilization and the Status of the Embryo” (http://data.ccarnet.org/cgi-bin/respdisp.pl?file=2&year=5757 ) and 5758.3, “In Vitro Fertilization and the Mitzvah of Childbearing” (http://data.ccarnet.org/cgi-bin/respdisp.pl?file=3&year=5758 ).
16. Responsa Committee, 5761.7, “Human Stem Cell Research” (http://data.ccarnet.org/cgi-bin/respdisp.pl?file=7&year=5761 ); testimony of Rabbi Moshe Dovid Tendler, Ethical Issues in Human Stem Cell Research, Volume III: Religious Perspectives (Rockville, MD: National Bioethics Advisory Commission, 2000), H1-H5 (http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/past_commissions/nbac_stemcell3.pdf , accessed February 20, 2008).
17. See Broyde (note 10, above).
18. As they are viewed in fact under current interpretations of Roman Catholic theology. See Donum vitae, the statement of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith published on Feb. 22, 1987 and signed by the prefect of the Congregation, Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger (now Pope Benedict XVI); http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_19870222_respect-for-human-life_en.html (accessed September 24, 2008).
19. The classic expression of this point is provided, once again, by Nachmanides, in his commentaries to Leviticus 19:2 and Deuteronomy 6:18.
20. For a brief statement of this argument, see our responsum “Endangered Species,” Teshuvot for the Nineties (TFN), 5753.3, pp. 319-320 (http://data.ccarnet.org/cgi-bin/respdisp.pl?file=3&year=5753) .
21. For example, R. Eliezer Yehudah Waldenberg, Resp. Tzitz Eliezer 15:45; R. Moshe Hershler in Halakhah Urefu’ah (Jerusalem: Makhon Regensburg, 1985), v. 4, 90-95; and R. Shelomo Goren (note 7, above), 265-275.
22. The “slippery slope” argument is a familiar feature in ethical and legal debate. Strictly speaking, it is not a logical fallacy, because it cannot be either proven or refuted by formal logical demonstration. For this very reason, though, the argument is always controversial. There is no formal logical reason why taking step A will necessarily lead to the undesired conclusion Z or why the slope cannot stop at B or C or at any other acceptable middle step. See, in general, Frederick Schauer, “Slippery Slopes,” Harvard Law Review 99 (1985), 361-383; G.D. Hartogh, “The Slippery Slope Argument,” in H. Kuhse and P. Singer, eds., A Companion to Bioethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), 280-292; and Mark Washofsky, “On the Absence of Method in Jewish Bioethics,” in Alyssa Gray and Bernard Jackson, eds., Jewish Law Association Studies XVII (2007), at 265-267. For critiques of the use of the “slippery slope” argument in the area of human genetic engineering, see N. Holtuq, “Human Gene Therapy: Down the Slippery Slope?” Bioethics 7 (1993), 402-419, and T. McGleenan, “Human Gene Therapy and Slippery Slope Arguments,” Journal of Medical Ethics 21 (1995), 350-355.
23. Resolution on Stem Cell Research, adopted at the 67th General Assembly of the Union for Reform Judaism (Minneapolis, 2003), http://urj.org/Articles/index.cfm?id=7152&pge_prg_id=30698&pge_id=1625 (accessed February 20, 2008).
24. See Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu, “The Perils of Cognitive Enhancement and the Urgent Imperative to Enhance the Moral Character of Humanity,” Journal of Applied P{hilosophy (forthcoming). http://www.practicalethics.ox.ac.uk/Pubs/Savulescu/moral_enhancement.pdf , accessed on March 12, 2008. This article is especially interesting in that Professor Savulescu, Director of the Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics at the University of Oxford, is otherwise known for his support of genetic enhancement of humans. See his “Why I Believe Parents Are Morally Obligated to Genetically Modify Their Children,” Times Higher Education Supplement, Nov. 5, 2004, p. 16, http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/story.asp?storyCode=192218§ioncode=26, accessed on March 12, 2008.
25. See Avot deR. Natan, nusach aleph, ch. 11, and nusach bet, ch. 21: “R. Shimeon b. Elazar said: Even the first human being did not taste any food until he had performed an act of labor,” etc.
26. B. Shabbat 10a; Mekhilta de-Rabbi Yishma’el, Masekhta de`Amalek, ch. 2, on Exodus 18:13.
27. Pesikta Zutarta, ed. S. Buber (Vilna, 1880), 136b.
28. B. Shabbat 119b.
29. Bereshit Rabah 8:9 and parallels.
30. For an argument along these lines, see Daniel Schiff, “Developing Halakhic Attitudes to Sex Preselection,” in Walter Jacob and Moshe Zemer, eds., The Fetus and Fertility in Jewish Law (Pittsburgh: Freehof Institute of Progressive Halakhah, 1995), 91-117.
31. Arthur L. Caplan, Glenn McGee, and David Magnus, “What Is Immoral About Eugenics?” British Medical Journal 319 (1999), 1-2, http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=1129063 (accessed on April 16, 2008).
32. On the traditional obligation to teach our children both Torah and a useful occupation, see B. Kidushin 29b and Yad, Talmud Torah 1:1ff. Rambam (1:12) understands “Torah” expansively, as encompassing subject matters (“Pardes,” the domains of physics and metaphysics) that go beyond the specifics of religious practice. Our own liberal understanding of the tradition would include the human sciences and the humanities within this rubric, just as it would set aside the traditional determination that excludes women from the mitzvah of talmud torah.
33. See Jurgen Habermas, The Future of Human Nature (Oxford: Polity Press, 2003). 13: “as soon as adults treat the desirable genetic traits of their descendants as a product they can shape according to a design of their own liking, they are exercising a kind of control over their genetically manipulated offspring that intervenes in the somatic bases of another person’s spontaneous relation to self and ethical freedom. This kind of intervention should only be exercised over things, not persons.” For a good, brief summary of this position see Michael Sandel, The Case Against Perfection (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2007).
34. Sandel (note 33, above), 92.
35. An example is our response to the question of plastic surgery. Despite the obvious differences between genetic manipulation and plastic surgery, the two are similar in that the latter, like the former, involves technologies administered by medical-scientific personnel that can serve either a medical or a non-medical goal. See TFN, no. 5752.7, pp. 127-132 (http://data.ccarnet.org/cgi-bin/respdisp.pl?file=7&year=5752 ), and Responsa Committee, no. 5759.4 (http://data.ccarnet.org/cgi-bin/respdisp.pl?file=4&year=5759 ). See especially TFN, no. 5752.7, p. 131: “(i)t is conceivable that, for some persons, ‘mere’ cosmetic surgery may serve a useful and legitimate purpose. It may be determined, for example, that an enhanced appearance is vital to an individual’s psychological and emotional well-being. This is a judgement that must be made carefully in each individual case; when it is made, these persons should not be dissuaded from this alternative. In general, however, we think this argument is too frequently raised and too easily exaggerated. We would argue the opposite: that so many people are willing to subject themselves to damaging and potentially dangerous procedures for no other reason than better looks is clear evidence of the overemphasis which our materialistic culture places upon superficialities. Rabbis customarily and justly critique this distortion of values. Indeed, if Judaism means anything to us, it admonishes us to look below the surface, to concentrate upon the development of deeper and more lasting measurements of self-worth and satisfaction.”
36. For sources and discussion, see Teshuvot for the Nineties (TFN), no. 5754.18, pp. 373-380 (http://data.ccarnet.org/cgi-bin/respdisp.pl?file=18&year=5754), as well as Responsa Committee no. 5759.10 (http://data.ccarnet.org/cgi-bin/respdisp.pl?file=10&year=5759 ).
37. Rabbi Jacob reaches this conclusion in QRJA, no. 154. And see Nishmat Avraham (note 5, above), p. 217: “Those researches that are presently focusing on human beings who suffer from various genetic defects and that seek to correct the defects by way of genetic modification are certainly worthy of praise.”
38. See our discussion in TFN, no. 5754.14, “On the Treatment of the Terminally Ill,” at p. 350 ( http://data.ccarnet.org/cgi-bin/respdisp.pl?file=14&year=5754 ): “Terms such as ‘therapeutic’ and ‘successful treatment’ are inherently vague and impossible to define with precision. In many situations it will be problematic if not impossible to determine when or even if the prescribed regime of therapy has lost its medical value. Yet the decision to continue or to cease the treatment must nonetheless be made, and those who must make it will confront an element of doubt and uncertainty that cannot be entirely resolved.”
39. Arthur L. Caplan, “If Gene Therapy Is The Cure, What Is The Disease?” http://www.bioethics.net/articles.php?viewCat=6&articleId=58 (accessed April 9, 2008).
40. See, in general, Wendy Kline, Building a Better Race: Gender, Sexuality, and Eugenics from the Turn of the Century to the Baby Boom (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); Harry Bruinius, Better for All the World: The Secret History of Forced Sterilization and America’s Quest for Racial Purity (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2006); and M. A. Hasian, Jr., The Rhetoric of Eugenics in Anglo-American Thought (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1996).
If needed, please consult Abbreviations used in CCAR Responsa.