CCAR RESPONSA
5769.2
Annulling a Pledge to Tzedakah
She’elah
A member of the Jewish community (we’ll call him “Ploni”) made a pledge this year to the United Jewish Communities (“Federation”) communal campaign, as he customarily does. This year, however, the leaders of the UJC knowingly took actions that could have had a negative effect on Ploni’s workplace and livelihood. Ploni works for a Jewish organization in town, an organization over which the UJC has attempted to exert control. Relations between that organization, which has served the Jewish community for over forty years, and the UJC have sharply deteriorated. The UJC has acted in a vindictive way, speaking negatively about Ploni’s organization in the community and threatening to start a competing agency should the organization’s board not accept the UJC’s demands. While the UJC board has since backed away from that threat, the situation between the two parties remains tense, and actions taken by the UJC continue to suggest that they are operating in a competitive mode.
For these reasons, Ploni is not inclined to fulfill his monetary pledge this year to the UJC. He wants to know, according to Jewish law, if he is obligated to pay all, some, or none of his pledge, in light of the ongoing and unresolved difficulties with the UJC board, and the possible negative impact such actions can have on him his livelihood, and his family. (Rabbi Beth J. Chottiner, Wheeling, WV)
Teshuvah
The Responsa Committee is not a beit din, a court of Jewish law that adjudicates actual cases. Were we empowered to perform such a function, we would need to hear the evidence and claims of both sides to a particular dispute before rendering a decision. In this instance, as in most of the communal disputes over which we are occasionally called upon to express an opinion, we are presented with the arguments of only one side (that of “Ploni”) and have no access to those of the other (the UJC-Federation). We say this to make it clear that we are not deciding this dispute; we cannot say that the right lies with either Ploni or the UJC or that it is somehow split between them. Our task is to respond to the question as it has been framed for us. That is, if we presume Ploni’s version of events to be correct, would we regard him as obligated according to Jewish law and tradition to fulfill his pledge to the UJC campaign?
1. Pledges to Tzedakah in Jewish Tradition. “Tzedakah,” writes Maimonides, “belongs to the category of vows. Therefore, one who says ‘I pledge a sela to tzedakah’ must give that sela to the poor immediately” unless he specified in his pledge that the gift would be made at a later time.[1] This rule, repeated in the Shulchan Arukh,[2] is based upon a Rabbinic interpretation of Deuteronomy 23:24.[3] Jewish tradition would regard a pledge of tzedakah, such as Ploni’s pledge to the local Federation campaign, as a binding obligation under Torah law. The relevant legal theory is that when one makes a vow to “Heaven” – for example, a pledge to bring a sacrifice or to make a donation to the ancient Temple or to pay a certain sum to tzedakah – one effectively transfers to “Heaven” the legal title to that object or sum, just as surely as if one had transferred the physical possession of some object or sum to an earthly buyer.[4] For this reason, “(o)ne who has made a vow to tzedakah is not permitted to retract it.”[5]
The word “retract” implies a unilateral decision: one cannot on one’s own renounce a pledge to tzedakah. On the other hand, one can annul the vow through the process of hatarat nedarim (“release of vows”), a legal ritual that takes place before an ordinary beit din of three judges or before a single scholar who is an expert in this field of law.[6] In its essence, the process requires that the individual express sincere regret over the vow, saying that “had I but known at the time that thus-and-such would have happened to me and that I would feel this way today, I never would have made this vow.”[7] This procedure suffices to release a vow made concerning any subject; a pledge to tzedakah would be no exception.[8] However, in an important responsum, R. David ibn Zimra (Radbaz, 16th-century Egypt and Eretz Yisrael) writes that while aa a matter of law a tzedakah vow can be annulled, “the scholar who annuls it deserves excommunication (nidu’i)… because he has caused a loss to the poor.”[9] This ruling, cited approvingly by a number of subsequent authorities,[10] affirms the existence of a powerful moral (if not strictly legal) obligation not to seek or to grant a release of a pledge made to tzedakah.
2. The Case Before Us. We, too, cite the decision of Radbaz with approval. Ploni has made a pledge – that is, a vow – to tzedakah, and he bears an obligation under Jewish law to pay it. He could, of course, seek a release of that vow, and assuming the accuracy of his description of the relations between his agency and the UJC, he could without much difficulty support the required claim that “had I but known that these things would happen, I never would have made this pledge.” At the same time, the moral obligation of which Radbaz speaks would argue powerfully in favor of his paying the pledge and not seeking to annul it.
Against this, Ploni could raise two pertinent arguments.
First, he could assert that his pledge to the UJC campaign does not take on the character of a vow, since the very concept of a vow is rather foreign to us. When we sign a pledge card or say “yes” to the UJC telephone solicitor, we do not generally imagine that we have made a ritually-binding obligation that the Torah requires us to fulfill. Instead, we think that we have made a simple statement of intent, an intent that we can change without transgressing against the details and technicalities of the traditional laws that govern vows (hilkhot nedarim). This argument, however, is insufficient. Whether or not one is thinking “vow” when one pledges to the campaign, that pledge is a promise, a self-imposed obligation to perform a mitzvah. And the concept of “promise” or “obligation” is not foreign to us at all. For example, this Committee has ruled that Jewish law empowers a congregation to bring suit in civil court against a member who is delinquent in paying his or her financial obligations – i.e., pledges – to the synagogue. Although we cautioned that a congregation should think long and hard before resorting to this difficult remedy, the remedy itself is approved by our tradition.[11] This simply underscores the binding nature of the promises we make, particularly promises of financial support to communal institutions. In short, we may not be thinking “vow,” but a vow is what we are making.
Second, Ploni might offer to take the money he would have donated to the UJC campaign and give it directly to the Federation’s constituent agencies or other charitable organizations. In this way, the objection of Radbaz that one who annuls a pledge to tzedakah “has caused a loss to the poor” would not apply to him. Yet there are problems with this course as well. As Radbaz notes in his teshuvah, when one has vowed tzedakah to a particular individual, that person has legal title to it; the one who has made the vow cannot thereupon transfer the tzedakah to another recipient.[12] In this case the UJC, as the agent for its constituent agencies and the clients and causes they serve, has “title” to Ploni’s pledge, a title that translates into a reasonable expectation that he will keep his promise. The pledge, upon which the Federation relies as it considers its allocations for the coming year, thus becomes a moral (as well as legal) obligation. The UJC may well have dealt unjustly with Ploni and his agency; if so, all appropriate remedies should be sought and employed. But that fact – again, assuming that it is true – does not justify his retracting a pledge that was intended, after all, to perform a mitzvah: to assist the Federation in helping the poor and in supporting Jewish life.
Conclusion. Jewish law allows an individual to annul a vow to tzedakah, but it regards such an annulment as a transgression against one’s moral obligation to aid the needy. We think that this teaching applies quite well to our case. Ploni, should he choose to do so, may refrain from pledging to next year’s UJC campaign, so long as he donates directly to tzedakah agencies the sum he would otherwise have pledged. We hope, of course, that he does not choose to do so, that the disputes between his agency and the UJC can be resolved by that time. As for this year’s campaign, meanwhile, he should fulfill his promise.
NOTES
1. Yad, Matanot Aniyim 8:1.
2. Shulchan Arukh Yoreh De`ah 257:3. Isserles, ad loc., notes that pledges made to a public campaign are generally not due to be paid “immediately.”
3. B. Rosh Hashanah 6a. The verse clearly establishes the obligation to fulfill one’s vows; the Rabbis include tzedakah among these vows on the basis of befikha, the final and seemingly superfluous word of the verse. See Kesef Mishneh to Yad, Matanot Aniyim 8:1.
4. Amirato legevo`ah kemesirato lehedyot: M. Kidushin 1:6, Tosefta Kidushin (ed. Lieberman) 1:9; B. Kidushin 28b and parallels.
5. Shulchan Arukh Yoreh De`ah 258:6, ratifying the conclusions of a long line of authorities: R. Yitzchak Alfasi, Hilkhot HaRif, Bava Kama fol. 18b; Tosafot, Bava Kama 36b, s.v. yad; R. Asher b. Yechiel, Hilkhot HaRosh, Bava Kama 4:3; R. Shelomo b. Adret, Resp. Rashba 3:298; and Tur, Yoreh De`ah 258.
6. Rambam describes the procedure in Yad, Shevu`ot 6:1ff. In 6:2, he informs us that the procedure “has no legal root (`ikar) in the written Torah; rather, our teacher Moses learned it through oral tradition.” In Yad, Nedarim 4:5 he notes that the procedure is identical with respect to vows (nedarim) and oaths (shevu`ot).
7. See M. Nedarim 9:1-2: the members of the court may even suggest to the individual various pretexts upon which he might appeal for the annulment of his vow.
8. R. Meir Azariah of Fano (d. 1620), in his Responsa, no. 62, summarizes the discussion in the sources. One can have a vow to tzedakah annulled, although the grounds are somewhat more stringent than those required for other vows, given that one should not be seen as attempting to avoid the fulfillment of a mitzvah.
9. Resp. Radbaz 4:134.
10. R. Shalom M. Schwadron (19th-20th century Poland), Resp. Maharsham 3:119; R. Halfon Moshe Hakohen (20th-century Tunisia), Resp. Sho’el Venish’al 1, Yoreh De`ah no. 166; R. Ovadyah Hadayah (20th-century Israel), Resp. Yaskil Avdi 2, Yoreh De`ah no. 11); and R. Rachamim Hakohen (20th-century Israel), Resp. Simchat Kohen, Yoreh De`ah no. 109. A number of these authorities do hold that one may ask for release from a vow to tzedakah under certain circumstances: for example, when one’s financial situation has deteriorated, or when the organization to which one made the original pledge has dissolved. Such circumstances do not apply in the case before us.
11. Responsa Committee, no. 5764.1, “Collection of Debts to the Congregation,” http://data.ccarnet.org/cgi-bin/respdisp.pl?file=1&year=5764 .
12. See note 9, above: amirato lo kemesirato, “the pledge to this person is tantamount to transferring ownership to him.”
If needed, please consult Abbreviations used in CCAR Responsa.