Breast-Feeding or Bottle-Feeding

In the government hospitals which do obstetrical work for the wives of service men, it often happens that mothers refuse to breast-feed their babies. In ac cordance with their wish, a suppression of lactation is made and the baby is fed by formula from a bottle. Is there any objection to this process from the point of view of Jewish legal tradition? Further, the physician making the inquiry wants to know some of the tradi tions or folklore concerning breast-feeding, mother’s milk, and so forth. (From Rabbi Aryeh Lev, New York

City, asked unofficially on behalf of the physician)

In Biblical times the only known way of feeding an infant was by breast-feeding. Hence, a mother who would refuse to breast-feed her baby would, in effect, be willfully starving the infant. Therefore, the author of Lamentations uses such a cruel mother in a metaphor, as follows:

Even the jackals draw out the breast,
They give suck to their young ones;
But the daughter of my people is become cruel,
The tongue of the sucking child cleaveth to the roof of his mouth for thirst . . . (4 : 3-4).

However, this poetic statement does not necessarily indicate that only the mother herself must breast-feed her child. They did use wet nurses in Biblical times. These wet nurses were greatly beloved and honored. Thus we read that when Rebecca left home to be married to Isaac, her wet nurse (Maynekes) went with her (Genesis 24 : 59). When this wet nurse died (Genesis 35 : 8) the place of her burial was affectionately called “the oak of tears.”

But the question asked is whether it is a mother’s duty to breast-feed her baby herself as long as it is possible for her to do so. There is a great deal of legal material on the general question of breast-feeding. Most of it is found in the Talmud in b. Ketuboth 59-60, and then, based on the Talmud, the law finds its way into the various Codes, particularly in the Shulchan Aruch, Even Hoezer 80 and 82.

It must be realized at the outset that there are a number of circumstances under which a mother can actually refuse to breast-feed her baby. Of course, such a refusal would not mean that the baby would not be nourished. A wet nurse would be engaged. In fact, even if a wet nurse were not available, they had a sort of a formula involving milk and eggs (see b. Yevamoth 42b). There are a number of circumstances, mentioned in the Talmud and embodied in the later law, under which a woman can simply refuse to breast-feed her baby herself. If, for example, it was the custom in a parental home to employ wet nurses and if she brought two maidservants into the marriage, she could refuse to nurse the baby herself (see b. Ketuboth 59 b ; also b. Ketuboth 61c). If the husband can afford wet nurses, she can refuse to nurse the baby herself.

But how can a mother be allowed to refuse to nurse her baby herself when the Mishnah says clearly, in Ketuboth 5 : 5, that it is the duty of a mother to nurse her baby? It is to be observed that the duty is mentioned as follows— and the exact wording is significant: “These are the tasks which a woman must do for her husband; she must grind the corn and bake and wash and give suck to her son.” It is noteworthy that these are the duties which she owes to her husband; in other words, basically, the obligation to nourish a child up to the age of six, or to provide for his nourishment, is incumbent upon the father. He can be compelled to nourish or to provide for the nourishment of his child if he refuses to do so of his own free will (see Even Hoezer 71 : 1). So, in effect, nursing the infant is one of the duties which the wife owes her husband. But the basic duty of feeding the infant in some way or other is incumbent upon the father. Thus the law is clear that if the wife can afford to hire a wet nurse, she may do so. The child is fed and her duty to her husband is thus fulfilled. Hence, if she is divorced, she no longer has these various duties toward her husband mentioned in the Mishnah, grinding corn, weaving, and so forth, and therefore is no longer obligated to nurse his baby and her baby. Now he must pay her for it or hire a wet nurse (b. Ketuboth 59b). In this regard, there is a very interesting responsum by Samuel D. Medina, of Turkey, sixteenth century (“Rashdam,” Even Hoezer 193). A widowed woman bore a posthumous child and she demanded pay from her husband’s brother (who shared in the estate) for nursing the child, and the rabbi allowed her claim. Of course, if the husband does not want her to nurse the baby and she does want to nurse the baby, her will must prevail because of the pain caused her by the undischarged milk (b. Ketuboth 61a). But if he wants her to nurse his child and she refuses, her will prevails if it is the custom to have wet nurses in her father’s house.

Of course, while a divorced woman can refuse to nurse the child, there is, nevertheless, an interesting and important limitation to this right of refusal. If she has already nursed the child long enough (usually forty days) so that the child recognizes her and might refuse to take nourish ment from someone else, then she may not refuse to nurse him (Shulchan Aruch, Even Hoezer 8 : 50).

As far as I know, there is no law concerning techniques of suppression of lactation. The authorities do not speak of it directly; but they do have considerable discussion about which foods hinder the production of the milk or increase it, what foods the mother may not eat, lest they affect the child through the milk, and so on (see, in general, b. Ketuboth 60 b , and a special discussion of it in W. M. Feldman, The Jewish Child, p. 183).

As to the latter part of the question, asking for some of the folklore regarding lactation, Feldman refers to much of it. For example, people believed that the mother’s milk is derived from the mother’s blood. They evidently connected the cessation of menstruation during pregnancy with a transformation of the blood into milk for the child. Then they speak of various foods and vegetables which might do harm to the child through the mother’s milk.

The various laws which prohibit a woman remarrying while she is nursing her first husband’s child, are of no direct concern to the question except, perhaps, that the questioner might be interested in the related matter of weaning the child. If a child has been kept off its mother’s milk for four or five days, it may return to the breast if this abstention occurred within twenty-four months of birth; but if it has been kept off mother’s milk after twenty-four months from birth, it is forbidden to return to the breast. However, a mother may continuously breast-feed a child for four to five years. If a mother gives birth to twins, she may refuse to breast-feed both and has the right to demand that a wet nurse be provided for one of them.

There is no need to mention more of these folkloristic customs and some of the laws which may have folkloristic motivations. The answer to the essential question asked is clear: The duty to suckle the child is one of the duties which a wife owes to her husband. If she can afford a wet nurse, or he can afford a wet nurse, she need no longer feed the child, since the essential law is that the father is in duty bound to arrange for the child to be fed. If she is divorced, therefore, she can refuse to nurse the child. If, therefore, a modern woman does not wish to nurse the child, she is justified in refusing. Certainly with her husband’s consent, she may do so. Even without his consent, she may refuse if she can afford to make other provisions (in the ancient times this meant a wet nurse). Therefore it is clear that the law is permissive in this regard.