Father Transfers Children to Christian Sunday School

A physician in your congregation removed his chil dren from your religious school and entered them into the Sunday School of the local Presbyterian Church. You ask whether this action affects his right to he a member of your congregation. (To Rabbi Max Selinger, Cumberland, Maryland)

There is no doubt that by taking the children out of the Jewish school this man has violated the positive commandment, namely, that it is a duty incumbent upon the father to teach, or to provide for the teaching of, the Torah to his children. There is also no doubt that by enrolling them in a Christian Sunday School he is putting them on the road to apostasy from Judaism. That he has committed a sin thereby is certain, but the specific question that you ask concerning him is a difficult one. Does he, because of this sin, forfeit the right to be a member of the congregation?

You know, of course, that as far as worshiping with the congregation is concerned, the Talmud states (b. Keritot 6b) that no fast day service is a proper one unless sinners are included among the worshipers. That is why, in the preliminary statement to the Kol Nidre, we say that God has commanded us to worship with sinners. In other words, if he should want to worship with the congregation, one would not forbid him that duty or privilege. But you ask whether he has the right to be a member, which means the potential right to be an officer and even to be honored by the congregation, as being called up to the Torah, and so on. In other words, just what has he forfeited by his sin?

The legal literature does not specifically mention a man’s status in the community in relation to this particular sin. But there is sufficient discussion of analogous matters to give us some guide as to the spirit of the tradition in such matters. There is a great deal of discussion in the law concerning “one who separates himself from the ways of the congregation” {Hapores m’darche zibbur). The statement is used specifically, at first, with regard to the question as to whether one should mourn for such a man if he dies or whether to engage in his funeral. For the sake of completeness, it would be well to go through this discussion from the beginning.

The Sifra to Emor, end of first section, and the Talmud in b. Sanhedrin 47a, speak of a priest being forbidden to “defile himself” by participating in funerals. He may do so, however, for his close relatives. The text, Leviticus 21 : 4, says, “He shall not defile himself, being a chief man among his people. . . .” To which the Talmud says, “If the relative acts truly as one of the people of Israel, the priest may defile himself for that funeral, but not if the person ‘hias separated from the ways of the congregation’.” It is from this passage in the Talmud that the phrase is carried over in all the later law. There is one other even sterner passage in the Jerusalem Talmud, Terumoth 8 : 3, in which it is said that if a shochet or a butcher feeds people trefa meat, we must not even bury him at all. The next important source is in the post-Talmudic treatise, “Semachot” 2 : 8, in which the law is applied not only as to priests, but as to all sinners and all relatives. Sefer Ha Eshcol, in the laws of the uncleanness of priests (p. 179, end of chapter 53) explains “he who separates . . .” as follows: “As for example apostates and sectaries.” A limitation is given by Solomon ben Aderet (0responsum 763) who says that a person who refuses to support the congregation financially belongs to this group, but that does not mean that we should not bury him and provide shrouds for him. It means that we do not do him the usual honors of standing in a row of mourners, and so forth. The fullest discussion of this sort of a person is given in the “Mordecai,” at the end of “Moed Katan,” chapter 3. There the Mordecai quotes his teacher, Meir of Rothenburg, who gives a careful limitation to the phrase “he who separates himself. . . .” He says, “It must be a person who commits these sins provocatively (l’hachis) and steadily, not merely occasionally.” The law is codified in the Shulchan Aruch (345 : 5). It is worth noting the text in the law as it is here definitely given. The phrasing comes from Maimonides (“Hilchos Avel” I : 10): “All who separate themselves from the ways of the congregation, these are the men who break the yoke of the commandments from their neck, and are not included with the rest of Israel in their actions, and in the honor given the festivals, and in attending synagogues and schools, but consider themselves free without the law, and also apostates to idolatry. For all these we do not mourn at all.” To which Isserles adds that if one does not bear the financial load of the congregation, his relatives may mourn for him but not the rest of the community.

While the law specifically speaks of burial, we may take it to be expressive of our general attitude to that person who separates himself. Now from the law as given we may- draw certain conclusions: First, much depends upon the motive of the person in his action. If, as Meir of Rothenburg said, the action was provocative (i.e., meant to affront the Jewish community) then the community is justified in the strictest reaction; but if the motive is not provocative, but due to some fancied advantage for his children, and if there is a possibility that the man can be persuaded to repent of his action, then the community would be justified in being patient and in trying to use persuasion.

However, there is another principle in the law not directly concerned with the motivation of the man, but concerned with the security of the Jewish community. Suppose, for example, that the action of this man, who may be a prominent citizen, should have a baleful influence upon other members of the community who may be led to follow his example, and that therefore the community may be endangered, then our legal tradition justifies any special strictness which may be necessary to protect the community, i.e., “to build a fence” (le migdar milsa). The right to stern action for communal defense is recorded in the Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpot II, and Isserles, at the beginning of Choshen Mishpot 425. This special right of drastic action for communal defense has been used by Jewish community leadership all through the ages.

I cannot, therefore, give you a specific and clear-cut answer as to this man’s right to continue in the congregation, since the tradition gives us some leeway for practical and common-sense judgment. If the action is merely a chance notion on his part, he can just be permitted to belong as he wishes, or not; if, however, it is a studied affront to the community (l’hachis), he should be excluded. If the community reaction against him is one of scorn, he can be ignored. But if his example may be followed by others and the community thus endangered, then strict action should be taken. This, basically, is the spirit of our religious tradition on the matter.