Jewish Nurse Baptizing Dying Catholic Infant

A Jewish nurse asks for guidance in the following sit uation: If a Catholic infant is dying and a Jewish nurse is the only nurse with the child at the time, the Catholic Church would want the child baptized by the nurse, who utters the following formula: “I bap tize you in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost.” May a Jewish nurse, from the point of view of Jewish tradition, perform this baptism? (From Rabbi Joshua O. Haberman, Trenton, New Jersey)

It is, of course, obvious that there is not and could not be any direct opinion on this question in Jewish traditional law. If, in earlier centuries, a Jewish physician were attending a Catholic mother giving birth to an infant, or if a Jewish midwife were helping at the birth, these situations occurred in homes and not in hospitals. So there were always members of the Catholic family present to perform the emergency baptism. But nowadays, with modern hospital practice, where it generally happens that a nurse (particularly a night nurse) will be alone in the room with an infant or in charge of the room in which the various newborn infants are kept, she may very well observe that a certain Catholic infant is dying and that there is no time to get a Catholic nurse to perform the baptism. Should she, a Jewess, feel that Jewish tradition permits her to perform this Catholic religious act?

First of all, it is necessary to clarify the attitude of Jewish legal tradition toward Christianity, especially toward Roman Catholic Christianity which was the only form of Christianity which most of the Jewish scholars found in their environment. A large section of the law in Yore Deah deals with the laws of idolatry. Many details of the relationship between Jews and Catholic Christianity are found there as developments of the Shulchan Aruch laws on idolatry. This fact may lead to a profound misunderstanding, namely, that Judaism, especially its legal tradition, looks upon Christianity with its Trinity as a polytheism or an idolatry. If that were the case, which it is not, then the old laws of complete avoidance of any contact with idolatry would apply also to Christianity.

But this is not so at all. Jewish legal tradition, which one would expect to be strict in its prohibitory mood, looks upon Christianity as a valid worship of God. As for Christian trinitarianism, the Christians are not prohibited in the eyes of Jewish law from adding divine persons to God in their worship. To add other divine or adored persons (e.g., the two other members of the Trinity and the saints, whether or not the adoration of the saints is “worship”) is called in Jewish law “shittuf (association or partnership). The Jews by their special covenant at Sinai are forbidden any shittuf and must worship God alone. The Christians, children of Noah, are not forbidden shiftuf, provided they worship God.

That this is so can be made clear by three different citations from the law, each centuries apart from the other. The first is a statement of Rabbenu Tarn, the great French authority of the twelfth century (in b. Bechorot 2 b and Sanhedrin 63b), in which he says that though Christians take oaths by their holy personages, their basic intent is that these oaths are taken in the name of God. Therefore, there is no sin in our exacting an oath from them in business transactions.

The second citation is from the seventeenth century. Moses Rivkes, of Vilna, in his commentary “Be’er Hagolah” to Choshen Mishpot 425, says that the sentence in the Passover Haggadah, “Pour forth Thy wrath upon the nations who knew Thee not,” refers only to those nations which do not believe in God the Creator, the miracles which God has done, and the giving of the Law. But these nations in whose presence we live, and where we are protected, believe in all these scriptural ideas, and we are firm in praying for the peace and prosperity of all of them.

The third citation is from the eighteenth-nineteenth century. The commentator, Israel Lipschutz, in his commentary “Tifereth Isroel” to Baba Kama, at the beginning of chapter 4, speaks of the duty of dealing fairly with non Jews in business relationships: “How much the more [he says] is the obligation upon us to deal fairly with these, our brothers, of the nations who recognize the One God and honor His Law and call Scripture ‘Holy Writ’ and observe that which is incumbent upon them of our Torah, namely, the seven commandments (of the sons of Noah).”

So it is clear that Christianity is, in the eyes of Jewish law, a valid worship of God, and the trinitarianism of its faith, which would be prohibited to Jews, does not invalidate their faith because they never were forbidden shittuf, adding of forms of deity.

Then why are the laws of the relationship between Jews and Christianity dealt with as a development of the laws of idolatry? Because these older laws on idolatry are the only systematic statement in the tradition of the relationship between Jews and non-Jews. Therefore such relationship, interpreted and modified, can help us in understanding the relationship between Judaism and other religions, provided we keep in mind the basic principle that Christianity, in spite of its trinitarianism and its saints, is not idolatrous, although forbidden to Jews, who are under the Covenant of Sinai.

Now, coming closer to our problem: Since Jews are forbidden any amplification of the personality of God (shittuf) then is not a Jewish nurse prohibited from baptizing this Catholic baby ” … in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost”? Yes, if thereby she proclaims her belief in the Trinity, or even pretends hypocritically to a belief in the Trinity. But does her recitation of those words really mean a belief or even mean a pretended belief?

I directed an inquiry to the Catholic Chancellery and was informed of the meaning of the Catholic law that the Catholic Church accepts the validity of a baptism made by a non-Catholic in times of emergency. I was told that this law means much more than the acceptance of a baptism by a non-Catholic Christian (who believes in the Trinity). It means that even a nonbeliever in the Trinity, or even an atheist who baptizes the child using the formula, has validly baptized the child, and the Church will not rebaptize provided the baptism was intended to be what the Church wants it to be.

Therefore, the Jewish nurse is not required to be hypocritical, to pretend to a belief she does not have, for the baptism to be a valid one. She says, in effect: “I myself do not believe in the Trinity. I do not even believe in baptism as a sacrament. But the Catholic parents do, and for the sake of their belief, I perform this ceremony which is of meaning to them.” In other words, she does not represent her own belief; she is only an agent of theirs. The principle in the Jewish law that one may not be an agent for a sin (‘Ayn Sheliach Lidvar Averah, ” b. Kiddushin 42b) can hardly apply here, because for the persons for whom she is the agent, namely, the parents or the Church, this action is not a sin, even in the eyes of Jewish law.

There is a parallel in the law to a situation like this one in which a person of one religion performs an act that is to be carried out according to the intention of the other religion. It is not exactly parallel, namely, that a Jew performs an act which Christians shall deem valid according to Christianity, as in the case of the nurse and the Christian baptism; but it is rather that a Christian performs an act that shall be valid according to Judaism. If, for example, a Christian makes a contribution to the synagogue, could that contribution be used, Iet us say, to make a curtain for the ark or for a Menorah? The law is that a Christian may make any contribution to the synagogue, provided he does not specify its use, but says, “Use it in the way that is most meaningful to you.” In other words, he gives the gift al da’as Yisroel. (See full discussion in Reform Jewish Practice, Vol. II, p. 45, and Shulchan Aruch, Yore Deah 259 : 4 Incidentally, Isserles says, 254 : 2, that even if the Christian does not say, “Use it in your Jewish way,” we accept the gift anyway.) In any event, this parallel indicates that Jewish law accepts the principle that one can give a gift or do a deed in which he says, “I am not doing it in accordance with my belief, but according to yours.”

So far it seems clear that there is no sound objection to the nurse performing the ceremony and her uttering the trinitarian words. But now we must consider whether she should do it or perhaps try to avoid doing it. In other words, what is duty in this matter?

In this regard it is important to bear in mind the two parallel ethical motivations in Jewish law: m’shum ayva— to avoid creating hatred; and mipne darche shalom— f orthe sake of the paths of peace. These principles are fre-quently invoked in the relationship between Jews and non Jews. For example, a Jew moving from a house must re move the mezuzah if a Christian will now occupy the house. Nevertheless, the law reads that if removing the mezuzah will create hurt or ill will between Jew and Christian, it should not be removed (see Yore Deah 291: 2). Or, for example, in pagan days, it was forbidden to have any contact with Gentiles even three days before their festivals, but the law is that with Christians we may have contact with them, not only on their festivals but even give them gifts on their festivals (see Yore Deah 128 : 12). All this “for the sake of avoiding hatred and creating peace.”

Perhaps of closest relevance to our theme is one of the laws which is also motivated by “the paths of peace,” namely, the admonition in b. Gittin 61a et seq. that we sustain the poor Gentiles, heal their sick, bury their dead, and console their mourners for the sake of the paths of peace.

Now, this emergency baptism involved in our question concerns a dying child whose Catholic parents would be greatly consoled if they felt that the child had been baptized with a baptism which the Church accepts as valid. Certainly this (anticipating by a few minutes or an hour) is a consolation to mourning parents, which is required by Jewish law of all Jews.

To sum up: Belief in the Trinity as involved in the formula of baptism is not a sin for Christians, according to Jewish law. Therefore the Jewish nurse, who is an agent in this case, is not an agent for a sinful act. The Church does not require her even to pretend belief in the Trinity. She is not a hypocrite. Jewish law requires her to comfort the mourners. The virtuous act, uttering this formal sentence in their name, is done “for the sake of the paths of peace.”