REFORM MARRIAGE FORMULA

QUESTION:

In order to express the equal status of bride and groom in the wedding ceremony, I have used a variation of the traditional formula used by the groom. The groom says, Haray at, etc., and the bride says, Haray ata mekudash, etc. But on reflection this double use of the formula seems to create Halachic difficulty. For example, if according to the bride’s formula the groom is now taken by the bride, as the bride is taken by the groom, then if a married man commits adultery, the child would be a mamzer, just like the child of a married woman with a man not her husband. Is there a way out of this difficulty or, also, what formula could be used which would obviate such difficulties, and yet indicate clearly the equal status of bride and groom? (Asked by Rabbi Mark Cartun, B’nai B’rith, Stanford University, California. )

ANSWER:

LET US IMAGINE that we would ask this question of a leading Orthodox authority. We might ask it of Moses Feinstein, the author of the many-volumed work on responsa, lgros Moshe. Moses Feinstein is perhaps the chief Halachic respondent nowadays in America. In one of his responsa {Even Hoezer #7 6) he was faced with the problem of a Jewish woman who was divorced in the courts and could not obtain a Jewish get. In order to spare this woman from the unfortunate status of agunah, he inquired about her original marriage. He discovered that she was married by a Reform rabbi. Thereupon he declared that the Reform marriage was not a Jewish marriage at all (chiefly because there were no kosher witnesses at the recitation of the formula and the giving of the ring). Since, therefore, the woman was not legally married by Jewish law, she did not need a get at all, and she was free to marry. A rabbi who will make so shocking a decision certainly is strict enough. If, then, we ask Moses Feinstein what are the Halachic implications of having a bride recite the formula Haray ata, he would laugh at the inquiry and brush it aside. From his point of view, the question has no meaning. He would consider the formula recited by the woman as a foolish invention, totally contrary to Jewish law, since by Jewish law the husband takes a wife and the woman is “acquired” (nikniss) of course with her consent. Therefor, if he had to give an answer at all, he would say that the question is meaningless. A formula that has no legal validity cannot possibly have any meaningful legal consequence.

In a somewhat different sense, we Reformers also tend to brush such a question aside, but from a motive different from that of the Orthodox rabbi. An outstanding example of a formula or a decision whose Halachic consequences we brush aside is in the crucial matter of divorce. We accept the full validity of civil divorce, and a woman so divorced may marry again without a Jewish get. This action is analogous to the situation in the question that is asked here. It, too, involves a declaration of the legal equality of men and women. In Jewish law only the man can divorce a wife, and if he is not available to do so, the woman is an agunah, “chained” forever. By our radical action we brought freedom to countless thousands of Jewish women all over the world.

But our action has involved grave Halachic consequences. According to Orthodox law, a woman divorced only in the courts is not truly divorced; if she marries again she is an adulteress, and the children from the second so-called marriage are mamzerim. Now consider how many tens of thousands of people are children of a remarriage of a woman without a get from her first husband. The Orthodox rabbinate could declare the entire Reform community as being under the taint or suspicion of illegitimacy (ch’sach mamzer us), and not only could the Reform part of Jewry be so denounced, they could do that also to Conservative Jewry, whose get they do not accept as valid. And as a matter of fact, there are also uncounted thousands of Jewish women who are not affiliated with Reform or Conservative Judaism who have remarried without a Jewish get. It is theoretically possible (if the Orthodox rabbinate dared to do so) to declare a vast section of Jewry as being under the taint of illegitimacy. Indeed, one member of the chief rabbi’s Bes Din in England threatened to do something of that kind, but he never actually did it. Perhaps the hesitation is due to the statement in the Talmud that all Jewish families are presumed to be legitimate (b’chezkas kashrus) unless their status is disputed (kiddushin 76b and Shulchan Aruch, Even Hoezer 2:2). Evidently, then, they find it too embarrassing or disturbing to dispute the legitimacy of so great a section of modern Jewry.

All these deeply disturbing consequences are the result of our decision to allow a woman to remarry without a get. In making this decision, we have not only incurred the possibility of the unhappy consequences mentioned above, but have brushed aside the vast section of Jewish law that deals with divorce. Yet we brush all these laws aside without hesitation because there is a matter of conscience involved. We insist upon the equal status of men and women, and are willing to put aside a large section of the law and face possible unpleasant consequences.

The same situation can apply to the question asked here. Since it is a matter of conscience with us that the bride be of equal legal status with the groom, and if we use a formula to express that equal status, then if the formula possibly involve such Halachic difficulties as mentioned here in the question, then, just as in the case of the get, we must be willing, for the sake of conscience, to brush aside the possibilities of these Halachic consequences.

However, the questioner finds it difficult to take so outright a step and remains concerned with the possible unpleasant Halachic consequences of the use of the Hebrew formula by the bride. Perhaps this sensitiveness, this unwillingness to brush aside Halachic consequences, although a matter of conscience is in volved, is due to a change in the mood of our Reform movement. Today there is a greater interest than in the past in Halacha, and therefore a greater desire to conform to it as much as possible. Hence we involve ourselves in inevitable contradictions. Here we are eager as a matter of principle to prove the equal status of bride and groom. Our declaration of their equality is totally against the Halacha. Then, when we do violate the Halacha for the sake of principle, we worry about the Halachic consequences of our action. Clearly we should do with the Reform marriage formula as we do with the Reform divorce action. We declare and live by our principle and face the Halachic difficulties involved therein.

Perhaps the difficulties mentioned in the question would be at least partially avoided if we did not attempt to use a Halachic-sounding formula ( haray ata) for a non-Halachic action. I myself, in many hundreds of weddings (and I believe most of my colleagues too in their marriages), make no attempt to use a Hebrew Halachic-sounding formula, but instead proceed as follows: The groom recites (after the rabbi) the traditional formula, Haray at, etc. The bride then says (after the rabbi) the following English sentence, “Be thou sacred to me as husband according to the law of God.” Thus we are not troubled by sounding Halachic when we are really in this case contra-Halachic. This procedure is also the one suggested in the Rabbi’s Manual.