RRT 224-228

 

 CONGREGATIONAL ABSENTEE VOTE

QUESTION:

Many of the members of a congregation in Texas live as far as a hundred miles away from the city in which the congregation is located. These members cannot attend every congregational meeting. Often the local members call a meeting consisting of a quorum of ten or fifteen people and pass rules affecting the entire membership. This is certainly unjust to the out-of-town members. Is there not some basis in Jewish traditional law, permitting the use of the modern custom of absentee ballots, i.e., voting by mail? (Asked by Rabbi Josef Zeitin, Odessa, Texas.)

ANSWER:

METHODS OF ARRIVING at decisions in communal affairs are discussed, at least by implication, in the Talmud and in later law. The two places in the Talmud which speak of communal government are Megillah 26a and Baba Bathra 8a. Both passages speak of the right of the community (or its designated authorities) to pass laws governing the entire community. In both cases the community is designated by the term b’nai ha-ir, “The People of the City.” There was also an administrative body called the shiva tuvey ha-ir, “The Seven Good Men of the City,” much as we say in modern English and American law of a jury, “twelve good men and true.” (Probably both phrases are influenced by the words used by Jethro to Moses, in Exodus 18:21, to describe the first governing body, “able men, men of truth,” i.e., “good men and true.”)

While we do not know what proportion of “the men of the city” had to be present at a decision or, for that matter, whether the leadership group needed to be unanimous, this much is certain: We know that most frequently the decision was by vote and the majority prevailed. A good example of this would be in the discussion in Beza 20b, where we are told that at first the members of the school of Shammai were a majority, and so they made certain decisions. Soon afterwards the members of the school of Hillel became the majority, and they made other decisions.

It is not clear how many members of the community constituted a quorum, but evidently there were times when the entire community needed to be present, ma’amad anshe ha-ir. This fact is clear from the case discussed in the Talmud {Megillah 26b) where Rabino asked permission from Rav Ashe to plant a crop on a site where there were some ruins of a synagogue building. He received the permission, but this decision was debatable since the sanctity of a synagogue still inheres in its ruins. However, the permission he received to plant on the site was considered legally justified because it was given “by the seven worthies of the city,” “in the presence of the men of the city” (ma’amad anshe ha-ir) , which would indicate that in especially important matters no decision could be reached by any designated administrative board without the consent of the entire community. In fact, this is generally the view of the law as it was developed. The Mordecai to Baba Bathra (i.e., the passage referred to above, Mordecai 1:481) says that the administrators by themselves have the right to make emergency decisions to prevent religious violations, but for all other matters they are not permitted to make any new ordinance without the consent of all. A similar thought is expressed by Meir of Rothenburg in his responsa (ed. Budapest, 1896; responsum # 9 6 8) .

The general question of majority rule or unanimous rule is fully and ably discussed in Louis Finkelstein’s basic work, Jewish Self-Government in the Middle Ages. The question we have referred to, namely, whether the decisions by leaders or the community itself, whether by majority or unanimity, all this had to be settled in behalf of the developing communities in northern France and the Rhineland. See the early part of Finkelstein’s book. It seems that Rabbenu Gershom advocated majority rule. Later Rabbenu Tarn leaned toward unanimity. And still later a compromise seems to have been made that if the administrative board (the seven worthies) was itself elected unanimously, then it can make decisions without the community giving its unanimous consent.

So it is clear from the Talmudic law, and especially from its development in the early Middle Ages, that considerable concern was felt for the rights and the voice of the entire community, although, of course, there were necessary restrictions to the requirement of unanimity, so that no one individual should be in the position to paralyze the legislation of the community by refusing to agree.

Since there is frequent reference to the ma’amad anshe ha-ir, the presence of the entire voting community, we may take it for granted that it is important to consider, as you felt in your letter, that we must give careful attention to the rights of the absentee members. To insist that those members who live far away must take the trouble to come to every meeting if they wish to participate is an unfair requirement and, in fact, violates the general principle of Talmudic law that “we may not make any decrees [i.e., regulations] for the community which the majority of the community cannot endure” (Baba Kamma 79b). In the light of the above, the motivation of the suggestion to make absentee voting possible can be considered justified by the spirit of the law.

How, then, in the spirit of Jewish practice should the principle of voting by mail be arranged for? It is possible to make enactments by unanimous or majority consent which shall govern the community. This is done by the process of congregational haskama, in other words, by an agreed upon ordinance. How the haskama works can be seen, for example, in a recently published book of responsa, Zichron Shlomo, the responsa of Jacob David Vilofsky (Ridbaz), a Palestinian authority of the past generation (responsum # 1) . The question was: Two generations ago, when the new immigration was still sparse, the community of Jaffa decreed by haskama that no matter how large the congregation might grow by immigration, no group in the congregation shall break off to form a separate congregation. The immigration then increased, and in spite of the haskama, a small group broke away and formed a separate congregation. The Ridbaz decided that the haskama was valid and the group had no right to establish a separate congregation. This is only one example of innumerable haskamas made by congregations and which are valid in governing the life of the congregation.

Therefore I suggest the following haskama: The rabbi and the officers (i.e., “the seven worthies”) should be empowered to decide which congregational proposals are merely administrative (such as where to buy stationery, etc.) and which are actually substantive, such as deciding whether the men and women should sit together if they have hitherto been separate; whether or not to raise the dues, and by how much. In all such matters as are declared to be substantive, the entire congregation should be given an opportunity to vote by their presence at a meeting or, when necessary, by mail. This haskama should itself be adopted by a vote of the entire membership, present or by mail, and would be our adaption of the Talmudic principle of ma’amad anshe ha-ir.