CCAR RESPONSA
Apostate in the Synagogue
5753.13
She’elah
A man, born and raised a Jew, has converted to Christianity and joined the Episcopal Church. Having earned a theological degree, he now teaches Comparative Religion at a local private school and has been “very helpful in the ecumenical dialogue between Christians and Jews.” Should he be allowed to speak in a Reform synagogue? If permitted to speak, may he do so from the bimah? If he is permitted to speak from the bimah, should he be permitted to deliver a homily during Sabbath or Holiday worship? May he lead the congregation in prayer or be offered an aliyah? (Rabbi Harry Rothstein, Amenia, NY)
Teshuvah
It must be made clear that regardless of how genial this man is, regardless of his academic credentials or how honest his intentions, because he has forsaken Judaism and converted to another religion we must consider him an apostate. The issue of how we are to interact with apostates has been thoroughly covered in traditional halakhic literature, as well as in our Reform responsa.1
Central to our she’elah is the question: Why would we even consider permitting an apostate to enter our synagogues, let alone teach or lead us in worship?
Jewish tradition has always been sensitive to the different circumstances under which a person would abandon his or her affiliation with the Jewish community. Not all apostates are lumped together. There are essential differences between one who is forced to convert during a period of religious persecution (anoos)2 and one whose apostasy is a matter of religious conviction and public rejection of Judaism (mumar l’hakh’is or meshummad).3
Nonetheless, we always hope that even those who are apostates of their own volition will at some time return to the fold. For ours is not simply a religion, we Jews are also a family. We can change our name, looks and religion, but we cannot erase the familial link with the Jewish people. An oft cited passage in the Talmud reads:
Rabbi Abba the son of Zavda said, Even though [an Israelite] has sinned, he is still called `Israel.’ Rabbi Abba said, there is a popular saying: A myrtle, though it stands among reeds, is still a myrtle, and so it is called.4
Indeed, our insistence that an apostate is still Jewish often led to grave consequences.5 To solve some of those problems, there was an attempt by Gaonic authorities to rule that the apostate had forsaken the Jewish people and, therefore, had forfeited his or her claim for certain benefits and rights within the Jewish community.6 But their attempts were rejected by Rashi and other leading halakhic authorities.7 Rashi takes the above-quoted statement from the Talmud and extends it to include apostates:
The meshummad is a Jew in every way, as it is said: “even though an Israelite has sinned …”, meaning that even though he has sinned [or in this case, apostatized], he is a Jew.”8
If then a meshummad, the willful and even provocative apostate, is still considered Jewish, are there any restrictions to his or her participation in the Jewish community? The question is an ancient one, and the answer is: yes, there are restrictions.9
Far from welcoming the apostate to participate in the service, the early Jewish liturgy included a Birkat haMinim, which explicitly cursed those Jews who abandoned their people.10 Some authorities have even rejected or restricted commmunal contributions by apostates.11 The Rabbinic decrees and ordinances against the willful apostates are founded on the Torah, which established the severest of punishments against those who left the faith and people of Israel.12
Thus we have, on the one hand, the classic teaching that a Jew is always a Jew. On the other hand, tradition effectively shunned complete apostates, denying them an active role in the Jewish community. Israel of Bruna, a 15th century German Rabbi, made an attempt to resolve the conflict by teaching that even though the apostate is an Israelite, he is not a Jew, meaning that “Israelite” is the designation of one’s lineage, while “Jew” refers to one’s relationship with the Jewish community.13 (The idea seems to parallel Reform Judaism’s recent insistence that from either mother or needs to be supported by “appropriate and timely acts of identification with the Jewish faith and people.”14)
The modern state of Israel has also ruled that an apostate, though Jewish by lineage, is not permitted to be registered as a “Jew” under the “Law of Return.”15 The Jewish community has thus been remarkably consistent in excluding apostates from active participation, all the while affirming the ancestral lineage and holding out hope for them to return. The Reform movement has similarly remained firm on the issue of the apostate Jew.16
In our case, we therefore conclude that this man, who has earned a theological degree and is an active member of the Episcopal church, has willfully converted and is thus an apostate, a meshummad. He is thereby is excluded from actively participating in Jewish worship. We would be sending the most confusing signals to our comunity if we permitted apostates to assume prominent roles in our synagogues and thereby blur the distinction between those who proudly declare their Jewishness and those who abandon our faith.
Consequently, this apostate should not be given the honor of ascending the bimah, nor should he be given the distinction of addressing the congregation before, during or after a worship service.17 Were we to honor an apostate who, to boot, is a scholar of theology, the community would be confronted with a man who was born and raised a Jew, but determined after much study that Judaism is inferior to another religion. We must be careful to avoid conveying any message which may weaken the Jewish community.
However, we would not keep him from attending the service, because we always hold out hope that he will repent and rejoin our fold.18
Notes
There are several Reform responsa that deal with apostasy: Solomon B. Freehof, “Status of Apostates and Burial of an Apostate,” Recent Reform Responsa #26, pp.120-127 and #27, pp. 127-131; “Our Attitude to Apostates,” Modern Reform Responsa #30, pp. 169-175. Also see Walter Jacob, “Status of a `Completed Jew in the Jewish Community,” Contemporary American Reform Responsa #68, pp. 109-112. Coercion is not, of course, limited to threats of violence. Coercion can also include the combined pressures of economic welfare and professional security. See, for example, Asher Siev’s article on the strange path of an apostate Jew in Sefer zikaron lish’mue’l kalman mirsky (Jerusalem, 1970). The mumar l’hakh’is, literally, the “provoking apostate,” is the most troublesome of those who forsake our faith. Rambam identifies this kind of willful apostate as one “who repudiates the Oral Law as a matter of personal conviction and through his reasoned opinion.” (Yad, Hilkhot Mamrim, 3:3). History has shown that it is the provoking or willful apostate who, all too often, acts in a way which denigrates Judaism and is most detrimental to the Jewish people. For evidence of the murders and oppression wrought by former co-religionists, see The Jewish Encyclopedia, 2:14-17; Yitzhak Baer, A History of the Jews in Christian Spain, Philadelphia, 1966, vol. 1, pp. 328-354) and vol. 2 (pp. 141-150, 341ff). BT. Sanhedrin 44a. Jacob Katz details some of the “grave consequences” (in Exclusiveness and Tolerance, pp. 70-71), such as the cases of apostates who did not grant their wives a Jewish divorce. If they would no longer be considered Jewish, their marriages could simply be annulled. But by insisting that every apostate was still Jewish, a get was necessary for a true divorce. Without it, the woman could not remarry in the traditional community. Katz (ibid, pp. 70-71) cites Otzar HaGeonim, VII, pp. 34-37, concerning their ruling that a widow did not have to submit to the ceremony of chalitzah with her apostate brother-in-law. In another case, some of the Geonim (Otzar HaGeonim, IX, pp. 28-35) and Rabbenu Gershom (Teshuvot Rabbenu Gershom # 58) ruled that an apostate was no longer eligible to inherit from his Jewish relatives’ estate. Teshuvot Rashi #173. “It was in this connexion that Rashi quoted the maxim `although he has sinned he remains a Jew,’ which has, since then, become a standard ruling in connexion with the definition of the status of the apostate. In its original talmudic context this sentence appears in an aggadic setting only, and not in relation to apostasy. By using it in this striking manner, Rashi ensured the almost uncontested adoption of his definition. Behind this clear-cut statement lies an emphasis on the unchangeable character of the Jew, an emphasis that would contest any possible justification for obliterating Judaism by baptism” (Katz, ibid, p. 71). Teshuvot Rashi # 173. See for example: BT. Chullin 4b-5b; Sifra 2.2 (Finkelstein ed., vol. II, pp. 20-21); Lev. R. 2.9; Yad, Hilkhot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot, 3.4; SA, YD, 53.4 and OC 215.2. Tosefta, Berakhot III.25; see also Gedalia Alon, The Jews in Their Land, ed. Gershon Levi (Harvard Univ. Press, 1989), pp. 288 ff. 11 Rabbi Yaakov Weil, She’elot uTeshuvot: Dinim v’halakhot #57; R. Moshe Schick, Teshuvot Maharam Schick, Yoreh De’ah, #231, cited by R. Solomon B. Freehof, The Responsa Literature (New York: Ktav, 1973), p. 134. Deuteronomy 13:13-19. She’elot uTeshuvot Mahari miBruna, #35; see R. Maurice Lamm in Jewish Tradition and the Nontraditional Jew, ed. J.J. Schachter, Northvale, NJ, 1992, pp. 169-170. Resolution of the C.C.A.R., see its Yearbook XCIII (1983), p.160, and the interpretation of the decision inRabbi’s Manual (1988), pp.225-227 (W. Gunther Plaut) and the detailed discussion in Contemporary American Reform Responsa, #38, pp. 61-68 (Walter Jacob). The ruling, which is known as the “Brother Daniel case,” was made by the Israeli Supreme Court: 72/62, PD 16:2428-55. Cf. Encyclopaedia Judaica, sub “Apostate.” See the Reform responsa on apostasy listed in the first footnote above. In the words of R. Walter Jacob, Contemporary American Reform Responsa # 68, “such individuals should not be accorded membership in the congregation or treated in any way which makes them appear as if they were affiliated with the Jewish community … We certainly do not want these individuals to speak for Judaism in any public forum.” This follows the CCAR’s Responsa Committee’s 1983 teshuvah, “Status of a `Completed Jew’ in the Jewish Community,” Contemporary American Reform Responsa #68. Thus, for the Committee, even “Messianic Jews” or the “Jews for Jesus” (who, because of their proclivity for proselytization, must certainly be classified as mumarim lehakhis (“provoking apostates”), are not to be excluded from attending services or classes “for we always hold the hope that they will return to Judaism and disassociate themselves from Christianity.”
If needed, please consult Abbreviations used in CCAR Responsa.