CCAR RESPONSA
Temple Board Member Accused of Cheating
5754.17
She’elah
A member of the congregation complains that a Trustee of the synagogue has cheated him in a professional matter and owes him a significant sum of money. The member contends that synagogue board members should be reputable and representative of the best in our tradition, and he feels that this Trustee has shown a character flaw serious enough to warrant removal from the Board. He has asked the Board to take that action. The synagogue constitution, which governs the selection of Trustees, does not address the issue. If the facts are established beyond dispute, what course of action should be taken?
Teshuvah
We begin this responsum by stating our operating presumptions. We presume that any individual named to a position of leadership in a synagogue is of high moral character. We presume that an individual who already serves on a synagogue board has not thus far given the congregation any reason to suspect that he or she possesses serious character flaws or that he or she may even be guilty of criminal activity. And we presume that the serious allegations mentioned in this she’elah are just that: allegations, not yet proven. We will therefore respond to this question not with a general pronouncement on the fitness of communal officials, but with a very
specific pronouncement on what to do if a currently serving board member is definitely found to have acted unethically in a matter not connected to his or her synagogue responsibilities.
We note, first of all, the absence of specific precedents. The structure of Jewish communal leadership has changed over the centuries, and in the pre-modern Jewish communities within which most halakhic activity took place there was no position exactly equivalent to the modern synagogue board member. Historically, too, the ability of the Jewish community to police itself was severely hampered at times by both internal and external circumstances. Internally, real authority often rested with lay leadership rather than with rabbinic scholars, thereby rendering
purely halakhic considerations irrelevant; externally, the interference of Gentile governments often removed Jews from the jurisdiction of the Jewish community. Nevertheless, there are significant indirect precedents.
Halachic Precedents.
Rabbinic literature discusses several types of communal officials, including the parnas, the gabbai tz’dakah, and the sheliach tzibur. References to the parnas, the community’s chief official(s), stress the importance of high moral conduct; virtually all these references, however, are aggadic in character.1 Generally, comments about the parnas are silent on the individual’s personal character and conduct, with the notable exception of B. Yoma 22b: “We appoint as parnas over the community only one who has a basket of crawling creatures hung at his back [i.e., who has some improper or unsavory aspect to his past], so that if he becomes too overbearing, we may say to him: look behind you.” The implication here is that a parnas is not necessarily a person of blameless moral character.2
On the other hand, the sheliach tzibbur (shatz) is supposed to be an individual of spotless character. “The sheliach tzibur should be worthy [hagun]. What is worthy? One who is free of sin and about whom an evil report has not circulated, even in his youth. He should be humble and pleasing to people; he should have a pleasant voice and should be accustomed to reading Torah, Prophets, and Writings.”3 The reason for emphasizing the worthiness of the shatz, of course, is that he is the community’s representative in prayer.4 As the Mishnah B’rurah comments:5 “Many books have discoursed at length about the shame caused by appointing an unworthy shatz, for thereby good fortune is denied to Israel.” An unworthy shatz causes great harm because God does not respond well to the prayer of the unrighteous. Good character in a shatz is preferable to a good voice.6
For the third type of communal official, the gabbai tz’dakah, good character is also essential.7 On the other hand, he is understood to be subject to extraordinary
temptation. For this reason, the halakhah builds in numerous safeguards to remove every possible opportunity for dishonesty, as well as situations that could give rise to rumors of dishonesty in the community.8 If less-than-upstanding individuals do hold this office, they must have obtained it through high handed tactics, perhaps even bringing the power of the Gentile government to bear on Jewish communal affairs.9
While there is no mention of removal of a parnas for any reason, there is considerable discussion of removal of an unworthy shatz or a gabbai tz’dakah suspected of financial malfeasance. The halakhah is far more restrictive with respect to a shatz, though the penalties are mitigated somewhat by means of repentance.10 If the shatz is already serving in that position, he cannot be removed for something he did before he was appointed; nonetheless, should there arise even a rumor that he has done something inappropriate since assuming the position, “even if it is the smallest thing, then even one person can protest and have him removed.”11 This opinion is expanded in the Arukh Ha-shulchan:12
When we say we do not appoint someone who is the subject of an evil report, this means appointing him a priori. But if an evil report goes out concerning an incumbent shatz, we do not remove him, for one does not remove a person from his position on the strength of a mere rumor. But if the rumor is persistent, and we know that his enemies have not planted it…then we do remove him. Even a single individual may protest and have him removed, as long as we know that person’s motivation is sincere.
However, if the shatz does repent of this transgression, he is not to be removed.13
The idea that repentance suffices to prevent a shatz from losing his position, even if he has committed deliberate and grave sins, is found in the Arukh Hashulchan in a comment upon the words of R. Moshe Isserles. It has the effect of nullifying virtually any dismissal of a shatz, except in cases of flagrant and unrepented wrongdoing:14
It must be, therefore, that [Isserles] does not mean an accidental transgressor who sins only once; for even a deliberate sinner who sins only once and then repents may be appointed shatz, for if he repents then his bad reputation is immediately cancelled. His disqualification as a deliberate sinner is only if he sins a number of times. And if he transgresses a number of times accidentally, in this case he is still fit.
In the case of a gabbai tz’dakah the issue is somewhat muddled. Clearly there is concern that a gabbai might violate the trust of his office; this is obviously the reason why he may be required to render an accounting. This is how the Siftey Kohen understands Isserles’ gloss to YD 257:2. Isserles states: “And in any case, in order that they be ‘clean before God and Israel,’ it is desirable that they render an accounting. This applies to worthy gabbaim. But one who is unworthy, or who obtained his position through coercive means…” Siftey Kohen explains that “one who is unworthy” is “one who was appointed with consent of the community and is then accused of malfeasance serious enough to be examined by a judge.”15
But it is not explicitly stated what the consequences are if he is found to have acted improperly. Isserles states: “if the community wishes, they may dismiss the gabbai and replace him with another, and this does not cast suspicion upon [the one dismissed]. The same is true for other officials.”16 Siftey Kohen explains that individuals serve for set terms, and therefore if the community chooses someone else to fill the position at term’s end this should not be taken as a slap at the former office holder. He is concerned, however, because Isserles seems to imply that “within the time of service the community cannot dismiss them because of suspicion of impropriety. And this is not explained as well as it should be in the words of Isserles.”17
Siftey Kohen‘s difficulty is noted and incorporated by the Arukh Hashulchan, who ignores any possibility that a gabbai cannot be replaced mid-term for wrong-doing and cites Siftey Kohen in such a way as to take for granted that a gabbai can be removed if he has violated the trust of his office.18
The case at hand.
In the present case, again, we are dealing with an incident be-di’avad, after the fact. We are not deciding whether an ethically dubious character should be appointed to a synagogue board, but whether, if an accusation against a person hitherto considered blameless is proven, that individual should be forced to resign.
First of all, a synagogue board member is not a parnas. He or she is not the administrative head of an autonomous or semi-autonomous corporate Jewish community, nor do we live in a time and place in which oligarchical rule and its abuses are accepted as norms. The absence of halakhic strictures concerning the character of a parnas or his removal from office should not be taken as a sign that we should tolerate unethical conduct among today’s communal leaders.
There is also no direct parallel between the position of synagogue trustee and the sheliach tzibur. The position of trustee involves responsibility for the welfare of the congregation, including a great degree of fiscal responsibility, but it certainly does not carry the same theological weight as that of shatz.
And there is no precise analogy to be drawn between the modern-day board member and the gabbai tz’dakah. While the halakhah concerning the latter speaks at length about financial probity, this always refers to communal funds, not personal business dealings. It does not call for the dismissal of a communal official for financial wrongdoing against a member of the community, though we may wish that it did.
Nevertheless, the lack of a specific precedent should not mean that there is nothing to be done in this situation. With regard to all three communal officials there is a basic assumption of righteous and ethical conduct. The parnas is not to govern in an oppressive fashion. A member of the community may protest against the shatz when the latter has committed some misdeed. And the gabbai tz’dakah is subject to elaborate procedures and strictures to avoid even the appearance of financial wrongdoing in office.19 The people must be able to trust in their institutions and the individuals who administer them. It is therefore imperative that, when a congregant has contested an individual’s moral or ethical fitness to serve as a board member, the complaint be resolved speedily and fairly.
In our case, the congregant charges that the board member “has cheated him in a professional matter and owes him a significant sum of money.” The language of the complaint is vague and is open to three interpretations: 1) the accused actually violated civil or criminal law in taking money that belonged to the accuser; 2) no law was broken but the accused acted in a manner that was morally culpable; 3) the accused and the accuser were involved in an unfortunate dispute where no law was broken and neither side’s action was morally superior.
If the case is one of the third type, then there would certainly be no compelling reason to compel the trustee to step down, although the local rabbi might take steps to mediate the dispute or to encourage the parties to seek professional mediation.
We hasten to add this note: it is of vital importance that the rabbi and the congregation respect the rights of the board member as well as those of his accuser. The board member, whose reputation and good name are at stake, is as
entitled to his “day in court” as is the congregant who is charging him with dishonesty. Mere accusation is not sufficient to disqualify a person from communal office. If it is found, after a careful and responsible investigation of the facts, that the board member has not committed the ethical infraction of which he is accused, he deserves public exoneration from the synagogue and a public apology from his accuser.
If, however, the case is of either the first or second type, then the Jewish legal and ethical tradition demands that prompt action be taken to safeguard the standards of moral conduct that our leaders ought to exemplify. As a first step, the rabbi and the congregational leadership through sensitive intervention might convince the board member to do t’shuvah, to admit his wrong and to make restitution to his accuser. Should the board member respond favorably to this request, then he should remain on the board even if the accuser refuses to be mollified.20
If the trustee refuses the opportunity to repent and to make restitution,
then he should be persuaded to step down from the board voluntarily. We say “voluntarily,” because as we have seen, tradition does not demand the removal of a communal official for misdeeds unrelated to his office.21 Nonetheless, misdeeds remain misdeeds, even if they are not impeachable offenses. If the board member refuses to resign, he should be regarded as one who is unfit to hold communal office. He should not be reappointed or re-nominated to any position of leadership in the congregation once his term expires.
Modern political tradition, especially in the British Commonwealth, suggests yet another solution: When a cabinet minister faces a serious accusation of misbehavior, he/she steps down temporarily until the matter is cleared up. This is one of the rare instances where we can learn from political precedent.
Notes
- For example: “One who is engaged in the needs of the community is like one
who engages in the study of Torah” (Y. B’rakhot 5:1). “There are four who
cannot be tolerated.. .and a parnas who lords it over the community without
cause” (B. P’sachim 113b). “Who are those that terrorize the land of the living?
- Hisdasaid: This is the parnas who intimidates the community when not for the
sake of Heaven. R. Yehudah said in the name of Rav: A parnas who intimidates
the community when not for the sake of Heaven will never have a son who is a
Torah scholar” (B. Rosh Hashanah 17a). “Our rabbis taught: There are three for
whom the Holy One weeps every day…and for a parnas who lords it over the
community” (B. Hagigah 5b).
- However, Rashi ad loc. explains this as referring to some family blemish (dofiba-
mishpacha).
- SA OC53:4.
- Jewish tradition has understood thesheliach tzibur (abbreviated as shatz) to be
quite literally the “representative of the community” in prayer. The shatz chants
the prayers on behalf of the congregation, acting as their agent. This is expressed
physically by having the shatz face the Ark, and not the congregation, during
prayer. The role of the shatz was largely eliminated from Reform worship.
- SA OC53:5.
- Ibid.
- Thegabbai tz’dakah was the communal official responsible for collecting,
counting, and distributing charitable funds. See Yad, Hilkhot Matanot Aniyim 9:1:
those in charge of tz’dakah must be “well known and trustworthy.”
- See, e.g.,M. Sh’kalim 3:2; B. Sh’kalim 7a, 9a; SA, YD 257:1, 2, 6.
- See Isserles to SA, YD 257:2: thegabbai tz’dakah must render an accounting
of his actions in office “if he obtained his position through coercive or violent
means.”
- SeeMishnah B’rurah 53, # 14 and 16.
- MishnahB’rurah 15 ad loc.
- Arukh Ha-shulchanOC 53:7.
- MishnahB’rurah 53, # 15.
- Arukh Ha-shulchan, OC53, par. 8.
- Shakh, YD257, # 3.
- SA, YD257:2, citing the Kol Bo.
- Shakh, YD257, # 4.
- ArukhHashulchan, YD 257, par. 13.
- The principle isn’ki’im tih’yu me-Adonai umiYisrael; Num. 32:22; M. Sh’kalim
3:2, SA, YD 257:2.
- It is axiomatic that, when those who have wronged us seek to repent and make
amends, we accept their effort as we would have them accept ours. B. Yoma 87a-
b; Yad, Hilkhot T’shuvah 2:9; SA, YD 606:1.
- The position ofshatz, of course, is an exception to this rule: as the
representative of the community before God, all aspects of the character of the
shatz relate directly to his (and — today — her) fitness for office. This is not true of
the gabbai tz’dakah, whose position affords the closest analogy to that of
synagogue trustee.