CCAR RESPONSA
A Divorced Spouse as Member of NAORRR
5754.7
She’elah
The leadership of NAORRR, the National Association of Retired Reform Rabbis, has received an application for
membership from a woman who was at one time married to a rabbi, a member of the CCAR. They were divorced many
years ago and the rabbi remarried. We heave learned that the rabbi initiated the divorce proceedings and that he cut his
first wife out of his pension. Hearsay has it that their marriage was most unpleasant. The first wife wishes to become a
member of NAORRR and to attend our convention. She indicated that she would need financial assistance in order to
attend the meeting.
Since widow(er)s are full-fledged members of NAORRR, this case raises a troubling question: are divorced spouses
entitled to the same privileges as widow(er)s regarding membership in NAORRR, attendance at meetings, and financial
aid? If so, then does that mean that after a rabbi’s death, NAORRR should open its door to two or more widow(er)s of the
same rabbi? (Rabbi Erwin Herman, Lake San Marcos, CA)
Teshuvah
NAORRR is a region of the CCAR and is therefore in most ways bound by the structure and by-laws of the parent body.
One major exception to this rule is the status of the spouse. While spouses in the CCAR have support groups but no legal
standing, NAORRR has made spouses equal members in its organization. Once a member, one remains a member for all
purposes, provided that all obligations that pertain to membership are fulfilled. Therefore, if the applicant (the divorcee)
was a member of NAORRR at any time, she would remain so. This, apparently, is not the case; she and her husband,
while they were married, were not members of NAORRR.
The she’elah raises an important issue of rights. Is a divorced spouse of a rabbi entitled to benefits that normally
accrue to spouses and widow(er)s of rabbis? We shall examine this issue in terms of the Jewish tradition concerning the
legal and moral responsibilities owed toward a divorced spouse.
1. The Legal Aspect. As is the case with most legal systems, Jewish law distinguishes sharply between the legal
status of the widow(er) and the divorced spouse. The texts draw this line most clearly with respect to the financial benefits
which the widow (almanah) enjoys but which the divorcee (gerushah) does not. Upon the death of her
husband, the widow receives the amount specified in the ketubah. In addition, she is supported by the husband’s
estate so long as she remains unmarried and so long as she does not demand her ketubah sum.1
This support is called mezonot, but it extends beyond the narrow sense of that term as “food.” The widow is
entitled to live in the marital home and to be maintained at the standard of living to which she had become accustomed
during her marriage.2 These “entitlements” do not belong to the wife solely as a result of her contractual
agreement with her husband, embodied in the ketubah. They are imposed, rather, as a tenai beit din, a
rabbinic legislative enactment. Even if the husband did not write in the ketubah that “you may dwell in my home
and be supported by my estate for the duration of your widowhood,” the court enforces that right as though the clause were
written.3
The widow, that is, remains the wife of the deceased in virtually all financial respects. Neither the husband nor his heirs
can strip her of the claims she may legitimately make upon his estate. The divorcee, by contrast, is no longer the man’s
wife. Upon termination of the marriage she receives the amount specified in the ketubah, unless by her actions
she forfeits that sum. Once she is a gerushah, she receives no mezonot.4 Unlike the
widow, she derives no benefits from the husband’s estate apart from those agreed upon contractually at the time of their
marriage.
2. The Moral Aspect. Based upon our Reform perspective, which holds that the financial obligations of marriage
are equal for both husband and wife, we would conclude from this discussion that the widowed spouse is entitled to the
financial and social benefits which accrue to him or her by virtue of the marriage. The widow(er) therefore is quite
properly a member of NAORRR, since he or she remains the spouse of the deceased rabbi. We would also conclude that
the divorced spouse, who is no longer a “spouse,” has no right to membership in the organization unless he or she had
been a member prior to the divorce. The divorce(e), that is, has no claim to financial and social benefits which stem from
a marital relationship that no longer exists.
Yet the matter is not so simple. The halakhah recognizes that, even though the marriage has ended, the husband
may owe something to his former wife. According to a talmudic dictum, “just as a man must show consideration
for the honor of his widow, so he must show consideration for the honor of his divorcee.” This notion is derived from
Isaiah 58:7, “do not ignore your kin.”5 The biblical word umibesarkha, which the rabbis
interpret to mean one’s divorcee, literally means one’s blood relations. Hence, in this view, a divorcee remains in some way
her husband’s “flesh and blood.” Indeed, he is permitted and even encouraged to support her financially following the
divorce.6 Though a marriage may have ended, in other words, the halakhah does not ignore the
fact that a sacred bond once existed between this man and woman and that certain ethical responsibilities flow from this
connection.
Of course, the fulfillment of these responsibilities is a voluntary matter, and for that reason, perhaps, R. Gershom b.
Yehudah (10th-11th century Germany) issued his famous edict (takanah) forbidding a husband from divorcing
his wife without her consent. The practical effect of this policy was to render the ketubah superfluous, since no
matter what financial terms were stipulated therein a husband will have to renegotiate those terms in order to secure his
wife’s agreement to the divorce. This means that the divorcee now has more claim to her former husband’s consideration
than she had previously, under biblical and classical rabbinic law. And even after the divorce has occurred, one’s
responsibility toward one’s former spouse may not be entirely left up to one’s warm-heartedness and good intentions. The
halakhah holds that the court is entitled to coerce a person to give his or her “fair share” to tzedakah.
Thus, were the community to determine that it is a good thing for one to display a particular degree of consideration
toward a former spouse, Jewish tradition empowers the collective to see to it that the individuals involved live up to that
ethical standard.
3. The Case Before Us. NAORRR, it would seem, is caught in the pull between these two sets of values. On the
one hand, the distinction between “almanah” and “gerushah” continues to be of relevance. NAORRR
offers continued membership and travel aid to widowed spouses of rabbis, precisely because those individuals retain their
status as rabbinic spouses. The divorced spouse is no longer the spouse. If membership in NAORRR is a benefit
which flows from the “estate” of the deceased rabbi, it is the widow(er) and not the divorced spouse who is
entitled to derive that benefit. There are, moreover good and convincing collegial reasons why this ought to be so.
NAORRR exists to insure, among other things, the continuation of community, of warm and friendly relations among
retired rabbis and their spouses. Attendance of divorced spouses at meetings might well threaten this goal. It is not
difficult to imagine the tension which would result if a retired rabbi’s former spouse were to participate in a meeting
alongside the rabbi and his or her current spouse or alongside the widow(er) of that rabbi. NAORRR would thus be
justified in denying membership to divorced spouses, especially in view of the additional financial burden it would thereby
assume in offering them travel aid.
On the other hand, let us imagine a different scenario. A woman has been married to a rabbi for many years. She has
been, in every sense of the word, his partner, working with him side-by-side in the realization of his rabbinate. She has
drawn a great deal of strength and emotional support from her status as a rabbinic spouse. And her friends, those who
most truly understand her and in whom she can confide, have tended to be other rabbinic spouses, the very people she
looks forward to meeting at national and regional conventions. Divorce presents some severe problems to this spouse.
Should she remain a member of her husband’s congregation, which is in fact her own congregation? Or should she join
another community so as to avoid embarrassment? Should she be discouraged from attending CCAR functions, such as
NAORRR conventions, in order to avoid causing difficulties for her former husband and, possibly, his current wife? Or do
we say that, because the rabbinic community has long been her social network as well as his, she has every right
to maintain her place in it? Do we, as an organization of rabbis, necessarily emphasize the personal and emotional needs
of rabbis over those of persons who were at one time related to these rabbis? Is this an unavoidable social tragedy, simply
“one of those things that can’t be helped”? Or do we bear some kind of ethical responsibility to a human being who has
invested a great deal of herself in the rabbinate as an institution?
These are difficult questions, not just for NAORRR, obviously, but for the Conference as a whole. The growing incidence
of rabbinic divorce confronts our profession with a singular array of difficult challenges. The way we choose to respond to
these challenges will do much to enhance or to diminish our reputation as pastors, as counselors, as religious leaders.
There are no easy, simple answers. But we believe that a sufficient and satisfying answer must begin with the recognition
of a complex reality: the Reform rabbinate is simultaneously a professional body and a community, a family. As
a professional body, its institutions exist first and foremost to serve the needs of its members. Spouses of rabbis may derive
benefit from this membership, but only to the extent that they are and remain spouses of rabbis. When divorce has put an
end to the relationship between a rabbi and a spouse, that spouse has no legal right to demand continued membership in a
rabbinic organization. As a community, however, as a family, our institutions serve as meeting places where life-long
friends and acquaintances may come together, feel at home with each other, and share interests and memories that are the
product of years of warm association. A divorced spouse surely has no legal right to demand entry into such a meeting
place. But, just as surely, the CCAR and NAORRR should be the last to cut off rabbinic spouses from life-long friends and
associates whether or not such spouses are widowed or divorced.
Conclusion. We recommend, therefore, that the she’elah be resolved by an approach which recognizes
two distinct levels of spousal membership in the Reform rabbinic community.
1. Legal membership is a matter of entitlement, flowing from marriage to a rabbi who is or was a member.
In our case, the applicant is not now the spouse of a rabbi and was not a member of NAORRR when she was married to
the rabbi. She is therefore not entitled to membership in NAORRR.
2. Collegial membership is of a different and less formal nature. It is not a matter of entitlement but of
recognition; that is, when a former spouse of a rabbi is understood to be and accepted as a member of the Reform rabbinic
family even in the absence of a “legal” right to join one of our organizations. This recognition is a form of
tzedakah, since it is based upon the conviction that our values of justice and righteousness may demand that a
particular person who is no longer a rabbinic spouse be accorded membership in our organizations. Like all questions of
tzedakah, those which pertain to this category of membership should be handled confidentially, on a case-by-
case basis.
We are in no position to decide whether the divorced spouse in this case ought to be granted the status of “collegial
member”. That determination must be left to NAORRR and its constituent bodies. We know that those who are granted
the privilege of making such difficult decisions will keep in mind the needs of both NAORRR and the applicant.
Notes
- M. Ketubot 11:1; Yad, Hilkhot Ishut 18:1.
- BT Ketubot 103a: “she enjoys the use of the home as she did
during her husband’s life, the servants as she did during her
husband’s life, the household furnishings as she did during her
husband’s life, etc.” See Yad, Ishut 18 of her rights and her
corresponding obligations toward her husband’s heirs.
- M. Ketubot 4:12; BT. Ketubot 52b; SA, EH 93:3.
- BT. Ketubot 97b; Yad, Hilkhot Ishut 21:17 and Magid Mishneh ad
loc.; SA EH 82:6.
- YT. Ketubot 11:3 (34b). The specific halakhic issue there
concerns the degree to which a man should want to spare his former
wife the humiliation of appearing in court to sell her ketubah in
order to support herself.
- Hagahot Maimoniot, Yad, Hilkhot Isurei Bi’ah 21, # 70.
Isserles codifies this rule in SA, EH 119:8: “a man is permitted to
provide maintenance to his divorcee. To do so is to fulfill a
greater mitzvah than one fulfills by supporting other poor
persons.”
If needed, please consult Abbreviations used in CCAR Responsa.