CCAR RESPONSA
Non-Jewish Parent as Member of Synagogue
5755.10
She’elah
Our congregation’s by-laws enable the non-Jewish spouse of a Temple member to be classified as a Temple member. That non-Jewish member enjoys all membership privileges, except for holding office, voting in a congregational election, and performing ritual functions appropriate only for Jews. In the event of the death or divorce of the Jewish spouse, the non-Jewish husband or wife can continue membership if he or she so wishes. This provision was established so that the children of that marriage could continue to receive a Jewish religious education in our congregation.
Recently, a non-Jewish woman, who was married to a Jew, contacted us about joining our congregation, because at the time of her marriage she had promised to raise her children as Jews. According to our by-laws, however, because she was not a member at the time of her marriage she cannot become a member now. We also cannot grant membership to the children, since one must be eighteen years of age or older in order to join our congregation.
By denying her membership, however, we are failing to provide a religious education for her children. Is there any membership status that we can confer upon this woman so that she can fulfill her promise to raise her children as Jews? (Rabbi Samuel M. Stahl, San Antonio, TX)
Teshuvah
Granted that neither the mother nor her children qualify for synagogue membership under your by-laws, the congregation nonetheless bears a certain responsibility for the Jewish education of these young people.1 According to tradition, the father is obligated to teach his child Torah2 or to engage others to do so.3 Naturally, we Reform Jew hold that this obligation is incumbent upon the mother as well as the father.4 Should he refuse to perform this mitzvah, he can be coerced to fulfill his responsibility; that is, the beit din can seize his assets in order to provide a teacher for the child.5 The case can be made, moreover, that in the event the parent does not meet this responsibility, the obligation falls upon the community. We find this to be the case with milah, another of the obligations of the father toward the son which the Talmud specifies: if the father does not discharge this duty, the court–that is, the community–must see that the boy is circumcised.6The community, in other words, stands in loco parentis. In the case before us, these children, represented by their mother,7 have come before the congregation and asked that they be taught Torah. It would appear that you have a duty to accept them.
This does not mean that any one synagogue or community is obligated to accept more than its fair share of these difficult cases. On the other hand, this family has come to you; as such, your congregation carries a special responsibility toward them. We have recently addressed the question of physicians and the treatment of indigent patients. We concluded that, while doctors in a community may make any and all reasonable arrangements concerning medical treatment for the poor, the fact remains that when a person comes to a particular physician and asks for medical care, that patient cannot be refused due to inability to pay.8 The same reasoning, we suspect, applies to this case.
Having said this, how can the children be admitted to religious school when according to your congregation’s by- laws neither they nor their mother qualify for membership in the Temple? We suggest the following interpretation of the rule. The mother should have the same associative status that she would enjoy were she married: she can be a “member” in the same way that she would be a “member” were she married to a Jew. Once the congregation has accepted its responsibility to educate the children, they become, if not “members”, then certainly part and parcel of your congregational community. Their mother’s membership would flow through them just as it would flow through a Jewish spouse. We might put this another way: were this woman a member of your congregation prior to her divorce, she would retain her membership, on account of her children, following the divorce. In our case, since this woman has accepted upon herself the obligation to see to the Jewish education of her children, she is entitled to associate membership “so that the children of that marriage could continue to receive a Jewish religious education in our congregation.”
We therefore believe that your congregation can fulfill its Jewish religious duty toward these children without transgressing the letter or spirit of its by-laws.
Notes
Under the CCAR’s resolution on Patrilineal Descent, the children enjoy a presumption of Jewish status. This presumption can be established “through appropriate and timely public and formal acts of identification with the Jewish faith and people.” Torah study is regarded as one such act. See the text of the resolution in American Reform Responsa, 550. BT. Kiddushin 29a; Yad, Hilkhot Talmud Torah 1:1; SA, YD 245:1. Yad, Hilkhot Talmud Torah 1:3; SA, YD 245:4. For a Reform analysis of the traditional attitude to the study of Torah by women, see our responsum 5755.15. Isserles, SA, YD 245:4. BT. 29a; SA, YD 261. We should note that the mother, as a non-Jew, bears no halakhic obligation to teach her children Torah, although she makes this request in fulfillment of a promise she made to their father, her former husband. See our responsum 5754.11.
If needed, please consult Abbreviations used in CCAR Responsa.