THE MERCY-KILLING OF AN ANIMAL

QUESTION:

A pet dog of a child was “put to sleep” by a veterinarian because the animal was incurably ill. The child was saddened by the loss of its pet and actually became depressed. The family asked the rabbi whether they had done wrong in having the sick animal put to death and they wanted to know whether Jewish tradition can give them a basis for justifying the event to the child.

ANSWER:

There is a great amount of discussion and law in the tradition on the question of the rights of animals, especially the question of cruelty to animals. But as far as I can find there is no clear statement in the legal tradition as to whether we are justified in putting to death an incurably sick animal. Actually, the question could hardly have come up in the Mishnah and Talmud, since pet dogs were rare. In fact, the Mishnah (Baba Batra 7:7) prohibits keeping a house-dog (unless it is chained). So, too, the Talmud (Shabbat 63a; Shulhan Arukh Hoshen Mishpat 409.3), but Isserles records a change of popular sentiment in this regard.

As to the rights of an incurably sick human being, the tradition is clear. Even though there is no hope for his recovery and even though he suffers great pain, we have no right to give him the release of death. But on the other hand, we are not in duty bound to exert efforts to keep him alive in his agony, nor even to pray for his recovery. Certainly we may not take any overt action to hasten his death. The law permits changing any outside situation which may tend to keep him alive. That is to say, we may remove what prevents him from dying but may not take any direct action leading to his death. See the discussion and the references in Modern Reform Responsa, pp. 197 ff.

Does this human precedent apply in the case of an incurable animal? That is to say, is it equally true that we may not take any direct action to bring about its death? On this specific question there is no clear statement, but the abundance of discussion of the rights of animals can lead us to an acceptable conclusion.

The prevention of cruelty to animals is a clear mandate in the tradition, beginning with Scripture itself. The Torah forbids us to neglect an animal that is staggering under his burden, to muzzle an ox on the threshing floor to keep him from eating the grain. The animal must be given the right to rest on the Sabbath as a human being must rest. Even a stray animal must be taken and given shelter until its owner is found. The Talmud, discussing this principle of prevention of cruelty to animals, deals with many questions of what may or may not be done to an animal (e.g., Baba Metzia 90a) and the Shulhan Arukh (Hoshen Mishpat 338) has a number of enactments registered as law.

There are certain definite statements as to the rights of animals under special circumstances that have bearing on our question. The law states that wolves and lions should be destroyed because they are dangerous. There is some exception made with regard to trained or tame animals, but Rabbi Eliezer says (M. Sanhedrin 1:4) that whoever kills them acquires merit. By this precedent, therefore, we may say that if the dog is dangerous, for example, it has rabies, then there is no question that for the safety of man, he must be put to death.

In general, the point of view of tradition is that animals may be used for the benefit of man. Thus it is clear that they may be put to death, as mentioned above, for their flesh or for their hides, etc. Putting an animal to death is not considered to be a violation of the general prohibition of cruelty to animals provided, of course, the animal is not killed in a way that would cause it suffering.

This general point of view, that killing an animal does not violate the prohibition of causing cruelty, is based upon the discussion in the Talmud (Hullin 7b) between Judah Hanasi and Phineas ben Yair. Thus modern Israeli medico-legal writings permit the use of animals in experimentation which may benefit sick human beings. See Lev Avraham II 71, and the medico-legal journal Assia Vol. I, 268, and especially the more classic reference, Jacob Reisher’s Shevut Ya-akov III, 71. Thus it is not a violation of the prohibition of cruelty to end an animal’s life if this is not done in cruel fashions and also if it is done for a worthy purpose.

Of course, if an animal is killed just for a man’s pleasure in hunting it, this is definitely against the law as stated by Ezekiel Landau (Noda Biyehudah, II 10. Cf., also Treasury of Responsa, pp. 215 ff.) But if the animal is killed for a worthy purpose (and, of course, mercifully) then to use the phrase of Jacob Reischer, “There is not the slightest prohibition in it” (ein bo hashash issur).

Clearly, then, the prohibition against “mercy killing” of a human being cannot be extended to the case of sick animals. The basic reason for the prohibition against mercy killing of a human being is that human life may never be taken (except under special circumstances such as capital punishment with due process of law, or the harsh necessity of war). But in this regard the status of animals is entirely different. The life of an animal can be taken under normal every-day circumstances, as a kosher animal may be killed for food or a non-kosher animal for its hide, etc. However, with regard to the mercy that must be shown to living creatures, the law virtually equates animals and man. As stated above, the law is firm in its demand for mercy to animals.

Therefore we may come to the following conclusion: If an animal has been terribly injured in a traffic accident or if it is incurably sick, suffering pain or the miseries of helplessness, then since in general the killing of animals is permissible if there is a useful purpose for it, and since also mercy is a mandate with regard to animals, therefore we may well conclude that according to the spirit of the tradition to end the life of a suffering animal, it is quite permissible and indeed justifiable.