Apostate
See also “Messianic Jew/s”
See Marriage
See Qaddish
RRR 127-131
RRR 120-127
Status of Apostates (Children and Adults)
The Committee has received during the past year a number of questions which involve Jewish converts to Christianity, and some questions with regard to the reversion to non-Jewish faith on the part of converts to Judaism. A question arose about the status in Juda ism of Christian children, adopted, converted to Juda ism, and then, because of physical or mental defects, the adoption is cancelled and the child returned to the agency. What is the status of such a child? The questions involving apostasy have come up generally in the following circumstance: A child is of an immi grant family in which there is a Gentile father and a Jewish mother, the family having been converted to Christianity in Germany. Now the young girl from this mixed family wants to marry a Jew. May she be married to a Jew without conversion? Analogous to it is the question of a child of a Jewish mother adopted and raised by a Christian family as a Christian. Can this child be married to a Jew without conversion? Does the fact that this child was not raised by her Jewish mother make a difference? As for a Christian child adopted, converted to Judaism, and then, be cause of physical or mental defects, returned to the agency, is this child to be deemed to have remained a Jew? May he or she, for example, when grown up, be married to a Jew, without further question as to reconversion?
These are all practical questions, and therefore it is important not only that we analyze the attitude of Jewish law in the past to these individuals, but also arrive at a practical conclusion for ourselves as to how we should deal with the problems mentioned above.
At the outset, it is to be noted that these problems are not new. To some degree they are dealt with in the Talmud, but they come to more complete discussion in the many responsa dealing with the Marranos, who for cen-turies kept on escaping from Spain and Portugal and appearing in Jewish communities elsewhere. Decision had to be made as to the status of these fugitives. Should they now be converted to Judaism? Or was the conversion unnecessary on the ground that they still were Jews? The question came up likewise in Ashkenazic Jewry due to the waves of compulsory conversion in the wake of the Crusades and later persecutions. It would be well, therefore, to trace the law in its general principles from the beginning.
The Talmud, in Yevamoth 45b, says that a child born of a Gentile father and a Jewish mother is “kosher.” To which Rashi comments, “Since his mother is Jewish, he is counted as one of our brothers.” The Talmud in Kiddushin 68b, in discussing the verse in Deuteronomy 7 : 4: ” … he will wean your son away from following Me,” indicates that “he” means the Gentile father of the son, who will mislead the son away, and so forth. Therefore, the Talmud says, this indicates that “your son” born of an Israelite woman is truly your son, but a son born of a Gentile woman is her son. The principle is so embodied in the Codes: in the Tur, Even Hoezer 4, it is written that the son of any Gentile man and a Jewish woman is “kosher” to marry a Jew; so it is also in the Shulchan Aruch, Even Hoezer 4 : 5 and 19. There is some question whether a child of such a mixed marriage may marry a priest, but most authorities agree that she may do so.
Therefore, there is no question that the child of a Jewish mother is fully a Jew and may be married to a Jew. Now, theoretically speaking, if this daughter of a mixed marriage also marries a Gentile, her child is a child of a Jewish mother and is also Jewish. For how many generations would this Jewish status endure? While, of course, this is a theoretical question, it is interesting to note that Solomon, the son of Simon Duran, of Algiers, says (“Rashbash” 89) that it applies “ad sof ho ‘olom, ” forever. The statement of Duran is as follows: “One whose mother is Jewish, even for many generations, even if the father is Gentile, the child is Jewish, even to the end of the world, ad sof ho ‘olom. ”
But such a person has been raised as a Christian—either, as in the case concerning which the Committee was specifically asked, the child was herself converted to Christianity; or, as in the case of the Marranos, the child was raised in a Christian environment from the very beginning. Granted that the child is Jewish by birth, must it not be in some formal way restored to its Jewish status—by a ceremony akin to conversion? This is discussed in the law and most of the discussion goes back to the Talmud in Bechoros 31a and Avodah Zara la. Here the discussion is specifically with regard to the Am Haaretz, meaning in the Talmudic sense one who is not to be trusted to observe the laws of purity and to give tithes and heave offering properly. What should be the relationship between these non observers (Am Ha’aretz) and the Chaverim (those who are careful to keep all the laws mentioned)? The Talmud says that the Am Ha’aretz, before he can be accepted as trustworthy, must make a formal promise of Chaverus, i.e., to be one of the Chaverim who are careful to observe the law.
The same term is used in the discussion of apostates who want to return. Repentant apostates are asked to take upon themselves the promise of Chaverus, i.e., to obey Jewish law. As to whether any formal ceremony other than such a promise is to be required of them, there is a general agreement that the ritual bath is not really required by strict law (m’d’oraiso), but some would require the ritual bath as a rabbinical caution (m’d’rabbanan). Thus it is decided by Moses Isserles in Yore Deah 268 : 12. However, it is noteworthy that in the discussion in the Talmud, in Bechoroth, Rabbi Simon and Rabbi Joshua, speaking of the nonobservant and whether we should accept their repentance, say that under all circumstances we should accept them because of the verse in Jeremiah (3 : 22), “Return, ye recreant children”; and the Talmud says that the law is according to this pair of lenient authorities. The status of the nonobservant Jew, and that of the proselyte are brought together in the Tosefta (Demai II). In the discussion on the Shulchan Aruch passage mentioned above, Elijah of Vilna quotes this lenient discussion in the Talmud as applying also to apostates who revert to Judaism. In general, the Talmud is lenient also with regard to children of Jewish birth who, unaware of their Jewish origin, are raised among non-Jews (Tinok hanishbah bayn hanochrim). See the discussion in Shabbas 68 b ), especially with regard to their being excused since in their ignorance they violated the Sabbath.
The general mood of the law with regard to all those who seek to return was to make as little fuss as possible and to interpose no hindrances. The rest of the statement of Solomon Duran as to these reverts is as follows: “The requirements of conversion do not apply to them at all. When they wish to return to Judaism, we do not have to tell them about the various commandments (as we do to Gentile converts) for they already stand sworn as part of Israel from Mount Sinai and they do not need the ritual bath for conversion.” That this is not merely a chance liberal statement is evidenced by the fact that it is quoted by Joseph Caro in his “Bes Joseph” (Bedek Ha Bayis) at the end of Yore Deah 268, where the question is discussed. It is noteworthy, too, that Rabbenu Gershom, the Light of the Exile, speaking in the Rhineland, also says in a similar case (in fact, with regard to a priest) that we should be as lenient as possible and refrain carefully from reminding them of their former state lest we discourage thereby the apostates from returning in repentance (“Vitry,” pp. 96-97).
It is clear from this that no ritual of conversion should be required of a child of a Jewish mother. To do so would indeed violate the law and imply that they are not Jews, which would be errpneous. However, the decision of Is series that they avow Divre Chaverus could well be accepted by us as a cautionary action. We should ask the person involved to promise to maintain a Jewish home. This, at the most, is all that is necessary.
Now as to the other and somewhat related question: What about a child born of a Gentile mother who, in infancy, is adopted into a Jewish family, converted to Judaism, and then, after conversion, is returned to the adoption agency because of some physical or mental defect? Is this child, because of the original conversion in infancy, to be deemed permanently a Jew? This may become a practical question if, when the child grows up, he or she wants to marry a Jew.
In general, the law concerning an infant who is converted is different from that governing an adult who is converted to Judaism. An adult accepts Judaism of his own free will after a careful explanation is made to him of all the circumstances involved in becoming a Jew. But an infant is converted without knowing what is involved. The Talmud says (Ketuboth 11a) that an infant may be converted by the authority of the Beth Din, not, of course, on the ground of the child’s intelligent acceptance of the conditions involved, which is impossible, but because becoming a Jew was deemed to be an advantage, and we may do a favor to a person even without his consent. Therefore, with regard to an adult convert, he cannot completely discard the allegiance which he had accepted. He simply becomes a sinful Jew and he may still enter into Jewish marriage, just as an apostate Jew may (see Tosefta, Demai I I : 5; Yore Deah 268 : 12).
This convert to Judaism who reverts to his former faith is, of course, not deemed a Jew in the full sense of the word. Just as in the case of a born Jew who apostatizes, he is, for example, not to be relied upon with regard to various mitzvos. The wine in his possession is Gentile wine, and his bread is Gentile bread. But with regard to marriage, he has the same right as an apostate Jew. The only exception with regard to apostates in the marriage relationship concerns the levirate marriage and Chalitza. If, for example, a man dies and has no children, and his brother is an apostate, some few authorities ease the requirement that the widow obtain Chalitza from this apostate. But otherwise the apostate, whether born Jewish or having been converted as an adult, retains his Jewish status in marriage relationships (cf. Ezekiel Landau, “Nodah b’Yehudah” II, Even Hoezer 150).
Thus, the adult convert, like a Jew by birth, possesses what international lawyers call an “indelible allegiance,” at least with regard to marriage and divorce. However, a child who has been converted without his own intelligent consent, but merely on the theory that a favor has been done him, is given the permission to renounce the conversion when he grows up. So says Rabbi Joseph in the dis-cussion in the Talmud (Ketuboth 1 1a). This is embodied as law by Asher ben Yehiel in his Compendium on the Talmud. He adds, however, that if the convert, when he is full-grown, is known to observe Jewish law, this observance is deemed to mean consent; and then he can no longer renounce his allegiance. So it is in the Shulchan Aruch, Yore Deah 268 : 7 and 8. The child in question, therefore, has the right to determine whether his conversion in infancy remains valid or not. If he chooses to live a Jewish life as he grows up, he is a Jew; if not, his conversion is void.
To sum up: Those who are born of Jewish mothers and those who are converted to Judaism as adults have an indelible allegiance to Judaism with regard to marriage laws. The only real exception to this is the circumstance in which a woman is free from the need of Chalitza if her husband’s brother is an apostate.
(Originally published in Central Conference of American Rabbis Yearbook, Vol. LXX, 1960.)
RR 127-131
Burial of an Apostate
A Jewish family in Los Angeles asked an undertaking establishment to arrange for the burial of their close relative who had just died in a Catholic institution in San Francisco. The nuns in charge delivered the body at the request of the family, but informed the family that the man had been converted to Catholicism and had received extreme unction. The question is this: Is a Jewish institution, or are Jews in general, in duty bound, according to Jewish law and tradition, to pro vide burial for an apostate from Judaism? The family also asks that the body be put in shrouds (tachrichim).
(From Louis J. Freehof, San Francisco, California)
The origin of the law is to be found in the post-Talmudic treatise Evel Rabatti (Semachos, chapter 2). The discussion there includes suicides, criminals executed by the court, people under ban, apostates, and so forth. The general injunction given with regard to all these sinners is that we do not tear the garments for them (Keriah) and we do not engage in any burial activity with them (Eyn Misaskin). This law, namely, the general injunction that we have no concern with, or burial responsibility for, such people, is repeated almost verbatim in all subsequent legal discussion and in the Codes.
Yet, although this formal prohibition is stated and repeated, it is noticeable that there has been continual limitation of the scope of the prohibition. Sometimes the limitations have to do with one of the types of people involved (the suicide, or the man under ban, or the apostate, and so forth). Sometimes the limitation concerns one or the other elements of the general prohibition, such as the formal periods of mourning, or standing in line at the cemetery to console the mourners, or providing shrouds, and so forth. In general, not much distinction is made between these sinners, and what applies to one applies to the other. One can say that the prohibition against formal mourning for this group is the one which is most fully observed. This is due to the general principle that whenever questions have to be settled as to mourning (i.e., how long it should endure, and so forth) the rule is to make the lenient decision; that is to say, whenever in doubt, the decision is to mourn less or not mourn at all. Therefore, this part of the general prohibition (namely, the mourning ritual) usually remains firm through all the discussions of the law. Yet, even in this case, permission is occasionally given to participate in regular mourning. See, for example, the responsum of Moses Sofer, “Chasam Sofer,” Yore Deah 326, where he says with regard to a certain honored family concerning whom the inquiry was made (when a member of the family committed suicide) that he certainly would permit such a fam ily to save itself from gossip and shame, which would come if they conspicuously kept from mourning for the deceased suicide.
Moses Sofer’s decision to permit mourning in the case of a suicide was based upon his concern for the honor of a family. This motivation explains much of the development of the law in this case. The original source of the law in Evel Rabatti summarizes what is permitted and what is not permitted in regard to this group of sinners, by saying that whatever is for the honor of the dead we do not do (since they do not deserve any honor from us), but that whatever is for the honor of the living we do observe. Based on this distinction, every element in the ritual of burying and mourning has been, and must be, separately evaluated. Whatever is for the honor of the dead we do not do, and what is for the honor of the living we do observe. Thus, almost no authority except, perhaps, Ezekiel Katzenellenbogen, of Altona (“Knesses Yecheskel” 37), would say that we give a hesped (eulogy), since the hesped is clearly for the honor of the dead.
Therefore, the question as to whether we are in duty bound to bury these sinners, or to provide tachrichim or not, depends upon the prior question, whether burial and tachrichim are for the honor of the dead or for the honor of the living. This very question is the subject of an elaborate debate in the Talmud (b. Sanhedrin 47c ff.). This debate is evaluated by Abraham de Boton (“Lechem Mishna” to Maimonides, Yad, “Hilchos Avel” I : 10). He bases his judgment on the Tosfos which he cites, namely, that although burial does involve the honor of the dead (and therefore one would think we are not in duty bound to provide this honor for these sinners), nevertheless some disgrace is always involved for the living if the body of the sinner is not properly buried. The fact that the honor of the living is always involved is cited by Abraham de Boton as the explanation of a crucial decision in this matter by Solomon ben Aderet, Rabbi of Barcelona, thirteenth century. (See his responsum 763.) Solomon ben Aderet (Rashbo) says that when Evel Rabatti states that we do not do anything for these sinners (eyn misaskin), this does not mean that we are free from our responsibility for burying them and providing shrouds. Although Solomon ben Aderet is one of the greatest authorities, his opinion would not stand up against the earlier authority of Evel Rabatti if he stood alone. But his opinion is cited by Joseph Caro; see “Bes Joseph” to the Tur, Yore Deah 334, where he quoted this responsum and also another by Rashbo to the same effect. Caro quotes them without the slightest disagreement. So, too, in the Shulchan Aruch, Yore Deah 333 : 3 (the discussion here is specifically about an excommunicated man), Schach (Sabbetai Cohen) cites the opinion of the Rashbo, and states that it has been quoted by Joseph Caro (“Bes Joseph”) and he accepts it as the rule. So the Be’er Hetev (ad loc.) cites it as a rule that the Evel Rabatti does not mean at all that we should refrain from providing burial and tachrichim for these sinners. It is noteworthy that the great Rabbi of Egypt of the sixteenth century, David ben Zimri, said in his commentary to the Yad, “Avel” I :10: “It seems that we must bury them, but not alongside of the righteous.” A full responsum on the question is found in the Responsa of Bezalel Shaffran, rabbi in Rumania, responsum 131. He is asked a question from Yassy about the burial of an apostate. The questioner says they have a minhag in Yassy not to bury such persons in the Jewish cemetery. Shaffran denies that the minhag is valid. He quotes all the authorities, Maimonides, Rosh, Rif, who emphasize that we do not mourn for apostates but imply that We do bury them, and he also quotes Solomon ben Aderet, who specifically says that we do bury them. He also quotes Joel Sirkes (Bach) to Yore Deah 362, who con eludes that we do bury but do not give tachrichim. He then tells that Or Zerua (II, 422 : 3) takes the opposite point of view, that we do not bury them, but he calls attention to Joseph Saul Nathanson’s commentary, “Yad Shoul” to Yore Deah 345, which says that Or Zerua’s statement that we do not bury applies only to the specific case of a shochet who supplies Jews with trefe meat. Finally, he leaves the matter unsettled.
In a footnote, the son of Bezalel Shaffran, Enoch Shaffran, Rabbi of Bucharest, says the matter is decided, and that we do bury them; and he quotes Moses Sofer, Yore Deah 341, who says that we do, and then adds that it is the custom to bury them with tachrichim.
An interesting older responsum on the question of burial of a sinner is found in the Responsa of Jacob l’Ves Levi, 49 (rabbi in Turkey, seventeenth century). This responsum concerned a woman who threw in her lot with her excommunicated son, and violated all the laws of the community and the faith. (By the way, this woman is identified by Perles as the mother of Uriel Acosta [Monatsschrift, vol. XXVI, 1877].) He decides, on the basis of all the opinions cited above (going back to the fundamental decision of Solomon ben Aderet) that it is our duty to bury her. He adds, of course, that if the rabbinical court wishes to make a special example of her and not bury her, they have the right to do so; but that is only under special circumstances of community tension when the safety of the community is involved, when it is permitted even to deprive a sinner of the right to have his son circumcised, or the right of the son to study in the communal school. See Responsa of Nachmanides, 244. Except for these emergency rights of the rabbinate, the general rule is clear: All the sinners listed in Evel Rabatti, including apostates, should be buried by the Jewish community (or their relatives), and also, if desired, shrouds (tachrichim) should be provided
MRR 169-175
OUR ATTITUDE TO APOSTATES
QUESTION:
In these days of ecumenical mood, religious groups are rethinking their attitude towards each other. Should we not, therefore, also rethink our attitude to those Jews who have abandoned Judaism for Christianity? (From Rabbi Abraham Shinedling, Albuquerque, New Mexico.)
ANSWER:
THE BIBLICAL attitude to apostates (to idolatry) is stern and even harsh; they are to be put to death (Deuteronomy 13:13-19). This is the same attitude which the Church had to its heretics. Post-Biblical law also says that a provoking heretic (mumar Lehach’is) “must be brought down and not brought up again from the pit,” i.e., must not be rescued from danger (AvodahZarah 26b). Thus the attitudes of both religions to heretics seem to be the same. Yet in actuality they differed drastically from each other. While the pages of history are red with the blood of heretics to Christianity, there is no record in all of Jewish history, beginning with Scripture, of any such violence done to one who aban-doned Judaism and the Jewish community. In addition to this negative self-restraint, Jewish legal literature is replete with law revealing a positive attitude of con-tinued kinship with apostates.
The rule “Even though he has sinned, he is still a Jew” (Sanhedrin 44a) applies also to the apostate. This reveals itself in laws that touch the most intimate side of life. The apostate’s marriage is still a valid marriage. If his wife is to be divorced, he is eligible, in spite of his change of faith, to give a Jewish get. In fact a get must be obtained from him if his wife is to be divorced. If he is the surviving brother of a childless man who has died, the widow cannot be freed unless the apostate gives her chalitsah (although there is some disagreement on this question in the law). When his father dies, he is entitled to inherit the estate (although there is some disagreement in the law about that also). In other words, in all intimate family relations, he is still considered a part of the Jewish community, with the basic rights and duties of a Jew. He has sinned, but he is still a brother. This insistence that he is still part of our life, of course, created great difficulties in the obtaining of a get or a chalitzah from one who wants to have nothing to do with Jewish life. Nevertheless, in spite of these difficulties, Judaism has persisted in holding to this kinship.
It is with the background of these attitudes that the present relationship of Jews and Judaism towards apostates must be considered. But first of all it is necessary to understand, more precisely, the mood and the motivation of presentday apostates in the United States. In our long history we have had a wide spectrum of different relationships with apostates. Sometimes, and perhaps most times, our apostates became our bitterest enemies and persecutors, such as Abner of Burgos in Spain, Nicholas Donin in France, and Pfefferkorn in Germany. Sometimes they remained our friends and helpers, such as Paulus Cassel in Germany and Chwolson in Russia. Most of the time they became neither friends nor enemies, but just dropped out of Jewish life; and sometimes, especially when the apostasy was forced upon them, they returned to Jewish life. Some writers say that as many as 10 percent returned to Jewish life. Whether the figure is correct or not, there must certainly have been a fair number of such reverts, be-cause laws have developed in our legal literature governing their return. Cf. Yoreh Deah 158:2 (end). To the hostile apostates the Talmudic term can be applied mumar lehach’is, (provocative apostates). To the nondestructive type of apostate the Talmudic term can be applied, mumar leteavon (apostates for ther own benefit). To which of these types of apostate do most of those belong whom we meet nowadays in the United States? Of course, there are a large number of them whom we never meet, Jewish men and women in a large city who marry Christians and convert for that purpose. They disappear into the Christian community and the Jewish community has no knowledge of their existence. There is no personal contact with these people; they simply disappear from our life. We need not develop an attitude to people we never meet, except perhaps our general attitude of selfaccusation that our Jewish education has not succeeded in instilling a greater loyalty to our tradition. But there are some who keep in contact with their Jewish family and to a considerable extent, in social contact with their Jewish friends. Also, in a small city, where everyone is known to everyone else, even those who might wish to disappear from Jewish life cannot quite achieve it. They meet their former coreligionists frequently. It is in relation to these two classes of people to which we must consider our attitude, as individuals and as a social and communal body.
There are of course, among them some apostates whom we may well consider analogous to the hostile apostates who persecuted Jews and Judaism in the past. These are the ex-Jewish professional missionaries whose aim is to lure Jewish adults and children from their ancestral faith. These are conscious enemies of Judaism and with them we can have no other relation ship than to do our best to resist their depredations.
But these active ex-Jewish subverters of Judaism are comparatively few in number. The overwhelming majority of apostates intend no harm to Jews and Judaism. In fact, they feel no longer concerned with it; they are concerned only with themselves. They leave Judaism either in order to facilitate their marriage to a Chris-tian or to further their social, professional or business standing. They are clearly mumar leteavon, apostates for their own benefit, and with regard to them Jewish law is comparatively speaking lenient. For example, we may not lend them money on interest, for to that extent, they are still Jews (cf. Isserles to Yoreh Deah 159:2). Of course, we cannot have any respect for them because they have abandoned our embattled Jewish community for the sake of their own ease or wishes.
It is not logical to equate the mood of a Christian who becomes a Jew with the mood of a Jew who becomes a Christian. Even though marriage may be the main motive in a conversion, the person who is being converted cannot help being aware of other moods involved. A Christian who converts out of love for a Jew is well aware that he or she is now entering into a some-what disadvantaged minority. In fact it is our duty so to inform the candidate for conversion (Yoreh Deah 268:2). Whereas a Jew converting to Christianity out of love for a Christian cannot help but be aware that he may thus be bettering his situation as to career or business. In joining Judaism there is a touch of the unconsciously heroic, while in leaving Judaism there is an element of desertion. If, for example, an apostate would donate candles for use in the synagogue, we do not kindle them in the synagogue. Yet donated candles would be acceptable if given by a Gentile (cf. Orach Chayim 154:11, Isserles and Magen Avraham; also Is-serles to Yoreh Deah 254:2).
We therefore cannot respect the Jewish apostate. Yet although we do not respect him, it is nevertheless clear from the general mood of Jewish law that we do not cast him off. He has cast himself off, but we do not exclude him entirely. He still has bonds with Jewish family life, according to Jewish law. A child may say Kaddish for an apostate father (cf. Recent Reform Re-sponsa, p. 134 ff.) A Kohan who has apostasized and returns is considered to have his sanctity completely returned to him and he may bless the people in the congregation in the services. (See the letter of Rabbenu Gershom in Vitry, p. 96.) Besides, it well may be that he or his children may return to Judaism. We frequently these days have occasion to marry a Jew with a child of a family which had converted to Christianity and we do not require reconversion.
If, of course, apostasy would increase greatly, as it did once or twice in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, then the apostate would be a constant danger to us and our attitude might then be justifiably sterner. Unless that occurs, then as to these apostates who are not concerned with us and mean us no harm, we do not and cannot respect them but, in accordance with the spirit of Jewish tradition, we do not reject them entirely. The door is always open for their return.
NRR 189-192
APOSTATE WEDDING ATTENDANTS
QUESTION:
The sister of the bride has converted to Christianity. Now this convert wishes to stand under the chuppah as an attendant at her sister’s wedding. Should this be permitted? (Asked by Rabbi David Polish, Chicago, Illinois.)
ANSWER:
IT IS NECESSARY, first, to consider the actual status in Jewish law of the apostate from Judaism. Then, after considering the legal status of the apostate, we must come to a conclusion suitable to our present circumstances as to the rights of this apostate in the wedding ceremony of her sister.
In Deuteronomy 22:1-3, Scripture speaks of strayed cattle and other lost objects. It declares it to be the duty of everyone to protect these strayed or lost objects until the owner can search them out and recover them. In verse 3, Scripture says:” Thus shall you do with regard to all things lost by thy brother.” R. Jochanan, in Avoda Zara 26b, says, “I take the Scriptural word ‘brother’ to include the apostate.” Also, the phrase in Sanhedrin 44a, “Although he has sinned, he is still an Israelite,” applies as a general principle to the apostate. Note that Pachad Yitzchok (s.v. Mumar) applies this phrase a number of times to the apostate. Of course the law makes a distinction between a hostile apostate (mumar l’hachis) and an apostate merely out of supposed self-benefit or self-gratification (mumar l’teovone). These two different groups are met, of course, with different attitudes, but legally they are Jews, poshey Yisroel, sinful Jews, but still Jews.
These general maxims which include the apostate in the Jewish fold are exemplified and emphasized by the fact that certain vital Jewish functions, if performed by an apostate, are fully valid. This rule applies especially in matters of family life. If a woman’s husband has become an apostate, her marriage cannot be dissolved unless her apostate-husband gives her a get. In this divorce document the apostate may not use his new Gentile name but must use his old Jewish name, since it is still his name (Even Hoezer 129:5). If a man dies childless, his wife must get chalitza before she can marry again. She must get the chalitza from her husband’s brother even if the brother is now an apostate (Even Hoezer 157:4). (There are some variations of this law, but they do not directly concern us here.) This unbroken kinship with the apostate is to be seen also in the laws of inheritance. An apostate is entitled to inherit his father’s estate; and if he is the first-born, he still has the additional rights of a first-born (Choshen Mishpot 283:2).
Now if an apostate can validly perform and participate in these vital legal situations, there certainly can be no legal objection to an apostate being an attendant at a wedding. The wedding attendant is not an indispensable functionary. A Jewish wedding is legal if the husband proposes to the wife and gives her an object of value, and she accepts it in the presence of witnesses. Here the apostate sister is not necessary as a witness. There are other witnesses present, and so there can be no legal objection to her participating in the wedding.
This is the purely legal situation. But in all relationships with an apostate, there is, of course, some natural human reaction. We have suffered so cruelly through the centuries from the slanders and machinations of apostates that their very presence becomes hard for a Jew who knows Jewish history to endure. Of course, those bitter enemies of ours were mumar l’hachis. While it is reasonable to assume that this girl has no hostile intention at all, but has converted out of convenience, she is a mumar l’teovone. Nevertheless, to the extent that we are guided by our Jewish feelings, any sort of mumar is objectionable.
Thus it is that although the law gives a mumar virtually every legal right, the law still expresses caution in dealing with them. For example, in the laws of shechitah (Yore Deah 2:2, 4), as a general rule the apostate’s shechitah is kosher, but he must be carefully examined and watched. In the laws of inheritance, while the apostate may legally inherit, the rabbis under certain circumstances have stopped the transfer of property from a Jew to an apostate (see Choshen Mishpot 283:2). In other words, we judge the special circumstances before we decide whether or not we permit an apostate to exercise his privileges in Judaism, although it is legal for him to do so.
Thus in this case, the rabbi by tradition has leeway to go by his personal judgment. He must consider the communal and also the family situation. If having the apostate sister stand under the chuppah next to the bride at the marriage will be taken by many in the community as a condoning of apostasy and may, therefore, tend to increase such occurrences, then the rabbi has the right l ‘ migdor milso, to make “a fence of protection” and forbid the apostate’s participation. If, however, there is no danger of misunderstanding, then we must remember the legal status of the apostate in general. Nevertheless it would be wise not to have her there if it is a very small wedding. If there are more people present who are considered the legal witnesses, and if there is no danger of her presence being taken as condoning apostasy, then there can be no legal objection to her presence. Furthermore, one must also consider the family situation. If the parents of the bride are eager to have their daughter present, and if the bride herself is eager to have her sister, then forbidding her to participate could easily do more harm than good, especially since, after all, there is no real legal objection to her presence.
TRR 64-65
CIRCUMCISING CHILD OF AN APOSTATE MOTHER
QUESTION:
The Jewish wife in a mixed marriage has given birth to a baby boy. They want the child circumcised. However, the situation is complicated by the fact that the mother has converted to Christianity. Should this child be circumcised? (Asked by Rabbi Michael B. Berk, San Jose, California.)
ANSWER:
Since the mother was born Jewish and the child follows the status of the mother, the only question involved is the fact that the mother has converted to Christianity. Nevertheless, in the eyes of Jewish law, she is still Jewish and her child is Jewish, and there is no reason why there should not be a bent milah.
Now as to the question of the wife having converted to Christianity. The easiest way to deal with the relevance of this statement is to consider the status of an apostate in Jewish law The specific question then becomes this: Has the woman’s conversion to Christianity abolished her status as a Jewess in the eyes of Jewish law?
The answer to this question is negative. If a Jew converts to Christianity, he is considered a sinner, of course, but as the Talmud (Sanhedrin 44a) says: “Although a sinner, he is still an Israelite.” This is more than a social statement. It is a legal principle. A woman married to an apostate must receive a get from him and he can validly give it. In other words, he has legal status as a Jew. This applies to her also. Regardless of her conversion, the child should have a berit milah. Certainly her apostasy does not change the status of the infant.
TFN no.5753.13 81-85
CCAR RESPONSA
Apostate in the Synagogue
5753.13
She’elah
A man, born and raised a Jew, has converted to Christianity and joined the Episcopal Church. Having earned a theological degree, he now teaches Comparative Religion at a local private school and has been “very helpful in the ecumenical dialogue between Christians and Jews.” Should he be allowed to speak in a Reform synagogue? If permitted to speak, may he do so from the bimah? If he is permitted to speak from the bimah, should he be permitted to deliver a homily during Sabbath or Holiday worship? May he lead the congregation in prayer or be offered an aliyah? (Rabbi Harry Rothstein, Amenia, NY)
Teshuvah
It must be made clear that regardless of how genial this man is, regardless of his academic credentials or how honest his intentions, because he has forsaken Judaism and converted to another religion we must consider him an apostate. The issue of how we are to interact with apostates has been thoroughly covered in traditional halakhic literature, as well as in our Reform responsa.1
Central to our she’elah is the question: Why would we even consider permitting an apostate to enter our synagogues, let alone teach or lead us in worship?
Jewish tradition has always been sensitive to the different circumstances under which a person would abandon his or her affiliation with the Jewish community. Not all apostates are lumped together. There are essential differences between one who is forced to convert during a period of religious persecution (anoos)2 and one whose apostasy is a matter of religious conviction and public rejection of Judaism (mumar l’hakh’is or meshummad).3
Nonetheless, we always hope that even those who are apostates of their own volition will at some time return to the fold. For ours is not simply a religion, we Jews are also a family. We can change our name, looks and religion, but we cannot erase the familial link with the Jewish people. An oft cited passage in the Talmud reads:
Rabbi Abba the son of Zavda said, Even though [an Israelite] has sinned, he is still called `Israel.’ Rabbi Abba said, there is a popular saying: A myrtle, though it stands among reeds, is still a myrtle, and so it is called.4
Indeed, our insistence that an apostate is still Jewish often led to grave consequences.5 To solve some of those problems, there was an attempt by Gaonic authorities to rule that the apostate had forsaken the Jewish people and, therefore, had forfeited his or her claim for certain benefits and rights within the Jewish community.6 But their attempts were rejected by Rashi and other leading halakhic authorities.7 Rashi takes the above-quoted statement from the Talmud and extends it to include apostates:
The meshummad is a Jew in every way, as it is said: “even though an Israelite has sinned …”, meaning that even though he has sinned [or in this case, apostatized], he is a Jew.”8
If then a meshummad, the willful and even provocative apostate, is still considered Jewish, are there any restrictions to his or her participation in the Jewish community? The question is an ancient one, and the answer is: yes, there are restrictions.9
Far from welcoming the apostate to participate in the service, the early Jewish liturgy included a Birkat haMinim, which explicitly cursed those Jews who abandoned their people.10 Some authorities have even rejected or restricted commmunal contributions by apostates.11 The Rabbinic decrees and ordinances against the willful apostates are founded on the Torah, which established the severest of punishments against those who left the faith and people of Israel.12
Thus we have, on the one hand, the classic teaching that a Jew is always a Jew. On the other hand, tradition effectively shunned complete apostates, denying them an active role in the Jewish community. Israel of Bruna, a 15th century German Rabbi, made an attempt to resolve the conflict by teaching that even though the apostate is an Israelite, he is not a Jew, meaning that “Israelite” is the designation of one’s lineage, while “Jew” refers to one’s relationship with the Jewish community.13 (The idea seems to parallel Reform Judaism’s recent insistence that from either mother or needs to be supported by “appropriate and timely acts of identification with the Jewish faith and people.”14)
The modern state of Israel has also ruled that an apostate, though Jewish by lineage, is not permitted to be registered as a “Jew” under the “Law of Return.”15 The Jewish community has thus been remarkably consistent in excluding apostates from active participation, all the while affirming the ancestral lineage and holding out hope for them to return. The Reform movement has similarly remained firm on the issue of the apostate Jew.16
In our case, we therefore conclude that this man, who has earned a theological degree and is an active member of the Episcopal church, has willfully converted and is thus an apostate, a meshummad. He is thereby is excluded from actively participating in Jewish worship. We would be sending the most confusing signals to our comunity if we permitted apostates to assume prominent roles in our synagogues and thereby blur the distinction between those who proudly declare their Jewishness and those who abandon our faith.
Consequently, this apostate should not be given the honor of ascending the bimah, nor should he be given the distinction of addressing the congregation before, during or after a worship service.17 Were we to honor an apostate who, to boot, is a scholar of theology, the community would be confronted with a man who was born and raised a Jew, but determined after much study that Judaism is inferior to another religion. We must be careful to avoid conveying any message which may weaken the Jewish community.
However, we would not keep him from attending the service, because we always hold out hope that he will repent and rejoin our fold.18
Notes
There are several Reform responsa that deal with apostasy: Solomon B. Freehof, “Status of Apostates and Burial of an Apostate,” Recent Reform Responsa #26, pp.120-127 and #27, pp. 127-131; “Our Attitude to Apostates,” Modern Reform Responsa #30, pp. 169-175. Also see Walter Jacob, “Status of a `Completed Jew in the Jewish Community,” Contemporary American Reform Responsa #68, pp. 109-112. Coercion is not, of course, limited to threats of violence. Coercion can also include the combined pressures of economic welfare and professional security. See, for example, Asher Siev’s article on the strange path of an apostate Jew in Sefer zikaron lish’mue’l kalman mirsky (Jerusalem, 1970). The mumar l’hakh’is, literally, the “provoking apostate,” is the most troublesome of those who forsake our faith. Rambam identifies this kind of willful apostate as one “who repudiates the Oral Law as a matter of personal conviction and through his reasoned opinion.” (Yad, Hilkhot Mamrim, 3:3). History has shown that it is the provoking or willful apostate who, all too often, acts in a way which denigrates Judaism and is most detrimental to the Jewish people. For evidence of the murders and oppression wrought by former co-religionists, see The Jewish Encyclopedia, 2:14-17; Yitzhak Baer, A History of the Jews in Christian Spain, Philadelphia, 1966, vol. 1, pp. 328-354) and vol. 2 (pp. 141-150, 341ff). BT. Sanhedrin 44a. Jacob Katz details some of the “grave consequences” (in Exclusiveness and Tolerance, pp. 70-71), such as the cases of apostates who did not grant their wives a Jewish divorce. If they would no longer be considered Jewish, their marriages could simply be annulled. But by insisting that every apostate was still Jewish, a get was necessary for a true divorce. Without it, the woman could not remarry in the traditional community. Katz (ibid, pp. 70-71) cites Otzar HaGeonim, VII, pp. 34-37, concerning their ruling that a widow did not have to submit to the ceremony of chalitzah with her apostate brother-in-law. In another case, some of the Geonim (Otzar HaGeonim, IX, pp. 28-35) and Rabbenu Gershom (Teshuvot Rabbenu Gershom # 58) ruled that an apostate was no longer eligible to inherit from his Jewish relatives’ estate. Teshuvot Rashi #173. “It was in this connexion that Rashi quoted the maxim `although he has sinned he remains a Jew,’ which has, since then, become a standard ruling in connexion with the definition of the status of the apostate. In its original talmudic context this sentence appears in an aggadic setting only, and not in relation to apostasy. By using it in this striking manner, Rashi ensured the almost uncontested adoption of his definition. Behind this clear-cut statement lies an emphasis on the unchangeable character of the Jew, an emphasis that would contest any possible justification for obliterating Judaism by baptism” (Katz, ibid, p. 71). Teshuvot Rashi # 173. See for example: BT. Chullin 4b-5b; Sifra 2.2 (Finkelstein ed., vol. II, pp. 20-21); Lev. R. 2.9; Yad, Hilkhot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot, 3.4; SA, YD, 53.4 and OC 215.2. Tosefta, Berakhot III.25; see also Gedalia Alon, The Jews in Their Land, ed. Gershon Levi (Harvard Univ. Press, 1989), pp. 288 ff. 11 Rabbi Yaakov Weil, She’elot uTeshuvot: Dinim v’halakhot #57; R. Moshe Schick, Teshuvot Maharam Schick, Yoreh De’ah, #231, cited by R. Solomon B. Freehof, The Responsa Literature (New York: Ktav, 1973), p. 134. Deuteronomy 13:13-19. She’elot uTeshuvot Mahari miBruna, #35; see R. Maurice Lamm in Jewish Tradition and the Nontraditional Jew, ed. J.J. Schachter, Northvale, NJ, 1992, pp. 169-170. Resolution of the C.C.A.R., see its Yearbook XCIII (1983), p.160, and the interpretation of the decision inRabbi’s Manual (1988), pp.225-227 (W. Gunther Plaut) and the detailed discussion in Contemporary American Reform Responsa, #38, pp. 61-68 (Walter Jacob). The ruling, which is known as the “Brother Daniel case,” was made by the Israeli Supreme Court: 72/62, PD 16:2428-55. Cf. Encyclopaedia Judaica, sub “Apostate.” See the Reform responsa on apostasy listed in the first footnote above. In the words of R. Walter Jacob, Contemporary American Reform Responsa # 68, “such individuals should not be accorded membership in the congregation or treated in any way which makes them appear as if they were affiliated with the Jewish community … We certainly do not want these individuals to speak for Judaism in any public forum.” This follows the CCAR’s Responsa Committee’s 1983 teshuvah, “Status of a `Completed Jew’ in the Jewish Community,” Contemporary American Reform Responsa #68. Thus, for the Committee, even “Messianic Jews” or the “Jews for Jesus” (who, because of their proclivity for proselytization, must certainly be classified as mumarim lehakhis (“provoking apostates”), are not to be excluded from attending services or classes “for we always hold the hope that they will return to Judaism and disassociate themselves from Christianity.”
If needed, please consult Abbreviations used in CCAR Responsa.
CARR 104-105
CCAR RESPONSA
Contemporary American Reform Responsa
64. Return to Judaism of an
Apostate
QUESTION: An elderly man, both of whose parents were
Jewish and who had no Jewish education, married a non-Jew early in life and was baptized.
Later in his life he became a member of the Congregational Church, and eventually he was even
ordained as a minister of the United Church of Christ. He served in several pulpits. Eventually he
became disillusioned with Christianity and dropped his ministerial status. He is now actively
studying Judaism. Is anything required aside from haverut for readmission to Judaism?
What ceremony and what words should actually be used? (Rabbi N. Hirsch, Seattle,
WA).ANSWER: The question of someone returning to Judaism after leaving it goes
back to Talmudic times where there is a discussion of this matter (Bekh. 31a; A. Z. 7a). The
entire matter, however, became crucial in the Middle Ages. There we deal with two kinds of
apostates who have returned to Judaism. The first are those who are forced to convert
individually or as a community. This occurred from time to time in virtually all the countries of
Europe, especially in Spain which led to the problems of the Marranos. The second instance
included those who converted under little duress or who remained Marranos for a longer period
of time when it was quite possible to escape that status. In the first instances, it is
clear that such individuals were readmitted to the Jewish community (and we must remember
that this was a corporate community not merely a congregation) without any action on their part
except their desire to become formally part of the Jewish community once more. No ritual bath
or anything else was considered necessary. This was the law as finally stated in the Shulhan
Arukh (Moses Isserles to Shulhan Arukh Yoreh Deah 268.12; Abraham Gombiner,
Magen Avraham to Shulhan Aruch Orah Hayim 326), based upon a verse in
Jeremiah (3.22) – “Return you recalcitrant children.” This Biblical statement, as well as various
Talmudic statements similar to it, were cited by Elijah Gaon of Vilna in his discussion of the
above mentioned passages of the Shulhan Aruch. There was a general feeling
that one should embarrass such people as little as possible and make it easy for them to return
to the Jewish community. So Rabenu Gershom, who lived in the Rhineland in the eleventh
century, felt that one should simply admit such individuals and not in any way remind them of
their previous apostasy (Mahzor Vitry, pp. 96 ff). Solomon ben Simon Duran
(Responsa #89) also felt that no ritual bath or any other act was required. These thoughts
have also been followed by Joseph Caro in his Bet Josef (to Tur Yoreh Deah
268). However, in instances where the apostasy was not under duress, and where the
apostate may have caused considerable trouble to the community, then it was considered
advisory to demand a ritual bath (Moses Isserles to Shulhan Aruch Yoreh Deah 268.12).
This entire ceremony, as well as a promise to become an observant Jew, had to be made before
three witnesses (Joseph Ibn Habib to Alfasi Yeb., Chap. 4). Examples of this more
demanding point of view may be found in Zimmel’s Die Marranen in der rabbinischen
Literatur. In this instance we are dealing with an individual who has been a leader
in another religious group and, therefore, may be looked upon by some in the community in a
different fashion than an ordinary apostate. We should require more of him. Certainly a rather
specifically worded statement of haverut made before three witnesses would be in order.
The statement should be worded in a manner appropriate for this individual.March 1983
If needed, please consult Abbreviations used in CCAR Responsa.
CARR 161
CCAR RESPONSA
Contemporary American Reform Responsa
100. Burial of an Apostate
QUESTION: The
following tragic situation has presented itself to me. A woman was murdered by her husband who
then in turn shot himself. There is also a possibility of a suicide pact on which they had agreed.
This was a second marriage; both parties were Jewish, however the wife converted to
Christianity two years ago. The children by a former marriage have also converted. The husband
will be buried in another city; the children (who are Christian) would like a minister to officiate at
the funeral but would like the burial to take place in a Jewish cemetery with a rabbi officiating. Is
this permissible? (Rabbi S. Akselrad, Columbus, OH)
ANSWER: This tragic
situation raises a number of questions, however the main issue is whether we consider this
woman to be Jewish or not. When an apostate has died, she has always been given the benefit
of doubt as it was felt that on her deathbed she may have repented and reverted to Judaism.
Although such individuals were considered sinners while alive, they nevertheless were be
considered to be Jews (San. 44a). We bury sinners (Semahot II; San. 47a; Yad Hil. Avel
1.10; Tur Yoreh Deah 334; Shulhan Arukh Yoreh Deah 333.3 ff), but do not
accord the honors of the dead to them. There has been some disagreement about the nature of
such honors. We would not provide shrouds, stand in line at the cemetery to console the
mourners, or have a mourning period.
In this instance as the surviving family
members are Christian the ritual at the cemetery should be very simple. The woman may,
however, be buried in a Jewish cemetery.
January 1987
If needed, please consult Abbreviations used in CCAR Responsa.