CCAR RESPONSA COMMITTEE
5775.2
St. Valentine’s Day and Other “Secular” Holidays
Sh’elah.
Is it acceptable for Jews to participate in the customs and celebrations of St. Valentine’s Day and other non-Jewish holidays that are currently regarded as “secular” but that originated as religious observances? (Rabbi David Vaisberg, New York, NY)
T’shuvah.
The quick and easy way to answer our sh’elah would be to say: “Go and see what the people are doing,” i.e., let the minhag, the widespread custom, indicate the correct standard of practice.[1] In this case, we would discover that Jews in our communities take full part in the activities of such non-Jewish holidays as St. Valentine’s Day, Halloween, Thanksgiving, New Year’s, and Mardi Gras, and we would therefore conclude that the answer to our sh’elah is “yes.” But it is the task of rabbis not simply to accept the existence of a custom as a fait accompli but, at times, to submit that custom to careful Judaic scrutiny. Even if our people participate in these non-Jewish holidays, we should inquire as to whether our sources raise any objections to that participation. We should ask, as well, as to the line that we must draw between those non-Jewish holidays that are acceptable to us and those which we feel Jews ought not to observe.
1. The Prohibition of Ḥukot Hagoyim. This most obvious potential objection to Jews’ participation in non-Jewish holidays is rooted in the Biblical injunction (Leviticus 18:3) uv’ḥukoteihem lo teleichu, “you shall not follow their laws.” While the verse refers explicitly to the “laws” of the Egyptians and the Canaanites, the Rabbis interpret it as a prohibition against the imitation and adoption of the customs of all Gentiles.[2] Jews realized early on that the forbidden “laws” could not encompass every existing behavior of the surrounding society, since it was impossible not to adopt at least some of those behaviors. As the Midrash explains, the verse cannot mean that we are forbidden to build buildings and to engage in agriculture merely because the Gentiles do the same! Rather, the prohibition applies only to the sorts of religious[3] and social practices (nimusot)[4] that distinguish one culture from another.[5] As Maimonides codifies the rule:[6]
We are not to follow the laws of the Gentiles[7] or seek to resemble them in their manner of dress, haircut, and the like… Rather, the Jew should remain separate from them, recognizable (as a Jew) by his manner of dress and by his other deeds, just as he is recognizable by his philosophy and his beliefs.
Over time, halakhah came to permit significant exceptions to the prohibition of ḥukot hagoyim. An early example is the Tanaitic statement that the rule does not apply to those who are k’rovim l’malchut, Jews who are “close to the government,” who must deal constantly with the authorities and who therefore must follow the latter’s expectations of appropriate grooming and dress.[8] More to the point here, despite the prohibition medieval Jewish communities adopted any number of the cultural practices of their neighbors – even some that were specifically religious in nature – and adapted them to their own needs. If some rabbis sought to protest against such borrowing, others were supportive. Addressing the custom in one community for mourners to visit the cemetery every morning during the seven days following the funeral, the eminent 14th-century posek R. Yitzḥak bar Sheshet urged his correspondent not to interfere with the practice, even though the Jews had apparently learned it from their Muslim neighbors. If we wish to forbid the custom for that reason, he wrote, “we might as well prohibit the eulogy, since the Gentiles, too, eulogize their dead.”[9] R. Yosef Colon (Maharik; 15th-century Italy) permitted Jewish physicians to don the distinctive robes worn by their Gentile colleagues. The prohibition against adopting “Gentile laws,” he argued, covers only two categories of “laws”: 1) customs that offend the rules of modest behavior; and 2) cultural practices that are unique to the Gentiles and serve no other rational and acceptable purpose (taam), so that the Jew would adopt them only because they wish to imitate the non-Jewish culture.[10] Maharik’s approach, though not accepted by all,[11] was codified by R. Moshe Isserles in the Shulchan Aruch[12] and is followed by many in the halakhic community today. Thus, leading Israeli Orthodox authorities have approved the sounding of a siren on Yom HaZikaron and Yom HaShoah, even though this custom was “borrowed” from the memorial practices of other nations, because it serves the acceptable purpose of rendering honor to the dead.[13]
2. “Secular” Versus “Religious” Celebrations. Our Reform Jewish approach to Leviticus 18:3 is based upon the conviction that the prohibition of ḥukot hagoyim does not apply to aspects of our contemporary surrounding culture that we experience as secular. Since the term “secular” is a broad one, difficult at times to define with precision, we will explain what we mean in detail.
First, in the negative sense, that which is secular is “non-religious” or, perhaps better, “non-sectarian” in nature. This helps us determine just how far we may go in adopting non-Jewish modes of expression to serve our own specifically religious needs. For example, it is well known that the style of our public worship – the architecture of our prayer spaces, our modes of liturgical music, our approaches to the leadership of communal prayer – are heavily influenced and have been so throughout history by the styles we have encountered in the surrounding culture. With respect to the content of our public worship, however, we have drawn the line. Thus, this Committee has cautioned against borrowing non-Jewish prayers and hymns, both because they are identified with other religions and because our own Jewish liturgical tradition is sufficiently rich to afford us abundant resources for worship.[14] Since we regard it a mitzvah to preserve the distinctly Jewish elements of our identity, particularly as this touches upon our religious practice, inappropriate borrowing from other religions runs afoul of the prohibition against the imitation of non-Jewish customs and ceremonies.
Second, in the positive sense, that which is secular in our culture is that which all citizens of the community can share in common and in which they can participate on an equal footing with all their fellow citizens. To put this in traditional Jewish terminology, in a liberal democracy all of us should be considered k’rovim l’malckhut, for we are the malchut; the government and the culture belong to us, they are of us, and we do not regard them as alien entities. Secular customs, as the common space in which all of us can meet, serve the “rational and acceptable purpose” (to use Maharik’s terminology) of uniting the members of a disparate and multicultural society into a common bond.
For these reasons, we have no objections to Jews’ participation in national patriotic holidays. These special days are secular in both the senses we have described: they are non-religious, and they speak equally to all the citizens of the state. True, these holidays are major events in the calendar of what has been called the “civil religion,” the set of beliefs, texts, rites, and ceremonies by which the citizens express their collective national identity.[15] The civil religion, one could argue, is a religion, a sort of non-sectarian “faith” (the “cult of the nation,” of “God and country”) and is therefore not secular at all. We, however, resist this conclusion; as we have written elsewhere, participation by Jews in their nation’s civil religion “is a proper expression of their full participation in the life of the general community.”[16] Although patriotism can be and all too often has been twisted into the form of a quasi-religion,[17] we see national holidays as occasions that, in Maharik’s words serve the “rational and acceptable purpose” of uniting the citizens of the state and of reminding them of their social and ethical duties toward each other. They are secular observances precisely because they belong to us all, and for that reason they cannot be dismissed as ḥukot hagoyim.
For these reasons, too, we see no reason why Jews should be prohibited from participating in holidays we deal with here: Valentine’s Day, Halloween, Thanksgiving, New Year’s, Mardi Gras. Although these holidays originate in Christian practice,[18] they are now secular observances; neither we nor the vast majority of our fellow citizens perceive them as religious festivals. They are in this regard easily distinguishable from Christmas, Easter, and other obviously religious holidays which it is clearly inappropriate for Jews to celebrate.[19] And here is where we depart from the stance taken by some of our Orthodox colleagues. For example, Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, the leading American Orthodox halakhic authority of the twentieth century, has famously ruled that Jews are forbidden to take part in the festivities” (שמחות) and “feasting (סעודות) of American Thanksgiving, not, to be sure, because he thinks of Thanksgiving as a religious holiday – he doesn’t – but because he defines it as the sort of “Gentile custom” that Leviticus 18:3 forbids Jews to observe.[20] The wording of his argument suggests that Rabbi Feinstein does not recognize the existence of the cultural realm that we have defined as “secular.” We, by contrast, do recognize the existence of the secular; Thanksgiving and these other holidays pertain to the culture that we share with all others in the society and in which we participate as full and equal members. As such, they are not “Gentile” festivals, and we would not prohibit them on that basis.
3. Secular vs. Religious Holidays. We have stated that secular non-Jewish holidays are “easily distinguishable” from “Christmas, Easter, and other obviously religious holidays.” An obvious objection to this is the claim that for many non-Jews in our society these holidays have become non-religious celebrations, so that by the logic of this t’shuvah Jews should be permitted to participate in their observance. We acknowledge that the line separating “religious” from “secular” is not a hard and fast one. As the examples of St. Valentine’s Day and Halloween demonstrate, and as the Rabbis of the Talmud were aware, holidays with religious origins can lose their religious connotations over time.[21] But other holidays are and remain essentially religious in nature. By this we do not mean that everyone in the non-Jewish population celebrates them as religious festivals but rather that they retain their central role in the doctrine and practice of non-Jewish faiths. It is our task to distinguish between these two categories. That requires a careful act of judgment, and judgments, of course, can be controversial. Still, we fill quite confident in saying that, despite all the tinsel and reindeer and Santa Claus and bunny-and-egg displays, Christmas and Easter retain a status in Christian thought and practice that is quite different from that enjoyed by Halloween and St. Valentine’s Day. The religious meaning of those days is still central in the eyes of many of our Christian neighbors, who would rightly feel insulted were we to declare those days – wrongly – to be “secular” observances.
4. A Final Note. We do find it sadly ironic that we are talking about Jews taking part in secular non-Jewish holidays while the level of our community’s observance of many of our own holidays leaves much to be desired. We state therefore for the record: there is a difference between permission and encouragement. Jews are certainly permitted to participate in secular and national holidays, but they ought as well to take part in the full range of observances that mark our Jewish calendar. Our communities should never ignore the task of strengthening the specifically Jewish nature of our Reform Jewish life.
Conclusion. It is permissible for Jews to take part in the celebration of St. Valentine’s Day and other secular holidays, even if these originated in other religious traditions. As part of the common culture in which we all participate, these days are not to be thought of us “alien” and “foreign” – much less “Christian” – so as to fall under the terms of Leviticus 18:3.
NOTES
1. The Talmudic phrase is פוק חזי מאי עמא דבר, which occurs in B. B’rachot 45a and B. Eruvin 14b as the answer to the question: What is the halachah?
2. And not only those of the Egyptians and the Canaanites to whom the verse explicitly refers; Sifra, Aḥarei Mot, parashah 9, ch. 12.
3. This insight flows from the word that the verse uses for “law” – ḥok, חוק- which the Rabbis tend to interpret or translate as ritual obligations (e.g., rules covering forbidden foods, manner of dress, and the Temple service) that cannot be derived by human reason; they are obligatory solely because God has enjoined them upon Israel. By contrast, an obligation that is derivable through human reason is indicated by the word משפט, mishpat. See Rashi to Lev. 18:4.
4. Sifra, Aḥarei Mot, parashah 9, ch. 13, and see Onkelos and Rashi to Lev. 18:3. The word nimusot is the Rabbinic Hebrew translation of the Greek nomos.
5. This definition allows for some useful distinctions. See, for example, B. Avodah Zarah 11a: when a king of Israel dies, it is permissible as part of the funeral ritual to burn his bed and his personal property, even though Gentiles mourn their kings in the same way. Why? The burning is not a “law” (ḥukah), the sort of religious practice we are not permitted to copy, but simply a sign of respect.
6. Yad, Hil. Avodat Kochavim 11:1. See also Rambam’s Sefer Hamitzvot, negative commandment no. 30.
7. We adopt the reading הגוים, “Gentiles,” preserved in the edition of the Mishneh Torah edited by R. Yosef Kafiḥ (Jerusalem, 1983), in place of the printed version’s העובדי כוכבים, “idolaters.” Kafiḥ based his edition upon Yemenite manuscripts widely considered to be more faithful to Rambam’s original text than is the printed version.
8. B. Bava Kama 83a; Yad, Hil. Avodah Zarah 11:3.
9. Resp. Rivash, no. 158.
10. Resp. Maharik, no. 88. The wearing of a uniform identifying one as a physician is clearly a rational and purposeful act, and it is certainly not an immodest one.
11. See R. Eliyahu, the Gaon of Vilna, Bi-ur HaGra, Yoreh De-ah 178, no. 7.
12. Isserles, Shulchan Aruch Yoreh De-ah 178:1. See also R. Mordechai Yaffe, L’vush, Yoreh De-ah 178:1.
13. R. Hayyim David Halevy, Resp. Aseh L’cha Rav 1:44 and 4:4; R. Zvi Y’hudah Kook, T’ḥumin 3 (1982), p. 388; R. Y’hudah Henkin, T’ḥumin 4 (1983), pp. 125-129.
14. See “The Lord’s Prayer,” Contemporary American Reform Responsa (CARR; New York, CCAR, 1987), no. 171, pp. 256-257, http://ccarnet.org/responsa/carr-256-257, and “Amazing Grace,” Teshuvot for the Nineties (TFN; New York, CCAR, 1997), no. 5752.11, pp. 21-22, http://ccarnet.org/responsa/ccarj-fall-1992-65-66-tfn-no-5752-11-21-22.
15. Although the term “civil religion” originates with Jean-Jacques Rousseau (The Social Contract, chapter 8, book 4), the concept as presently understood by sociologists traces back to a famous article by Robert Bellah, “Civil Religion in America,” Daedalus 96:1 (1967), pp. 1-21, http://www.robertbellah.com/articles_5.htm (accessed March 27, 2015). Bellah speaks to the experience of the United States, and it is controversial whether his observations extend past its borders; see, for example, Andrew E. Kim, “The Absence of Pan-Canadian Civil Religion: Plurality, Duality, and Conflict in Symbols of Canadian Culture,” Sociology of Religion 54 (1993), pp. 257-275, and John von Heyking, “The Persistence of Civil Religion in Modern Canada,” Cardus, October 21, 2010 http://www.cardus.ca/policy/article/2273 (accessed March 27, 2015).
16. CCAR Responsum no. 5751.3, “Blessing the Fleet,” TFN, pp. 159-164, http://ccarnet.org/responsa/tfn-no-5751-3-159-164 .
17. We must be vigilant to maintain the lines that distinguish religion from patriotism; otherwise, religion will inevitably be drafted into the service of the cult of state power. As we have written elsewhere: “We are properly suspicious of rhetoric equating ‘God and King’ or ‘God and Country’ While… such language may not be, strictly speaking, a case of idolatry, it connotes for many of us today some of the most disturbing historical tendencies of our time: chauvinism, racism, and ethnic intolerance. If it is true that God alone is worthy of our religious worship, we ought to avoid language which, rightly or wrongly, suggests otherwise”; TFN, no. 5753.8, “Flags on the Bimah,” p. 31, http://ccarnet.org/responsa/tfn-no-5753-8-29-32 .
18. We will not enter the controversy over the source of Halloween: did it originate as a Celtic and probably pagan festival that was subsequently adapted into the Christian calendar, or was it a Christian festival to begin with? Suffice it to say that in its present form, as “the eve of All Hallows’ / All Saints Day,” its Christian associations are obvious.
19. See below, section 3. We leave aside here the often vexing question of whether and to what extent Jews may take part in the apparently non-religious aspects of Christmas and Easter: office parties, gift exchanges, watching parades, etc. Clearly, as members of a religious minority that does not seal itself off from its environment, we will participate in at least some of these. When we say that it is “inappropriate” for Jews to celebrate these days, we have in mind the introduction of holiday observances, decorations and the like into our own homes. We do not think it unreasonable to insist that the Jewish home be a “Christmas-free zone” during the holiday season.
20. Resp. Ig’rot Moshe, Oraḥ Ḥayim 5:20 (1981), section 6.
21. See B. Avodah Zarah 11b: the Babylonian sage Rav Y’hudah permits his students to engage in commerce with pagans on one of the latter’s festival days. Although this contradicts the prohibition set forth in M. Avodah Zarah 1:1, Rav Y’hudah permits the activity on the grounds that the festival in question is not permanently fixed on the calendar and is therefore not a truly serious pagan observance (see Rashi, Avodah Zarah 11b, s.v. d’la k’vi-a).